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Abstract 
Using narrative research study founded in social constructionism, I explored the 
lived experiences of thirty Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, to 
discover how they experienced the war on terror. Ten participants were individually 
interviewed and their stories, personal experiences, perceptions, and voices have been 
presented in this study. I also facilitated a focus group of twenty Afghan NGO directors, 
and their views are echoed in the study. The participants represented a diversity of 
different humanitarian service specialties that cater to Afghan individuals, communities, 
and government agencies in areas such as education, human rights and good governance, 
food and shelter, to building bridges and infrastructural development. Based on a critical 
review of existing literature, the interviews addressed significant issues that affect 
humanitarian aid workers in complex political emergencies. I investigated the 
sociocultural contexts and structural conditions that enable and inform the personal 
narratives. There were six main themes that emerged from the participants’ narratives and 
each main theme had an average of three sub-themes. The resulting themes were: 
Security/Insecurity; Funding; Trust; Abandonment; Achievement; and Interventionism. 
From the analysis of the storied narratives of thirty Afghan humanitarian aid 
workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, this study was able to create better understanding of how 
conditions from the war on terror create high-risk environments that expose humanitarian 
aid workers to kidnappings and violent attacks. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Topic Overview 
In 1998, a radical group known as the World Islamic Council co-authored a fatwa, 
declaring an ideology-based statement of terrorism translated into action on September 
11, 2001. The fatwa called for the “killing of Americans and their allies—civilians and 
military” and to “launch the raid in Satan’s U.S. troops and Devil’s supporters allying 
with them” (Bodansky, 2001, pp. 226-227). 
Terrorism has different meanings for some people—for many it is an offensive 
act, for others it is “an activity assigned by God,” for some “a distinctive act of 
maintaining power pride,” for many “a justified action against oppression,” still for others 
“an attack on the peace and security,” and for some “a quest for identity” (Lazare, 2002, 
pp. 216-219). 
The act of terrorism that struck New York City, Arlington, Virginia, and 
Shanksville, Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001 has significantly and, many believe, 
has permanently affected the way Americans view themselves and the rest of the world. 
Since the attack of September 11, 2001, there have been several changes in the daily lives 
of ordinary Americans, largely due to many changes in the U.S. government’s domestic 
and foreign policies. Many of these changes have continued to affect aspects of American 
culture, both internal and external politics, and the media. 
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America, the United Nations 
Security Council issued Resolution 1368 condemning the terrorist attacks, and called for 
other nations to “work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers 
and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and stressed that those responsible for aiding, 
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supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of these attacks will 
be held accountable” (as cited in Acharya, 2009, p. 667). Acharya posits that this attack 
created an opportunity for the UN Security Council to issue a clearer definition of 
terrorism as “an act of war,” instead the council chose to define terrorism as “a crime for 
which the perpetrator of such acts must be brought to justice” (2009, p. 667). Acharya 
argues that the war on terror is a “convenient and expedient” way for “powerful states to 
use against another state in self-defense” (2009, p. 670). 
On September 20, 2001, former U.S. President George W. Bush addressed the 
Joint Session of Congress, declaring the war on terror:  
We will direct every resource at our command -- every means of diplomacy, 
every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial 
influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the destruction and to the 
defeat of the global terror network.… We will starve terrorists of funding, turn 
them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge 
or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. 
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, 
or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to 
harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile 
regime. (Bush, 2001, para. 28, 30)  
The United States and NATO allies invaded Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. 
Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has been involved in two wars and several other conflicts 
as well as a lot of covert anti-terrorist activities around the world in pursuit of Al-Qaeda 
and other affiliated terrorist groups. The new Bush doctrine created a new world order 
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that has given rise to a new phenomenon in complex political emergencies, and created 
conditions that cause risks and insecurities for humanitarian aid workers in such insecure 
environments. In this study, I used narrative analysis of face-to-face interviews and focus 
group discussion to investigate the effects of the war on terror on Afghan humanitarian 
aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan; to explore how they perceived and ascribed meaning 
to their lived experiences of the war on terror, their roles with different stakeholders in 
the conflict, and the conditions that exposed them to risks of insecurities; and to better 
understand the effects of military conflicts in the new post 9/11 world.   
The Present Study 
This study was focused on understanding how Afghan humanitarian aid workers 
experienced the war on terror through the narrative analysis of their stories from face-to-
face interviews of ten Afghan humanitarian aid workers and a focus group discussion 
panel of twenty Afghan aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. Also, I set out to discover the 
effects of the war on terror on Afghan humanitarian aid workers, and how they ascribed 
meaning to the risks and challenges from the war on terror in the delivery of 
humanitarian aid. Consequently, one of my main objectives of this study was to give 
voice to Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul—men and women who risk their 
lives in very insecure environments every day, and often under pressure to align and 
interact with different groups in the conflict, which exposed them to risks of danger and 
insecurities. This study helps to bring their storied narratives to the forefront and lead to 
real, effective change that will give rise to constructive processes to better protect 
humanitarian aid workers in insecure environments. Lastly, this study sought to develop 
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better understanding of Afghan readiness and the potential consequences of the U.S. and 
NATO drawdown of military forces from Afghanistan at the end of 2014. 
As Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Wardak, Zaman, and Taylor (2008) posit, the NGOs 
are now under pressure from the “communities to deliver without jeopardizing security”; 
they are under pressure from the host government to “implement national programmes”; 
under pressure from the “politician-donors and NATO representatives pressuring them to 
align with hearts and minds’ strategies”; and pressured by “criminal groups and armed 
opposition groups (AOGs) who threaten their safety” (2008, p. 4). 
From the review of existing literature, research findings point to an alarming 
increase in violence against humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan since 2002. 
Stoddard, Harmer, & DiDomenico, (2009) assert that criminal forces are in collusion 
with the political elites and conclude that such conditions in complex political 
emergencies like Afghanistan, create limited alternatives for humanitarian aid workers. In 
light of these and emerging themes from the literature reviews, I developed the following 
research questions to facilitate the face-to-face interview discussions and the focus group 
dialogue with humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan: What meaning do Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul ascribe to the war on terror in Afghanistan? What 
roles expose Afghan humanitarian aid workers to insecurities as a result of their 
interactions in the war on terror? How do Afghan aid workers in Afghanistan perceive 
and describe their relationships with local Afghan communities? How do Afghan aid 
workers perceive and assess Afghan readiness for the withdrawal of U.S. and foreign 
troops in 2014? How do Afghan aid workers perceive and describe their interactions with 
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the international communities, the U.S. military forces, and the international military 
forces in Afghanistan? 
With the escalation of uncertainties in many parts of the third world and 
developing nations, the war on terror has become the new framework for international 
conflicts. Since the start of the war on terror, the rise of civil unrest in many parts of the 
Middle East and Africa has been witnessed—the overthrow of Sadam Hussein in Iraq, the 
uprisings in Egypt and Libya, conflicts in North and South Sudan, Somalia, and the civil 
war in Syria. All of these conflicts allude to some form of terrorism, real or imagined. 
This narrative study of the experiences of Afghan humanitarian aid workers reveals that 
Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul were exposed to great risks of danger as a 
result of their humanitarian and civil society roles in an insecure environment “where 
there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from an internal or external 
conflict” (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1999, p. 
6). As a student of conflict resolution, I believe that this research study will enable 
scholars of conflict studies to begin to ask the right questions on the indirect costs and 
consequences of the war on terror, the shrinking humanitarian space, and the rise in 
security threats to men and women who risk their lives every day to provide desperately 
needed help and services to vulnerable children, women, and the old. Through their 
storied narratives, voice is given to many who had become voiceless. 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Narrative research methodology advanced by Riessman (1990a, 1990b, 1993, and 
2000) was used as the theoretical framework for this research study of the lived 
experiences of Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul and how they ascribe meaning 
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to their experiences. Narrative research is receptive to interviewees’ ways and manner of 
experiencing their world, as opposed to developing theories for generalizations or 
predicting phenomena (Crist & Tanner, 2003). It is holistic and inductive. Narrative 
analysis provided me with the techniques to investigate the intricacies and the complex 
nature of my participants’ lived experiences—grounded in their individuality, their social 
interactions, and cultural density. 
A key subtext of this research study was to echo the voices of Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers—men and women who are pressured into high risk roles in 
their day to day interactions with different groups in the war on terror as they seek to 
provide humanitarian aid to very deprived beneficiaries and communities in insecure and 
violent environments. To this end, it was essential that their voices and points of view 
drive this study. Two other theoretical viewpoints were used to form this study: first by 
building foundational framework on social constructionism, and secondly by inductively 
advancing a fundamental theoretical model, grounded in the basic human needs theory 
(Burton, 1972, 1990, 1997).  
Social constructionism has significant theoretical influences that guide and inform 
the basic human needs theory. Social constructionism theory is based on the idea that 
reality is a construct created through human activities and interactions as individuals seek 
to create meaning and understanding of their world by developing “subjective meanings 
of their experiences” (Creswell, 2007, p. 20). This process of meaning making is often 
negotiated through interactions with other individuals across historical, social, and 
cultural norms (Andrews, 2012; Creswell, 2007; Prawat & Floden, 1994). Social 
constructionism has a focus on what is considered prevailing narratives or objective truth, 
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which is formed through social interactions between individuals in society, and not 
discovered from nature or based on ontological fact. Therefore, social constructionism 
argues that prevailing narratives are not created without bias and cannot exist without 
social interaction. The narratives become so dominant that they are perceived to be the 
norm with cultural and historical realities as individuals in society accept them to be the 
normal and customary truth (Espin & Gawelek, 1992). Therefore, my participants’ 
dominant narratives and ascribed meanings were negotiated and formed through 
interactions grounded in the social, historical, cultural, and political context of Kabul, 
Afghanistan. To better understand how the context (Kabul, Afghanistan) impacts on the 
dominant narratives, I borrowed a contextual framework from Lawrence-Lightfoot and 
Davis’s The Art and Science of Portraiture (1997) for setting up the physical location of 
my study, giving authenticity to the context from which my participants’ storied 
narratives and meaning emanate. Portraitists view human experiences as framed and 
shaped by the setting such that the conditions and the context work together to shape the 
experiences of individuals (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997). According to Lawrence-
Lightfoot and Davis, “The context is not only a frame for the action, it is also a rich 
resource for the researcher’s interpretations of the actor’s thoughts, feelings, and 
behavior” (1997, p. 59), and allows the reader to conceive vivid contextual setting of my 
participants’ environment that shaped their dominant narratives. I have used context in 
this research to place my participants and their storied narratives in their time and space 
to better understand the meanings they ascribe to their experiences. I began by describing 
the physicality of my participants’ environment (Kabul) and then revealed the historical 
background or “the origins and evolutions of the organization and the values that shape 
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its structure and purpose” (1997, p. 52). This idea of meaning making illuminates the 
core focus of social constructionism that dominant narratives are formed in contexts of 
historical, social, and cultural norms as individuals navigate and interact with each other 
(Creswell, 2007). 
I used Burton’s human needs model (1972, 1990, 1997) to critically understand 
the structural conditions in my participants’ contextual environment that impact and 
shape their experiences and the meanings they ascribe to these experiences. Burton’s 
model postulates that innate human needs are at the core of most conflicts, and they must 
be addressed and satisfied if society is to find peaceful resolution satisfactory to all the 
parties (1972). In this research study, I developed an analytic understanding of how 
Afghan humanitarian aid workers have experienced the war on terror from the face-to-
face interview conversations and focus group discussions with Afghan aid workers, and 
attended to their storied narratives to affirm that I fully captured their experiences in 
order to echo and give voice to their viewpoint.  
In the existing literature, there are several dominant narratives about Kabul, 
Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan that may not be situated in the social context 
of the nation from which the violent attacks of September 11, 2001 were launched. The 
prevailing portrait speaks to terrorism, insurgency, and jihadist doctrines; however, the 
dominant narratives from my participants contradict these notions. To give meaning and 
better understand these conflicting narratives, I use Burton’s basic human needs model 
with particular reference to his assertions on terrorism that “[t]he perception we have of 
‘terrorists’ is that of persons who are abnormal and disturbed and who need to be 
removed from society” (1997, p. 27). Rather he argues that the appropriate policy “must 
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be to uproot the causes of terrorism by putting an end to oppression of classes, nations, 
and ethnic communities” (Rubenstein, 1987, as cited in Burton, 1997, p. 27). 
Method of Inquiry 
In conjunction with the political and historical analysis of existing literature on 
the war on terror and its impact on humanitarian space in complex political emergencies 
since September 11, 2001, I used a qualitative research method, specifically narrative 
inquiry and thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2013), to facilitate my interviews 
and discussions with Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. According 
to Daiute and Lightfoot (2004), 
Narrative [research] is a mode of inquiry based in narrative as a root metaphor, a 
genre, and discourse…narrative analysis relies on themes, mostly drawn from 
literary theory, to explain the vicissitudes in the drama of interpreted lives, 
including time, truth, beauty, character and conflict. Narratives are 
also…culturally developed ways of organizing experience and knowledge. (p. xi)  
As Riessman (2005) purports, “investigators collect many stories and inductively 
create conceptual groupings from the data” and construct a “typology of narratives 
organized by theme” (p. 2). She argues that narratives allow “storytellers a way to re-
imagine life”—that narratives do not accurately depict the past, however, they “forge 
among past, present, and future” (p. 6). Riessman (2000) asserts that narrative inquiry is 
“relevant for the study of disruptive life events…studies of social movements, political 
change, and macro-level phenomena” (p. 3), such as the core tenets of this study, to 
understand how the war on terror has impacted and been “disruptive” to Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. Riessman argues that grounded theory 
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does not portray the stories of participants accurately; instead, it rips apart the data as 
presented by the interviewees, thereby impeding on deeper understanding of participants’ 
perceptions and points of view (1990a). 
Narrative inquiry has allowed me to explore the lived experiences of Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers extensively in the social, cultural, political, and historical 
context of the war on terror. This is in line with the theoretical tenets of social 
constructionism and Burton’s basic human needs model. By contrasting the prevailing 
narratives from existing literature about the war on terror, Afghanistan, and terrorism 
with the storied narratives of Afghan humanitarian aid workers who participated in this 
research study, deep divergences and paradoxes emerged. This density was as a result of 
lived experiences grounded and presented through the narratives of Afghan humanitarian 
aid workers in Kabul. The themes that emerged from the narrative interviews and focus 
group with my participants are not represented in the existing literature, but they are 
important to my participants and became the driving force that compelled this study. 
The meaning and significance that individuals ascribe to their experiences are 
dependent on their own interrelationships with the world, which in itself exists as a result 
of the meaning the individual assigns to it (Valle & King, 1978). According to Clandinin 
and Cornelly (2000), narrative investigation allows the interviewees’ stories to navigate 
the internal and external world across time and space. This process of telling the stories 
gives voice to how the individual constructs meaning from the system of identity, values, 
attitudes, and beliefs—this has relevance and is quite transforming for the interviewee 
and the researcher who together create knowledge (Etherington, 2009).  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This literature review is intended to situate my research study with the framework 
of current body of investigation. It is by no means exhaustive; however, my goal was to 
show the scope of knowledge and points of view that are in existing literature about the 
conflict in Afghanistan—particularly how the war on terror is seen from a humanitarian 
perspective. The literature review is structured around sub-headings that illustrate the 
topic of discussion. 
Complex Political Emergency 
 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) defines Complex Political 
Emergency as: 
A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or 
considerable breakdown of authority resulting from an internal or external conflict 
and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or 
capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country 
programs. (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
1999, p. 6) 
Stoddard et al. (2009), in their study of trends in providing aid in insecure 
environments, note that Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia were the most violent insecure 
contexts for local and international aid workers. At the same time, their study showed that 
most of the attacks were politically motivated. They argue that even though the findings 
point to a declining number of attacks and killings of aid workers from 2.7 victims per 
10,000 to 2.4 from 2006 to 2008, they attribute this decline to better security 
consciousness amongst humanitarian aid workers. However, they assert that the numbers 
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in Afghanistan tell a different story—the attacks on civilian aid workers in Afghanistan 
increased as criminal forces have “colluded with political forces” (2009, p. 4). They 
conclude that aid workers in complex political emergencies have very limited 
alternatives: “It boils down to reducing or withdrawing essential aids from needy 
population, or running intolerable risks to the lives of staff and partners” (p. 10). And 
they concur with humanitarian aid workers who advocate for separation from the military 
and political players, and argue that by maintaining humanitarian principles of neutrality 
and independence, aid workers are able to improve their overall security and maintain the 
trust and good standing they have always enjoyed in the communities that they serve (p. 
10). 
Humanitarian Principles 
Egeland, Hamer, and Stoddard (2011) believe that by actively promoting 
humanitarian principles, aid worker security was significantly improved. Their study 
showed that the “lack of respect for principles was the third-largest contributor to 
insecurity,” while the “lack of experience and cultural awareness” was seen to be the 
number one reason for aid worker insecurity, followed by “incompetence” and “taking 
unnecessary risk” (2011, p. 18). According to the authors, NGOs have conveniently 
“compromised a principled approach in their own conduct by closely aligning with 
political and military activities and actors” (2011, p. 19). They argue that many of the 
alignments were motivated by funding needs. 
According to accounts presented in the Aid Worker Security Report by Stoddard, 
Harmer, and Haver (2011) in their study that interviewed international NGO staff, the 
respondents believed that local and national NGO employees lacked proper training and 
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expertise on conduct and humanitarian principles, and questioned their ability to handle 
difficult and often life threatening situations in complex political environments. Teuten’s 
(2009) address to the NGO Military Contact Group (NMCG) was significant as it echoed 
the 1994 Red Cross Code of Conduct: 
We will never knowingly—or through negligence—allow ourselves, or our 
employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military or 
economically sensitive nature for government or other bodies that may serve 
purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian. (Teuten, 2009, p. 5)  
As noted in the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) policy 
brief (Schirch, 2010), NGOs expressed concern that the use of military capacity to deliver 
aid and nation building assistance will “prematurely deflect attention from Afghanistan’s 
deteriorating security situation and also engage in a range of activities for which others 
are better suited” (p. 1). Comparing NGOs to the military, the report posits that NGOs are 
dedicated to the humanitarian principles of “humanity, impartiality, independence and 
neutrality” (p. 1). The report notes that aid decisions are solely based on need without 
prejudice or regard to political agenda or pressures from donors. Their main focus is to 
provide aid to the people who need it.  
Civil-Military Collaboration 
Azarbaijani-Moghaddam and colleagues (2008) posit that the military and the 
humanitarian aid communities have very divergent interests and objectives in the delivery 
of aid to people in need. They allege that the military is driven by the “Winning Hearts 
and Minds (WHAM) theory” which they (military) perceive as a “charity paradigm” and 
categorize those who need and receive aid as “deserving poor” (2008, p. 7). On the other 
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hand, they claim NGOs have spent several years building understanding and service 
dedicated to eradicating the “handout mentality” and working to bring “ownership, 
involvement, and empowerment” to the Afghan people (p. 7). They argue that the 
military should be cognizant of how their “charitable acts can undermine NGO activities” 
(p. 7). 
Stoddard and associates (2009) affirm the belief that continued involvement with 
state officials and members of the military creates significant security problems for NGO 
employees and agents; however, they note that studies reveal that even NGOs who have 
taken significant measures to protect their employees and remain neutral have not 
completely escaped from these unfortunate attacks and killings of innocent men and 
women. They posit that “aid organizations are being attacked not just because they are 
perceived to be cooperating with Western political actors, but because they are perceived 
as wholly a part of the Western agendas” (2009, p. 6). 
According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) Quarterly Data Report 
(2010), their recommendation was very firm in discouraging NGOs from engagement in 
any form of civil-military coordination, noting that: 
NGO have nothing (sic) to gain and much to lose by interacting with the IMF who 
are only interested in leveraging advantage from your activities. Second, we 
recommend a policy driven engagement with all Afghan parties to the conflict 
where such can be concluded safely and legally. NGO (sic) must develop and 
apply deliberate communication strategies to ensure that all current and future 
powerbrokers understand the purpose, and independence, of your activities. 
(ANSO, 2010, p. 1).  
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According to a report exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations by 
Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al. (2008), one of the key issues from the Winning Hearts and 
Minds program is the frustration from local NGOs—that their input is not sought-out in 
the civil-military debate. They believe that there should be an “Afghanisation” of the 
civil-military process (Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al., 2008, p. 5), and complain that often 
local Afghan NGOs are underfunded unlike the international NGOs. The authors 
compared the struggle between the NGOs and the military with being “engaged in a 
complex dance with shadowy partners whose moves are increasingly unpredictable and 
deadly” (p. 74). They call for a better, more cultural look at human security issues in 
Afghanistan, claiming that the Afghan government is seeking objectives that are likely to 
“jeopardize” humanitarian space (p. 74). 
Several studies and reports have pointed to violent trends and sharp increases in 
attacks, kidnapping, and killings of humanitarian aid workers in complex political 
emergencies such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Sudan (Darfur) since 2003. The number 
of attacks on international NGO staff rose from 48 in 2001 to 143 in 2010, and the 
number of attacks on Local NGO and RCS staff increased from two in 2001 to 45 in 
2010 (Stoddard et al., 2011). As Stoddard et al. (2009) purport, since 2006, attacks on aid 
workers in the field increased by 61% and in the year 2008 alone, over 260 violent 
attacks against humanitarian aid workers were reported, making it the highest year of 
such report in their twelve year study (p. 1). In Afghanistan alone, there were 30 attacks 
on aid workers reported in 2008, 26 in 2009, and 59 in 2010—an increase of 97% 
(Stoddard et al., 2011). 
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Strand (2007) in his article on “Ways to Regain Afghan Trust” posed these 
questions: 
Why have NGOs become military targets and why has their reputation declined 
compared to the situation in the 1980s and 1990s? Why were people not coming 
out to greet us when upon arrival in a village, as they always did in the past? (9, 
11). 
A recommendation was made regarding the desire by Afghans for local 
ownership in their nation building and they applaud NGOs for encouraging Afghans to 
own and become part of building their country, and condemned the PRT for what they 
referred to as “PRT ineptitude in awarding contracts” (Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al., p. 
75). The final recommendation asserts a very strong warning for NGOs for a better 
understanding of the dynamics and nuances of Afghan communities—they warn that 
“growing military presence will not compensate for this”—but a mutual understanding of 
Afghan and international communities and their “realities” (p. 77). The report exploring 
Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations stresses the need for humanitarian 
principles to be “understood and made relevant to Afghan social, cultural and religious 
norms” (p. 77). 
According to Niland (2011), the Afghan people are now experiencing four 
decades of military conflict, “making it one of the most protracted conflicts in recent 
history” (p. 4). She noted that since the beginning of hostilities in 1979, “adequate 
measures to protect civilians” (p. 5) had not been taken. Referencing an ICRC survey 
from 2009, she stated that:  
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almost all Afghans - 96% - have been directly or indirectly affected as a result of 
the immediate or wider consequences of war; nearly half (45%) of those 
interviewed had seen a family member killed and a third (35%) have been 
wounded in fighting. (2011, p. 4) 
According to Niland (2011), data from an Afghan electronic database shows over 40% of 
those killed in 2008 were civilians – of which 39% of the dead were attributed to the 
government and its foreign military allies (p. 5). The numbers from the 2010 Annual 
Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Afghanistan give a similar and 
horrific narrative:  
Between 01 January and 31 December 2010, 5,446 civilian casualties were 
attributed to Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), representing 76 per cent of the 
total number of civilian casualties for the year. AGEs were linked to 2,080 
civilian deaths and 3,366 civilian injuries, (75 per cent and 78 per cent 
respectively of the total number of civilians killed and injured in 2010). IEDs, 
suicide attacks, assassinations and executions, abductions, intimidation and 
harassment were the dominant tactics used by AGEs to wage conflict. These 
tactics appeared aimed at undermining support for the Government of 
Afghanistan and its international military allies, and at spreading terror and fear 
among the civilian population as a means of control. (UNAMA, 2011, p. i) 
Remote Management Strategy 
In Once Removed: Lessons and Challenges in Remote Management of 
Humanitarian Operations for Insecure Areas, Stoddard, Harmer, and Renouf (2010), 
assert that when humanitarian NGOs implement remote management strategies, 
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management is accepting that there is a problem with the core humanitarian principles of 
neutrality, independence, and impartiality. They are no longer able to rely on these 
humanitarian principles that have protected them for many years (2010, p. 7). They 
define remote management strategy as “adaptation to insecurity, and an aberration from 
normal programming practice” (p. 11), and assert that remote strategies are not meant to 
be a permanent or standard situation; however, several international NGOs rely on local 
and national aid workers to maintain their presence and continue their aid activities in 
local communities, while the international NGO staff oversee operations from a safer 
environment. They question the morality and effectiveness of how the remote 
management strategy is implemented, and wonder if the “levels of sophistication and 
quality of programme activities will slip, often dramatically, when an operation ‘goes 
remote’” (p. 8).  
Basic Human Needs Theory 
According to Burton (1997), “past compliance systems led to alienation and anti-
social behaviours” because people would only tolerate so much, and “conform to elite-
sponsored institutions and norms” (p. 19). He postulates that when people are unable to 
meet their basic needs as a result of conditions in the system referred to as structural 
violence (Galtung, 1964), that frustrates and denies individuals their basic human needs. 
The unmet fundamental basic needs “will be pursued in one way or another” (Burton, 
1997, p. 19), and accordingly, these unmet needs would be perceived to be more 
fundamental to their survival than food and shelter (1997). Burton argues that individuals 
deprived and frustrated from attaining their fundamental basic needs are “prepared to go 
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to extreme lengths to defy systems in order to pursue their deeply felt needs, even death 
by suicide bombing or by hunger strikes” (p. 19). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
In this chapter, I provide a step-by-step description of the research study design, 
covering the purpose and justification of the study, research procedure, face-to-face 
interview and focus group discussions, participant recruitment, research question, 
informed consent, transcription, data analysis, data validation, and ethics and reflexivity 
section, which focuses on authenticity, consistency, and faithfulness of my study. 
Qualitative Narrative Research Study 
The primary goal of this study is to better understand the lived experiences of 
Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, and the conditions that give rise 
to perceived insecurities that expose them to risk of violence. I used open-ended, in-depth 
face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions to explore the dominant narratives 
about how Afghan aid workers in Kabul experience the war on terror. Six relevant 
research questions were used to investigate and understand the storied narratives and 
contextual conditions that framed and shaped the dominant narratives that emerged from 
this study. 
With the narrative research method, “practical acts of living are accessed through 
“narrative” (interviews and observations) to reveal meaning” (Crist & Tanner, 2003, p. 
202), with focus on ‘making meaning’ and this process occurred and continued all 
through the investigation instead of beginning after interviews and focus group 
discussions (Gehart, Tarragona, and Bava, 2007). I was able to make meaning through 
co-construction with my participants (2007) by listening attentively, asking follow-up 
questions, and using email communication for clarification (Riessman, 1993, 2008). The 
focus in this narrative analysis was on the cognitive and emotional situations of my 
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participants’ stories (Riessman, 1990a) and also paying particular attention to the context. 
I used a qualitative research method, specifically narrative inquiry and thematic analysis 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2013), to facilitate my interviews and discussions with Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. The process of analysis comprised of 
six phases of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006): familiarization with data, coding, 
searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and writing up my 
findings. 
The representations and boundaries that I chose to structure the narrative section 
of my analysis were strongly influenced by social constructionism theory and Burton’s 
basic human needs model, my disciplinary preferences, and my six research questions 
(Riessman, 2000). Recognizing my theoretical assumptions and predispositions, I used 
daily research journals and field notes that I made after each day of my interviews for 
bracketing and maintaining perspectives, so that the next day, I could listen to my 
participants’ narratives actively. Active listening allowed me to be fully immersed in the 
emotions and attentive to the nuances of my participants’ stories (Creswell, 2007; 
Holstein & Gubrium, 2012).  
The research analysis has cultural (religious), historical, social, and political 
contexts with detailed descriptions of ten face-to-face interviews and a focus group 
discussion with twenty participants, with particular attention to the location of my 
fieldwork (Kabul, Afghanistan) (Polkinghorne, 1995). My goal was to provide “a 
palpable picture that allows the reader to see, feel, smell, and touch the scene” 
(Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997, p. 59). I borrowed a contextual framework from The 
Art and Science of Portraiture (Lawrence-Lightfoot & Davis, 1997), so as to give 
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authenticity to the context from which my participants’ storied narratives and meanings 
emanated. 
As part of reflexivity in qualitative research, I would like to acknowledge my 
beliefs and feelings regarding this research study. The research topic, the research design, 
the research objectives, and the research questions were developed by me, and I am quite 
cognizant of how my personal biases may have affected my participants in this research 
study. Even though I may not share much in common with my participants, we still share 
our common humanity. I am of Nigerian heritage from the Christian South. My political 
and religious ideologies are quite liberal. I do not share a lot with Islamic militancy; 
however, having grown up in post-colonial Africa and having lived in the U.S. for over 
30 years as a minority class, I understand and sympathize with structural violence that 
denies individuals their basic human needs of identity, self-worth, and equal protection 
under the law (security). To that extent, I do share some solidarity with the people of 
Afghanistan and their struggle for national identity. Unlike most developing countries, I 
found during my earlier research that Afghanistan had many indigenously owned NGOs, 
which are referred to as National NGOs or Local NGOs. I believe that this was the 
beginning of my curiosity and the desire to investigate the lived experiences of this core 
group of humanitarian aid workers who provide services in their country to their own 
country’s men, women, and children. I became particularly interested in the fact that they 
were Afghan aid workers, providing services to Afghans (their people) and yet having to 
face the risk of violent attacks from Afghan communities. This paradox lead to my asking 
the following questions: Why are they being attacked? And who is responsible for the 
attacks? 
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As a narrative researcher, my goal was not to do away with my own researcher’s 
filters, experiences, values, preconceived notions, and biases that I bring to this study, but 
I was very cognizant of my presence and the influences that I had on my participants. It is 
my hope that my later section on ethics and reflexivity will address and bring to light how 
my experiences and beliefs have informed and given depth to my data analysis 
(Mauthner, Birch, Jessop, & Miller, 2002). I also wish to acknowledge that I have been 
quite enlightened and my perspectives have broadened as a result of my face-to-face 
interviews and focus group discussion experiences. The storied narratives that I share in 
this study have been co-constructed with my participants. Even though I have made 
significant efforts to seek higher levels of rigor and accuracy in interpreting my 
participants’ narratives in this study, I was not completely unfettered of my personal 
biases and prejudices. Narrative analysis asserts that objectivity does not exist, nor should 
a researcher strive to attain objectivity; rather, research should be “checked” in process 
with the participants. Hence, research is not neutral or objective, but verified through 
dialog (Riessman, 2005, pp. 1-7). Occasional check-ins with my participants were used to 
validate some of my values and thoughts. Over time, I have become personally attached 
and impacted by the emotions and distresses of this study as a consequence of being 
immersed in my research topic. The above noted acknowledgements may lead to 
presumptions of possible drawbacks with regard to this research study; nonetheless, I 
maintain that the purpose of this research is to give voice to the storied narratives of 
Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan.  
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Research Questions 
The research questions that this investigation seeks to address are: 
Research question 1: What meaning do Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul 
ascribe to the war on terror in Afghanistan? 
Research question 2: What roles expose Afghan humanitarian aid workers to insecurities 
as a result of the war on terror?  
Research question 3: How do Afghan aid workers in Afghanistan perceive and describe 
their relationships with local Afghan communities?  
Research question 4: How do Afghan aid workers perceive and assess Afghan readiness 
for the withdrawal of U.S. and foreign troops in 2014? 
Research question 5: How do Afghan aid workers perceive and describe their 
interactions with the international communities, the U.S. military 
forces, and the international military forces in Afghanistan? 
Proposition: Humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, are exposed to 
conditions which give rise to risks of insecurities and violent attacks as a 
result of their interactions with different parties in the war on terror.  
Justification 
The primary goal of this study is to better understand through the narrative 
analysis of stories from face-to-face interviews of a group of humanitarian aid workers in 
Kabul, Afghanistan how they experience the ‘War on Terror’. A secondary goal of this 
study is to discover the effects of the ‘War on Terror’ on this group of humanitarian aid 
workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, and how they ascribe meaning to the risks and challenges 
that they face in the delivery of humanitarian aid to beneficiaries in insecure 
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communities. The third goal of this study is to give voice to the stories of humanitarian 
aid workers—young men and women who are often under pressure from different parties 
in the conflict, and many are attacked, abducted, raped, and killed—with the hope that the 
analysis of their stories will start a dialog to create real, effective change, and 
constructive processes to better protect humanitarian aid workers in insecure 
environments. It is the final goal of this study that through better understanding, more 
constructive interactions with the different actors from the military, political, 
international, and community will develop, allowing policymakers a bona fide 
understanding and assessment of Afghan readiness for the 2014 drawdown of U.S. and 
international forces. 
According to Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al. (2008), NGOs are now under 
pressure from the “communities to deliver without jeopardizing security”; they are under 
pressure from the host government to “implement national programmes”; under pressure 
from the “politician-donors and NATO representatives pressuring them to align with 
hearts and minds’ strategies”; and pressured by “criminal groups and armed opposition 
groups (AOGs) who threaten their safety” (p. 4). 
Galtung (1964) asked the questions of who are the individuals responsible for 
structural violence, as he sought to discover the forces that cause and give rise to 
structural violence in society. Galtung’s search gave birth to the idea of “conflict 
resolution processes” (Burton, 1997). According to Burton, “Needs theory became a 
short-hand way of describing the problems created by structural violence and pointed 
more directly to ways in which they could be tackled” (1997, p. 35). It soon became 
evident that the responsibility for structural violence laid on those who controlled the 
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system, and that the people with power and influence have much to lose if structural 
violence were allowed to continue unchecked (1997). Today, with the war on terror and 
all the different ethnic, sectarian, and ideological conflicts around the world, the only 
“constructive option” is “problem-solving through conflict resolution processes in which 
all parties affected must play a part” (1997, p. 35).  
Research findings point to an alarming increase in violence against humanitarian 
aid workers in Afghanistan since 2002. As noted earlier, “Criminality has colluded with 
political forces pursuing national (and in the case of Al-Qaeda, global) aims” (Stoddard et 
al., 2009, p. 4). In light of these, the following research questions were central to this 
investigation.  
How do Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan experience and assign 
meaning to the war on terror? 
For many of my participants, the war on terror is simply a war between the super 
powers for the control of oil and resources, and for the control of central Asia. They 
claim that insecurities have increased since the war on terror (the arrival of the U.S. and 
NATO troops), and insist that Afghans are not terrorists, and that terrorism is brought 
into Afghanistan from outside its borders, and blamed on its neighbors, particularly 
Pakistan and Iran for funding Islamic fundamentalism and propagating jihadist 
propaganda. 
How do humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan perceive and describe their 
interactions with the U.S. military, and other international military forces in 
Afghanistan? 
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Many of my participants described the Afghan humanitarian aid worker as a 
“bridge” between the local Afghan communities and the U.S. and the international 
military forces in Afghanistan. However, some participants argued that the role of 
“bridge” between the parties, exposed Afghan humanitarian aid workers to risks of 
suspicion, which gave rise to distrust and violent attacks. 
How do humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan describe their relationship with 
the local Afghan people, the Afghan authorities, the insurgents, and the Taliban?  
The dominant narrative is that the Afghan humanitarian aid workers have trusting 
relationships with the local Afghan communities. They believe that the Afghan people 
trust them as “implementer” of desperately needed humanitarian aid programs for the 
local communities, and because they enjoy such working relationships with the Afghan 
communities while providing rural communities with essential humanitarian needs, the 
Taliban allow them to provide services to the people. 
How do Afghan aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan ascribe meaning and assess Afghan 
readiness for the withdrawal of U.S. and foreign troops from Afghanistan in 2014?  
The consensus is that the U.S. should not abandon Afghanistan like it did after the 
Soviets war in the 1990s. They maintain that such abandonment would lead to 
Afghanistan becoming a haven for terror as it was pre -September 11, 2001, and say that 
the U.S. should “put out the fire” before withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. 
With the escalation of uncertainties in many parts of the third world and 
developing nations, the war on terror has become the new framework for international 
conflicts. As a student of conflict resolution, I believe that this study will enable scholars 
and practitioners of conflict resolution to seek deeper meanings and begin to ask 
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questions of this new phenomenon called war on terror and its tendencies to create 
insecure conditions, which give rise to structural violence that expose humanitarian aid 
workers to danger and violent attacks—men and women who risk their lives every day to 
bring desperately needed help to some of the world’s most vulnerable children, women, 
and the old. Since September 11, 2001, many nations have erupted into civil and political 
unrest, sectarian conflicts, and jihadist militancy fueled by Islamic fundamentalism as the 
rich and powerful nations dominate and impose their will on less powerful and vulnerable 
populations around the world. This phenomenon—the war on terror—has become a 
pretext for suppressing voices for change, insurrections, as well as social and political 
conflicts around the world. It is the hope of this narrative study that through the stories of 
Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, voice will be given to many 
who have become voiceless and marginalized. 
From among the research traditions, I have chosen a qualitative narrative research 
methodology advanced by Riessman (1990a, 1993, 2000). This narrative research 
methodology in collaboration with social constructionism provided a viable methodology 
to explore my participants’ ways and manners of experiencing their world by focusing on 
their voices and dominant narratives as opposed to developing theories for 
generalizations or predicting phenomena (Crist & Tanner, 2003). The methodology is 
holistic and allowed for themes grounded in participants’ stories to inductively emerge. 
Narrative analysis provided me with the techniques to investigate the intricacies and the 
complex nature of my participants’ lived experiences—grounded in their individuality, 
their social interactions, and cultural density.  
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I particularly found narrative inquiry most suitable for this research study to 
explore and understand the impacts of the war on terror on Afghan humanitarian aid 
workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, and how they assign meaning to the conditions that 
expose them to risks of insecurities. I used the narrative inquiry to develop the framework 
for this study and the narrative analysis method to encapsulate and understand the 
complexities of the dominant themes in the stories of the lived experiences of my 
participants (Daiute & Lightfoot, 2004). The outcome of this study and its contribution to 
knowledge were founded on the lived experiences of my participants: Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan (Daiute & Lightfoot, 2004). My goal is 
and always was to remain faithful to the core tenets of this research study by giving voice 
to the storied narratives of my participants.  
Research Procedure 
Step 1: Data Collection 
I used three different forms of data collection methods: ten face-to-face 
interviews, a focus group discussion with twenty participants, and a collection of written 
entries by focus group participants prior to the start of the focus discussions. This data 
collection method allowed for data confirming and validation (Creswell, 2007; Willis, 
2007).  
Step 2: Transcription  
I used a transcription service to transcribe all recorded interviews and focus group 
discussions using a verbatim transcription method with sighs, emotions, or force of 
speech included in the transcript (Riessman, 2005). 
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Step 3: Analyze and interpret data  
My data analysis was done by analyzing data from two different sources, which 
were analyzed separately using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2013). In my 
interpretation section I used quotations from participants to give voice to their narratives 
and provide deeper meaning and understanding of their experiences (Riessman, 2000, 
2005). 
Step 4: Member Checking  
I sent interview transcripts via email to each interview participant that expressed 
interest in being contacted to review and provide any corrections or amendments as 
desired. Three participants returned amendments that were immediately made on the 
research transcript. Member checking is used in qualitative research as a form of 
validating the data (Creswell, 2007; Willis, 2007). 
Research Sample 
Participant Profile: 
 Afghan humanitarian aid workers who are Afghan nationals 
 Men and women over 18 years of age 
 Have lived experiences of the war on terror in Kabul or anywhere in Afghanistan 
 Able to travel to Kabul to participate in study 
 Civilian humanitarian aid worker working in Kabul and other vicinities 
I had two groups of participants in this study. The first group of participants was 
the face-to-face interview participants, and the second group of participants was the focus 
group discussion participants. Both participant groups were Afghan humanitarian aid 
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workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. All the participants were associated with local Afghan 
NGOs in Kabul. 
Interview participants. My initial attempt at recruiting interview participants for 
this study was in June 2012, from a list of local Afghan NGOs published on the website 
of the Afghan NGOs Coordinating Bureau
1
 (ANCB). The site listed email and contact 
information for local Afghan NGOs. I sent email to 118 contacts and received 25 
responses; however, four were located outside the city of Kabul so they were not able to 
participate due my decision to limit my interviews to participants in the city of Kabul. Of 
the 25 responses, 20 were interested in participating in the study. I informed them that I 
was in the process of an IRB review and would contact them upon receiving IRB 
approval.  
In January of 2013, upon receiving IRB approval, I contacted my 20 potential 
participants to begin arrangements for my travel to Kabul Afghanistan in May 2013. Of 
the 20 contacts, 14 responded; 10 would participate, two did not respond, and two were 
no longer able to participate. Prior to leaving the U.S. for Kabul on May 17, 2013, I had 
ten Afghan humanitarian aid workers committed to participating in the study. 
Before leaving for Kabul, Afghanistan, I sent my list of potential participants to 
my contact in Kabul, Mr. Anayattulla Niazi at WADAN (local Afghan NGO). Mr. Niazi 
contacted my prospects and scheduled interview dates, times, and locations for all ten 
participants of the study. According to Creswell (2007), snowball or chain sampling 
technique is a form of sampling technique used frequently in qualitative research to 
                                                          
1
 http://www.ancb.org/ 
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identify “people who know people” and allowing them to identify potential participants 
who are “information rich” for the study (p. 127).  
Focus group participants. The focus group had twenty participants. All 
participants were employees of local Afghan NGOs in Kabul, Afghanistan. Most of the 
participants introduced themselves as NGO or Civil Society Organization (CSO) 
directors. The Afghan NGOs Coordinating Bureau (ANCB) sent out notices to its 
members informing them of my plans to hold the focus group, and those interested in 
participating were to contact Mr. Niazi at WADAN. Mr. Niazi coordinated the two-hour 
focus group, which was sponsored by WADAN and took place in a conference room at 
WADAN’s home office building in Kabul, Afghanistan. 
A majority of the participants were men, four of the focus group participants were 
females, and three of the face-to-face interview participants were females.  
Face-to-Face Interviews and Focus Group Discussions 
Upon receiving approval from the Nova Southeastern University Institutional 
Review Board for research with human subjects in January of 2013, I made arrangements 
to travel to Kabul, Afghanistan, to conduct face-to-face interviews with Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers and facilitate a two-hour focus group of 20 Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers. Prior to traveling to Kabul, I was corresponding with several 
Afghan NGOs (humanitarian aid workers) via email in English; little did I know that 
most of the Afghans I was communicating with via email did not speak English. Upon 
arrival to Kabul, I discovered that the email communications in English were mostly 
written by staff members. Fortunately, my host had the wisdom to anticipate most of the 
problems I would encounter, so prior to my arrival, he had arranged for my interpreter, a 
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vehicle, and a driver that drove me and my interpreter to all my interviews. All the 
interviews took place at my participants’ offices, except for one interview with a female 
participant, which took place in a meeting room at WADAN, a national Afghan NGO 
with home offices in Kabul. The focus group session was arranged and hosted by 
WADAN in a company conference room.  
The face-to-face interviews and focus group participants were contacted and 
scheduled by my contact at WADAN. He was responsible for organizing the two-hour 
session, which started with tea and Afghan pastries at about 10:00 AM and a traditional 
hot lunch for all participants and WADAN staff at about 1:00 PM. All interview and 
focus group participants were given time to review the consent forms (see Appendix D), 
and presented with a signed copy prior to commencing with the face-to-face interviews 
and focus group discussions. 
The primary data collection for this research study was audio recordings of 
Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan: nine face-to-face interviews and 
a focus group of twenty participants. Please see a later section for discussion on the 
research sampling. All audio recordings were done using a Marantz professional audio 
recorder, which stored all data recordings on CompactFlash. The CompactFlash is a safe 
and durable method of storing audio and maintaining integrity of the original recording. 
The face-to-face interviews were approximately one hour to two hours long and the focus 
group lasted about two hours long.  
I used the open-ended questions and pre-specified questions (Appendix A) to 
prompt participants for more narratives, using interviewing technique drawn from 
Søderberg (2006) which allowed me, the researcher, to become participant and co-author 
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during the interviews. This method of interviewing was found to be conducive to the 
theoretical framework of this study, the social constructionism theory, which is based on 
co-construction of narratives, between the participants and the researcher who together 
create knowledge (Etherington, 2009). 
Transcription 
All transcriptions were done by Synergy Transcription Services, Ltd., 1761 West 
Edger Road, Linden, NY 07036. The transcription service transcribed all recorded 
interviews and focus group discussions using verbatim a transcription method with sighs, 
emotions, or force of speech included in the transcripts (Riessman, 2005). Participants’ 
initials were used to denote the interview narrators, and MS (Male Speaker) and FS 
(Female Speaker) to denote focus group narrators so as to maintain anonymity and 
confidentiality of the narrators. This method used to denote my research participants is 
consistent with my Nova Southeastern University Institutional Research Board approval 
(January 2013). All audio recordings are stored in a securely locked cabinet in my home 
office. Transcripts are also stored in my home office and in my personal, password 
protected computer. 
Data Analysis 
I used Braun and Clarke’s (2006, 2013) thematic analysis to analyze the storied 
narrative from my face-to-face interviews and my focus group discussions. I paid 
particular attention to my participants’ spoken and unspoken communication, to my 
interpretation of the narrative being told, and the reader’s reconstruction (Riessman, 
2008). This method thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2013) allows for 
flexibility, clarity, and detail, with specific stages and guidelines for conducting rigorous 
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qualitative analysis. In addition to being a widely accessible and acceptable tool for data 
analysis, it also aligned properly with the guiding theoretical perspectives of this study: 
the narrative theoretical framework advanced by Riessman (2008) and social 
constructionism (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
In this study, thematic analysis provided six phases for investigating and 
analyzing the patterns and themes that emerged from the storied narratives and focus 
group discussions of my participants. My literature review section highlighted themes 
from the experiences of Afghan humanitarian aid workers, and I used thematic analysis to 
compare, contrast, and understand the themes from existing literature with the themes 
that emerged from the storied narratives and the focus group discussions in this study. 
Using theoretical, thematic analysis, I was able to focus on exhaustive and nuanced 
accounts of particular themes, some of which overlapped and diverged from the themes 
noted in my literature review. Also using a social constructionist epistemology as noted 
in chapter one, I investigated the sociocultural contexts and structural conditions that give 
rise to the narratives and perceptions of my participants. I used Burton’s basic human 
needs theory to explore the structural violence endemic in the systems that influence my 
participants’ narratives. A great deal of attention was placed on the dominant themes, 
which were the fundamental presuppositions, ideas, and concepts that framed, shaped, 
and informed the semantic content of the data. To adequately understand my participants’ 
dominant narratives, the social, historical, and cultural contexts were given significant 
attention (Riessman, 2008; Lightfoot & Davis, 1997). 
The following are six phases of thematic analysis by Braun and Clarke (2006, 
2013). 
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Familiarizing with the data. Since thematic analysis is an evolving process 
where ideas, descriptions, or figures of speech progressively form into themes (Riessman, 
2008), the first phase of data analysis was very important. I immersed myself in the data 
that I collected from my face-to-face interviews and the focus group discussions. Prior to 
receiving the transcript from Synergy Transcription Services, Ltd. in New York, I 
listened to the audio recordings several times, and made notes of my impressions. Upon 
receiving the electronic transcripts, I made hard copies, and bound them in a three-hole 
binder in two sections: face-to-face interviews and focus group discussions. Each section 
was read about four times to become familiar with the data, and I noted any observations 
on the pages. I also used highlighters to note any comments that addressed research 
objectives or research questions.  
Coding/themes. In phase two, I used open coding from Riessman (2005), but 
borrowed the “lean coding” method informed by Creswell (2007, p. 153) to begin the 
coding process. Lean coding allowed me to structure my coding process towards the 
objectives of my research, yet gave me the freedom of the open coding to seek and 
recognize new emerging themes from my data. I began coding with a short list developed 
from my research questions and guided by my literature review. However, I was very 
careful not to become restricted by the pre-determined code structure, rather than the 
open coding method, which is more fitting to narrative analysis (Riessman, 2005). I 
remained open to codes that emerged from my data during data analysis, and developed 
six themes from my interviews, and seven themes from the focus group discussions. Each 
theme has an average of four sub-themes. 
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Review themes. In phase four, I began to review the themes by looking for 
relevance and relationship with the data. I also looked to make sure that the themes 
related to and enhanced the meaning of the quotations from the transcripts. I continued to 
monitor the data to make sure that the themes were homogeneous and well developed. 
When they contradicted, I sought to determine the reason for the contradiction; if 
necessary, the contradiction was used to enhance the analysis and presented as a different 
point of view, or maybe there was need for adjustment. In some instances it was 
necessary to re-evaluate a theme or pattern, and possibly drop and begin the process 
again. My rule of thumb was not to exclude any contradictory data; however, I made sure 
that the contradiction had meaning, and not just a lone standing voice that did not add to 
the meaning making. To avoid over simplification, I documented inconsistencies or any 
points of diversion, and all are organized together with the narratives as themes (Zaal, 
Salah, & Fine, 2007). 
Name and define themes. In phase five, I named and defined the themes by 
concentrating on the core tenet of each theme and paying particular attention to the 
ascribed meanings from my participants. This was where, I believe, my interpretation of 
the essences of my participants’ stories were crucial and needed to be faithful to their 
points of view and their voices. I framed and shaped this phase to reflect on my research 
questions and the voices of my participants—Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, 
Afghanistan.  
Discussions and interpretations. In phase six, I completed the report with 
discussions and implications found in chapter five. I used my research questions to 
structure a thematic discussion that addressed the relevance and significance of my 
38 
 
dominant themes to the research questions, and sometimes used quotations from 
participants to give clarity and depth to the understanding and meaning. 
Member Checking 
I sent individual interview summaries to seven interview participants who 
expressed interest in being contacted for summary reviews via email attachments for 
validation and accuracy checks to make sure their thoughts were accurately represented 
on the transcript. As part of my IRB Protocol, face-to-face interview participants were 
given the option to complete a request for summary review form, and seven participants 
completed the form with contact information. Of the seven summaries sent for review, I 
received four responses from participants who expressed agreement with their 
summaries, and three responded with request for amendments.  
AB noted three corrections: to change number of girls now attending school from 
100,000 to 1,000,000; change mind to mine; change “The organization operates in 
sixteen Afghan provinces and provides bicycles for amputees, and has been active since 
the 1990s during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan” to “The organization operates in 
sixteen Afghan provinces and provides different services for people with disability and 
other vulnerable groups, and has been active since the 1990s during the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan.” Lastly AB changed “Otherwise, I think there will be another disaster in 
this county” to “Otherwise, I think there will be another disaster in this country.” 
SP noted two corrections: to change “SP posits that during the Taliban regime, 
her organization and other women’s groups were forced underground, but they continued 
to work for the rights of women” to “our organization was working secretly during the 
Mujahedin and Taliban regime and we were forced underground but we could 
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successfully continue our fight which was for women rights, and after the fall of Taliban 
regime women got access to their relative rights and freedom from which one of them is 
women equality with men according to Afghanistan constitution and also positive 
discrimination in Parliamentary elections, women participation in election and different 
governmental section. Until 2005 women had good achievements in different area 
specially in reducing violence against women but after 2005 violence increased against 
women and currently also violence, insecurity and corruption is on its highest level which 
causes the women activity limited.” SP also changed “The Ibrahimi benefited the 
fundamentalist organizations who were working against women’s rights. Majority of the 
international aid went to the war lords, and little was given to the women’s groups. 
International aid, infrastructure needs were neglected” to “Azhar Ibrahimi Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General played positive role in the empowerment of 
Mujahedin (fundamentalist) and in their participation in power.” 
RMD noted corrections to change MSP (used two instances) to NSP—National 
Solidarity Program. All stipulated changes were made to text as requested by the 
participants. 
Peer/Expert Review 
I recruited two distinguished scholars and practitioners with very strong 
backgrounds in peace building, conflict management, and social justice to review my 
themes and my data analysis. Dr. Alison Milofsky is Director of Curriculum and Training 
Design for International Conflict Management and Peace Building at the United States 
Institute of Peace in Washington, DC, and Dr. Mark G. Brimhall-Vargas is Deputy Chief 
Diversity Officer at the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland. I met both of 
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them when I attended a United Stated Institute of Peace program on Facilitation in 
Conflict Environment; both were co-instructors for the one week long workshop. I left for 
Afghanistan a few months after the workshop. Upon completing my second draft, I sent 
to each of them via email, the complete dissertation draft and sections of the thematic 
analysis of my themes and sub-themes, plus the data analysis of all 10 face-to-face 
interviews and focus group discussions. They reviewed my data for approximately three 
weeks. Both were traveling outside the U.S. at the time of the review; Dr. Milofsky was 
on assignment in Rwanda and Jordan. They reviewed my data separately and provided 
me with excellent feedback and suggestions for improvement. There was a high degree of 
agreement with both reviews on the need for more interpretations in analyzing the sub-
themes. Dr. Milofsky felt that the introduction chapter was “extremely engaging,” while 
Dr. Brimhall felt that my description of the context of Kabul was “excellent.” Other very 
valuable comments have been integrated into my analysis and several of their comments 
have been incorporated into the discussions of my themes and sub-themes.  
Trustworthiness, Credibility, Authenticity, Utility, and Faithfulness to Data 
Using a narrative qualitative research foundation grounded in social 
constructionism and basic human needs model, this study does not make any claims of 
truth, but strives to echo and give voice to Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul 
who risk their lives daily to bring desperately needed help to vulnerable Afghan 
communities. Their storied narratives are retold in this study through their personal 
experiences of the war on terror. In this narrative qualitative research study, the notions 
of validity and reliability were not paramount; instead, my study is measured for its 
utility, authenticity, consistency, and faithfulness to the data. In order to be faithful to the 
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storied narratives of Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, and how they make 
meaning of their lived experience, I recruited two expert reviewers with expertise and 
backgrounds in international conflicts, facilitating in conflict environments, and dealing 
with issues of social justice to review and evaluate the transcripts and the themes that 
were generated from this study. They were asked to review the data for consistency and 
for perceived bias. Both experts were in agreement with my evaluation and assessment of 
the data. I also sought feedback from my participants for reviews of their summaries and 
assessments. Their suggestions, recommendations, and revisions have been incorporated 
into the findings of this study. According to Creswell (2009), the use of member checking 
in qualitative research, is a way to ensure that my interpretations are faithful to the storied 
narratives of my participants. 
Throughout this study, I have maintained reflexivity and fairness in echoing the 
diverse voices from my participants’ interviews and focus group discussions. I followed 
specific guidelines espoused by Lincoln and Guba (2000), on the criteria for authenticity. 
In addition, the use of expert reviews and member checking allowed for a report that was 
true to my participants’ storied narratives. 
One of my goals in this research study was to shed light on the conditions in my 
participants’ environment that exposed them to risk and harm. I believe that I was able to 
maintain this objective throughout this investigation by making sure that I brought 
attention to the conditions and experiences that have informed and framed my 
perspectives, my participants, and their context. To this end, my research design provided 
an active atmosphere that was conducive for learning. I have come out of this process a 
more educated person with better understanding of my participants’ experiences of the 
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war on terror, and the conditions that continue to give rise to insecurities and conflicts 
around the world. It is my hope that this research study is catalytic in its ability to shape 
future interventions in the war on terror, as nations seek ways to destroy cells which 
threaten and pose danger to their ways of life and national security.  
As I have always maintained throughout this research study, the utility of this 
investigation emanates not from its universally significant results, but rather simply by 
giving voice to the storied narratives of my Afghan humanitarian aid participants—this 
utility is enriched by their individual experiences and the existing literature about their 
violent context, their history of invasions and political unrest and their role in launching 
the U.S. attacks of September 11, 2001. I hope that by echoing their voices, this study 
creates better understanding of the challenges and the conditions that give rise to 
insecurities, which continue to expose Afghan humanitarian aid workers to risks of 
violent attacks.  
Ethics and Reflexivity 
In this section I focus on my obligation to the men and women who chose to 
participate in my research study. I affirm that neither harm nor wrong was done to any 
participant of this study. This study adhered to ethical standards and did not involve any 
form of deception in content or to any participant of the study. Prior to recording the 
interviews and focus group discussions, all participants were provided with the informed 
consent indicating that their participation was voluntary and that they had the right to 
withdraw from the study or decline to answer any questions (see Appendix D). All face-
to-face interview participants were also given the option to review their summaries and 
participate in data validation.  
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Participation in this research study was voluntary. My goal was always to be 
faithful to the personal narratives of my participants in my interpretations of their storied 
narratives and to give voice to their personal stories. As expected of all research studies, I 
am aware that my idiosyncrasies, my opinions, my personal experiences, and personal 
politics have influenced the outcome of this research study. However, my hope is that 
their stories will lead to better understanding of the conditions in insecure complex 
political environments that expose humanitarian aid workers to high risks of danger, 
harm, and violent attacks.  
As Mauthner et al. (2002) purport that transparency in all aspects of research is 
the best way of building and maintaining ethical responsibility and reliability in research. 
They note that the researcher must decide how much of themselves, their pre-conceived 
biases must be revealed, such as “issues of honesty, transparency, and overall 
accountability in research” (p. 125).  
For this study, I made sure that my personal values and beliefs do not impede on 
my participants’ voices, but help enrich my understanding and interpretations of their 
storied narratives. I was quite cognizant of how my personal values, beliefs, 
acquaintances, and interests influenced this research study. Therefore, I chose to reveal 
the following. 
In a world where resources are becoming more scarce, the population is 
increasing exponentially, the balance of power is shifting, and religiosity is becoming the 
prism from which national leaders view their actions or lack thereof. We live in a very 
dangerous world; the wealthy nations continue to seek more, and waste more, while the 
poor nations get poorer as they fuel the needs and wants of the rich nations, whilst their 
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populations suffer and die in poverty and degradation. We live in a world where nations 
that attempt to express their nationhood or independence are silenced by violent 
overthrow or occupation, and in a world that is festering with anger and breeding 
hopelessness by destroying the voices of freedom, insurrection, insurgency and hope, and 
tagging and classifying them as terrorists.   
I have often argued that neither a super-power, nor one known for their 
superiority over others, should ever use power or force against those considered to be 
inferior in the pursuit of conflict resolution. I argue that pompous power used is influence 
lost. Growing up in a small Ibo village in Nigeria, West Africa, I often sat under a big 
umbrella-like tree that formed a canopy over the village chief’s home, listening as I 
watched the elders of the village resolve disputes ranging from domestic to crimes 
against the clan. The village chief was emphatic and intolerant of the use of force by 
anyone perceived to be superior to their adversaries. He rebuked men for using force 
against their wives to resolve domestic quarrels. He would say that when a strong head of 
the family uses force in his home, he loses respect. A man who is truly superior and 
revered by his peers does not need to use force to be heard, he simply uses his advantage 
to mediate a resolution through mutual respect. By giving a little, one will gain more in 
return, he preached. He would say that a man with three heads does not need to be 
announced to get attention. Once he enters the room, all eyes will follow him. He 
demands attention. In the same token, a strong man does not need to flex his muscles to 
get respect. If he is truly strong, he would not need to flex his muscles because his 
strength comes not from his arrogant display of brute force, but from his humility. Once a 
man from a nearby village challenged the chief, saying, “Chief, sometimes we have no 
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choice; we have to use force so that they will know that we are serious, and we mean 
business!” The chief took a good look at the man who was a healthy, strong and muscular 
fellow, stoutly built with an unshaken center of gravity. The chief said to him, “If you 
unleash the weapons you have on a man and he survives, not only have you made a fool 
of yourself, but you have helped build up that man. Now you will have to fight many men 
waiting for their turns with you.”  
Over the years, I have come to the realization that force can never be used to 
bring peace. One who possesses overwhelming force should never employ force to 
mediate peace. The chief often said that any time victory seemed guaranteed, force must 
never be used. He would say, “It is better to lose gracefully than to win arrogantly.” We 
must stand up for those who cannot defend themselves, not because they do not try hard 
enough, but because they are not capable of defending themselves against enemies who 
possess overwhelming force. 
When I look at the world today, and all the conflicts around the globe, I wonder 
what the wise chief would have said about the Israeli/Palestinian situation that continues 
to question and prod our humanity, as well as the two Sudanese States, the Congo, the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Afghanistan, Syria, and now Ukraine. Are 
we doing all that we can to achieve peace? Are we treating all people the same way we 
want to be treated? I believe that we can no longer afford not to be our brothers’ and 
sisters’ keepers.   
As the world converges into a global citizenry, where national boundaries erode, 
and the information superhighway connects people around the globe and feeds images of 
war and destruction in unprecedented speed and proportion, the citizens of the world have 
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become more aware of the imbalances in the new world order, and in turn more ready to 
reject the first world order. War can no longer be the answer in the new world order. 
Power and influence must not continue to be measured by a nation’s military prowess, 
war machines, drones, and weapons of mass destruction. What is needed is a global 
citizenry that will redefine the role of the United Nations and its abilities to mediate 
between nations by utilizing comprehensive conflict analysis and resolution strategies. 
The recent United Nations report on climate change (2014) suggests the likelihood of 
violent conflicts over land and limited resources, as climate change might give rise to 
insecure conditions “by exacerbating well-established drivers of these conflicts such as 
poverty and economic shocks” (Gillis, 2014, para. 11). If we continue this trajectory, it 
won’t be long before the real SHOCK AND AWE! 
In consideration for the above noted factors, since objectivity is not an ideal to 
strive for in narrative analysis research methodology, most significant was my ability to 
occasionally check in with my participants, by verifying and validating some of my past 
experiences, values, and thoughts during my face-to-face interviews and focus group 
discussions (Riessman, 2005). I maintained reflexivity by being conscious of these biases 
during all phases of this research study, so as not to misrepresent or misinterpret 
participants’ narratives, but to enhance understanding and deep appreciation of 
participants’ storied narratives. I made attempts to consult via email with my participants 
for clarification and to make any changes they desired to their interview summaries.  
I recognize ethical issues with regards to relationships with all public parties in 
the research process—not only an obligation to the participants, but also the institution 
(NSU), DCAR, and the larger constituents who may read and interpret data and findings 
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from this study (Mauthner et al., 2002). The issues of transparency continue to be of great 
importance to me throughout this study. I made certain that every phase of this 
investigation was clearly defined and documented so it can be easily evaluated and 
replicated (2002). 
I am quite cognizant of the need for confidentiality, particularly with using 
narrative analysis methodology, and of the intimate nature of the personal stories told 
during the interviews. As a result, it is important that all collected data are securely stored 
and that the identities of participants are not displayed but kept anonymous at all times. 
To maintain confidentiality, participants’ identities were not disclosed on the transcripts, 
or in any part of this research document. Interview participants were identified by initials, 
while the focus group participants by notes as FS (Female Speaker) or MS (Male 
Speaker). All ethical considerations for this study complied with the stipulations set forth 
by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Nova Southeastern University. Participants 
were provided with approved informed consent for their perusal and authorization. Since 
interviews and focus group discussions were recorded using digital audio, participants 
were required to sign consent forms allowing permission to be recorded, and copies of 
signed consents were presented to each participant (see Appendix D). To this effect, I 
upheld ethical standards in interviewing, gathering information, and audio recording. 
Creswell posits that researchers have a responsibility to make sure that their prejudices 
and pre-conceived beliefs and ideologies do not impede on the voices of participants 
(2007). He maintains that the researcher must challenge participants to seek deeper 
revelations and understanding of their lived experiences (2007). This research study was 
committed to maintaining and upholding the dignity and trust of participants and 
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contributors to the research, and the integrity of the DCAR and NSU. This research study 
was submitted for the Institutional Review Board of Nova Southeastern University, with 
the title: War on Terror – Experiences of Aid Workers in Afghanistan; Research Protocol 
No. 07111208 Exp., and received IRB approval on January 25, 2013. 
During this research process, all notes and compact disc recordings were stored in 
a locked filing cabinet in my home office, to which only the researcher had access. All 
notes and compact disc recordings will be destroyed three months following the 
completion of this research study.  
According to Riessman (1993) and Lieblich, Tuval-Mishiach, and Zilber (1998), 
one of the best ways for narrative validation is by the “sharing of one’s views and 
conclusions and making sense in the eyes of a community of researchers and interested, 
informed individuals” (Riessman, 1993, p. 173). I recruited two reviewers who reviewed 
most of the dissertation with particular attention to the data analysis and the analysis of 
my major themes and sub-themes (see section on Peer/Expert Review). Individual 
interview summaries were sent via email to participants for their review and 
amendments. Three amendments were returned and others concurred with my summary 
(see Participant Data Validation). The completed study will also be made available to 
students and faculty at West Virginia University at Parkersburg and other interested 
parties within the humanitarian community.  
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis and Presentation 
In this chapter, I present the outcomes of 10 face-to-face interviews and a focus 
group panel of 20 participants I conducted with Afghan humanitarian aid workers in 
Kabul, Afghanistan. The goal of this chapter is to present a contextual analysis of the 
experiences of Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan through their 
voices and their storied narratives, with the hope that through the grounding of their 
complex storied narratives in the different corresponding interactions that affect them, 
such as interactions with the U.S. Military Forces, the International Military Forces, 
NATO forces, Taliban, non-military international communities, Afghan governments, 
and the Afghan communities. I used thematic analysis to explore the common themes and 
the contrasts among the experiences and perceptions of my participants. With an 
analytical framework informed by social constructivism and role theory, I investigated 
how my participants’ storied narratives are formed by their sociopolitical contexts, with 
focus on conditions, which affect their exposure to risk in complex political emergencies.  
This chapter brings to focus the different sections that give meaning to the shared 
process of conducting this study. I listened to understand the experiences of my 
participants, and present the analysis of their storied narratives, using the themes that best 
represent their experiences. In the preceding chapter, I summarize the interpretation of 
this study, using the framework of Burton’s human needs theory to understand the 
conditions that enable and shape the themes. I use initials of participant’s names to 
denote the narrator for face-to-face interviews, and FS (Female Speaker) and MS (Male 
Speaker) to denote focus group participants to protect the privacy of the participants of 
this research study.  
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I begin this section by exploring the context where the storied narratives of my 
participants emanate. This step is borrowed from Lawrence-Lightfoot and Davis (1997) 
about “framing the terrain” in portraiture research methodology:  
Like all researchers working in the phenomenological framework, portraitists find 
context crucial to their documentation of human experience and organizational 
culture. By context, I mean the setting—physical, geographic, temporal, 
historical, cultural, aesthetic—within which the action takes place. Context 
becomes the framework, the reference point, the map, the ecological sphere; it is 
used to place people and action in time and space and as a resource for 
understanding what they say and do. The context is rich in clues for interpreting 
the experience of actors in the setting… Portraitists, then, view human experience 
as being framed and shaped by the setting. (p. 43) 
Research Study Context 
As my plane from Dubai hovered over Kabul and negotiated landing, I was 
reminded of the reason for traveling over nineteen flight hours to a place I may have little 
or nothing in common with except for our shared humanity. I was met at the airport by a 
male voice that called out my name: Imanuel, he said, welcoming me to Afghanistan as 
he took my luggage and led me out of the airport. I’m able to park close, he informed me, 
I know a lot of the police people that work here, so I didn’t park where everybody is 
expected to park their cars—pointing into the direction that we are heading, as he pushed 
the cart that secured my luggage…he was giving me my first lesson on how to navigate 
Kabul. 
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Kabul is the seat of power for Afghanistan, a Central Asian country, north and 
west of Pakistan, east of Iran, and with southern borders of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan—a nation with stories of wars, invasions, and civil unrest. It was invaded by 
the Soviet Union in 1979, but forced to withdraw after ten years of war with the 
Mujahedeen forces aided by the United States. After the collapse of the communist 
regime in Kabul in 1992, devastating civil war erupted among the different war lords and 
factions of the Mujahedeen, destroying most of Kabul and opening the path that ushered 
the Taliban to power in 1996.  
We drove down a newly built modern highway from the airport. This road, he 
said, was built by the Americans, pointing out some of the new developments along the 
drive since the arrival of the Americans, also letting me know that “they” (the 
Americans) built big projects but left them no guide, no method or rule of law to navigate 
the unanticipated madness that now engulfs the streets of Kabul. I saw modern-day 
highways with no traffic signs or traffic lights, cars converging at different speeds from 
different directions, and drivers nudge their vehicles into traffic positions with no rules of 
engagement or anyone to enforce them. There is no traffic or driving rule apparent, just 
instincts and guesses of other drivers’ intentions. You just have the feeling for when the 
other car is going to stop…they told me… Even pedestrians have to joggle for their right 
of way as drivers dare them into traffic. Check points were manned by security officers 
carrying machine guns. Vehicles bounced and were thrown up and down by the depths of 
the pot holes that pave the dusty streets.  
The hills of this ancient city stand as testament to its rugged history and the harsh 
realities of its destitute population. Impoverished communities were built on hills with no 
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electricity, no water, or basic sanitation. According to aid workers, one of these hillside 
communities known as Tapaye Zanabad was built by Afghan women. They were widows 
of war who came as a last resort and built their mud homes on the hill with their bare 
hands.  
My Afghan escort brings me to a street—he grew up not far from here and 
remembers seeing bodies of men, women, and children on the streets—casualties of war, 
he said. He was just a little boy from the other side of town, but he knew most of the kids 
on this side of town. He said Kabul was totally destroyed during the Mujahedeen war. He 
said before the war between the warlords and the Mujahedeen was the Soviet invasion, 
and now, the Americans with the war on terror.  
Alongside the ruins of war, new structures of development bring promise to a 
people whose hope will not die. The streets and markets buzzed with the hustle as people 
of all ages and gender strived to make an afghani (Afghan currency). Little beggar boys 
and girls beseeched me for their daily bread. Stores displayed their wares from huge 
metal structures that gate and secure the homes of the wealthy and powerful, to lavish 
furnishings and tailored clothing that comfort the privileged, to bread shops that bake 
daily bread, broken daily at meals served on plastic tablecloths spread on floors for 
families and friends to share their meals. 
The men mostly wear lose traditional attire with a vest over, while the women 
mostly cover their bodies and wear head scarves. This is a culture of deep loyalty, where 
people trust each other and everyone knows their place. The women sit in designated 
areas of restaurants and public places. Married couples sit in designated areas reserved 
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for women to keep other men from gazing at their wives. Most interactions are within the 
sexes—there are very little to no cross-gender interactions outside the immediate family. 
Young university men and women sit-out their grievances on the pavement of the 
Parliament building in hunger strike to remove a university administrator. Even with the 
appearance of normalcy, Kabul remains an insecure environment marred by frequent 
outbreaks of planned military strikes and attacks, which continue to take the lives of 
innocent civilians and humanitarian aid workers. The following was a warning (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. ANSO alert, 2013. 
I was reminded from time to time that Kabul was still an insecure environment. 
This terrorist attack took place two compounds from where I had interviewed a 
participant one day prior to the attack. The Taliban later took credit for these attacks. The 
purpose of this context description was to illustrate the structural conditions that informed 
and framed my participants’ storied narratives.  
Interview Participants 
Participant SD: 
I met with SD in a colorful corporate building of WADAN—an Afghan NGO 
with over fifteen office locations around Afghanistan. This was my first visit to 
THREAT WARNING - ANSO CENTRAL - COMPLEX ATTACK (KABUL) 
 
As of 17:45 hours it has become evident that both the APPF and IO compounds in the area 
received elements of the attack, with AOG operatives still engaged in fire-fights with ANSF at 
the APPF compound at this time. While the IO compound was also directly hit with at least 
one grenade or RPG – and casualties are reported – at this point it remains unclear to what 
extent it was involved in the attack (collaterally, as a main objective, or as a means to attack 
the nearby APPF compound). ANSF has surrounded the area, and significant fighting is still 
ongoing. As such, the below advisory remains in effect, and ANSO Central will continue to 
monitor the situation and issue further updates as more information becomes available. 
(Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, 2013, transmitted to me by WADAN)  
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WADAN’s home office, and I was quite impressed by the structure, a massive brightly 
colored building with columns that fortify ornate architectural design facing a beautiful 
landscape that separates the building from the high Iron Gate that secures the fenced 
compound. SD was casually dressed in slacks and blouse with a veil over her hair. 
Initially, she informed me of her time constraint through my interpreter, but as the 
interview progressed, she seemed less in a hurry, and when the interview ended, she 
stayed around in conversation with my interpreter. 
SD is a young woman in her late thirties to mid-forties and has worked with 
clinics in very remote areas that she said were:  
“Hard to go to through the paths, and most of the time we need to supply these 
clinics through Tajikistan.”  
The lack of funding was one key problem that SD stressed throughout the 
interview. She shared: 
“I set up a kindergarten for children in Kabul on my own personal funds and I 
was able to run the kindergarten for one year through my own personal expenses. 
Most of the Afghan women who have children; kids, babies, they go to work so 
there is no one to take care of their children. But unfortunately no one helped, no 
organization assisted to fund this kindergarten and so I lost the kindergarten…” 
When asked if there was any help from the U.S. and the Allied Forces, or the 
international communities in Afghanistan, SD’s response was critical:  
“I’ve sent proposals to some organizations, but no reply, and they do not pay any 
attention to this pressing problem.” 
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On what she considers the most pressing challenge facing Afghanistan, insecurity 
ranked number one:  
“The biggest challenge is the security, the suicide attacks. Because of this suicide 
attacks this has almost paralyzed the life, especially the life of the organizations 
that run projects in areas which are not secure. It is very, very hard to carry on 
our activities in remote areas of the country… This was kind of intensive 
education for women because we wanted the women to be educated as soon as 
possible, and this school was running very well. It was the first one in that area. 
The area was insecure; the Taliban presence was much more in that area. But 
unfortunately it was not only the Taliban but most of the parents were also not 
willing to send their girls and their sisters and daughters to the school, and for 
this reason the school was stopped which I’m very, very disappointed. Until now I 
still feel disappointed.” 
When asked if she was hopeful that things would get better, she answered with a 
prayer for peace after the drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces in 2014:  
“I pray to God that after 2014 Afghanistan will be peaceful and secure, and we 
pray for peace and security in the country. A number of people would want them 
to leave, but the majority of the people are not prepared and do not want the 
international troops to leave the country.” 
Her message to U.S. President Obama is to keep U.S. troops in Afghanistan, but 
most importantly, to provide economic support to Afghans, especially to the women. She 
calls for the unity of all Afghans, and to be considerate of the Afghan people. She wants 
the opposition to: 
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“Stop violence and stop fighting and killing innocent people… You know most of 
the Afghan people are not afraid of terrorists because the people are innocent, 
they are a proud people, they are brave, and so they have no fear of terror.” 
Participant AB: 
I met AB, a 49-year-old medical doctor by training, in his office. He was quite 
hospitable and provided me and my interpreter with tea and refreshments. He was well 
dressed in Western attire: dress slacks and a long sleeve shirt. AB spoke English well—
he said that he was educated in Pakistan and worked several years in Pakistan while in 
exile from Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation.  
“For me being a doctor, I used to work in a busy trauma hospital in Pakistan, and 
every day many trauma cases were brought from Afghanistan to the hospital in 
Pakistan… many who lost their limbs and wondered if they will be able to move 
or walk again.”  
His organization rehabilitates individuals who lost their limbs, polio victims, and cerebral 
palsy patients, and he shared: 
“We treat them with physical rehabilitation education, mine awareness, AIDS 
awareness, and drug awareness…”  
The organization operates in sixteen Afghan provinces and provides different 
services for people with disability and other vulnerable groups, and has been active since 
the 1990s during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. AB spoke proudly of the role his 
organization played in persuading the Afghan government to sign the Ottawa Treaty in 
2003 to ban landmines. He said the first U.S. bomb was dropped on Afghanistan on 
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October 7, 2001, and the U.S. forces came to Afghanistan in 2002. He claimed that the 
war on terror brought many developments to Afghanistan:  
“Our activities and opportunities increased and there was a difference in the 
funding after 9/11. During 2001, all the other organizations were in terrible 
situation like in 1999 and 2000 and most of the aid workers were facing financial 
challenges. After 2002, many actors entered into Afghanistan, new actors and old 
actors, so to some extents, the funding situation became very good. In terms of 
reconstruction of the country, many things had happened.” 
AB told the story that he told to a group during a visit to the United States:  
“We trained some disabled people in Jalalabad. The only paved road we had was 
three kilometers that they could run by bicycle. When I told the story in United 
States, the people did not believe it and said this is the 21st century and you have 
only three kilometers paved road? And I said, yeah. There was paved road, but it 
was potholes from Jalalabad to Torkham. It was paved road by name only. Pot-
holes by dropping bomb or blowing mines and things like that. The only paved 
roads that the boys could practice were three kilometers. But nowadays, these are 
the positive changes - we have thousands, hundreds kilometers paved roads 
now.”  
Asked if there has been any downside to the development since the war on terror, 
AB said the suicide attacks increased a lot: 
“The terror increased day by day, the road side mines increased, there is a 
special word that the aid community uses BBIVED something like that those who 
want to explode themselves.”  
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AB expressed his frustration with having to wait hours, sometimes two or three 
hours, for military convoys to pass; he said that often meant missing important 
appointments. Referring to how military incursions into Afghan communities affect 
perception of aid workers in Afghan communities, AB stated,  
“We are very close with the communities, we are working with the communities, 
and so the people that their houses are searched during nights, they’re not happy 
about that.” 
AB recounted a personal experience with war:  
“I lost almost sixteen of my relatives and even my brother who was a PhD holder 
from Oxford University of England and he got killed before 9/11; during the war 
with the Russians. You know he was an asset, not only for our family but for the 
whole country. PhD holder from Oxford University in Afghan, that's really an 
asset, but he was assassinated because of this political… bullshits.” 
He argued the evils of war, and purported the human cost of wars to Afghan families:  
“I have very bad memories of war, it’s not only me, every family has lost two or 
three persons from their family. Especially those very important people that were 
breadwinner for the families - they lost them; so war is something that should be 
avoided and should be stopped.” 
Asked what led him into humanitarian work, AB told the story of when he was on 
exile in Pakistan:  
“I used to work in a hospital, very busy trauma hospital located in Pakistan, and 
every day there were many cases of trauma brought to the hospital. I was in exile 
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during the Russian invasion. The family members used to just cry when they see 
their sons and brothers. One day they had eyes and the other day they lost it. One 
day they had limbs, but the other day they lost it. And they have arm and lost it. 
It’s really a difficult situation and when their relatives came to the hospital, they 
cried and were worried of what happened to him and how will his future be. And 
this was kind of igniting me that something should be done for these people. I 
talked to our director of the hospital at that time that there should be an 
orthopedic workshop for us to make artificial limbs and it was approved, I thank 
my director. And we had a very good orthopedic workshop there for making 
artificial limbs. Realizing that only limbs cannot solve all the problems and the 
fact that they sacrificed their limbs for their country and for their religion, so I 
thought why not bicycles? I remember when I was a kid and I got a bicycle, it felt 
as if I had the whole world with me. So finally I was satisfied that bicycle is the 
perfect thing. So just like you are doing your research, I brought my bicycle from 
home to the hospital and I was encouraging two of my patients. At first I made the 
bicycle stationary - so no legs; don’t need it, you don’t need legs, just come on the 
cycle and use the handle to turn the wheel around, and maintain your balance, 
and by the third week, they were able to keep their balance and run the cycle 
themselves. And then I presented this case to other orthopedic doctors and they 
liked the idea very much. Some friends from the United States used to come to 
Peshawar to help us and I shared the idea with them. They said, doctor, go ahead 
with this, this is the perfect idea and they encourage me a lot. And then I shared 
this with the Afghan aid communities and they said, go ahead with it. So the first 
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time we got funding was from Afghan Refugees Fund based in London and we got 
$40,000 from them to start in Jalalabad.”  
Asked how this project has progressed, the doctor noted that:  
“For the last 2 years, there has been no bicycle program because of funding. We 
could not raise fund to run the program - sometimes donors only want to fund 
their own initiatives…not that crazy Afghan idea, you know… I shared those ideas 
in Jalalabad; I presented a case and the impact of the program. There were 
ministers and people from foreign affairs, almost 160 countries present in 
Jalalabad. I don’t know why we never got funding, because we graduated 
thousands of people from this program - more than 5,000 people. They are freely 
mobile now and they can work, they can have a job, they can complete their 
schools and so I’m satisfied. I’m quite happy for them.” 
On his experiences with the U.S. Military and the allied forces in Afghanistan, 
AB conveys his disagreement with the formation of the PRTs. He argued that the Afghan 
aid community has trusting relationship with the Afghan people:  
“We are in this country, we expect that the military forces will leave one day, and 
then there will be a very bad image on the aid communities that we were with 
those people who were bombing the villages. That was our fear and we opposed 
it, we raised our voices when they started activities of the PRTs and I think 
they’re folding it now or they have stopped it in many provinces. I heard some 
news, which I liked; good news that there will be no PRTs anymore in the 
provinces, which is a very good idea.”  
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According to AB, the argument from the foreign military and international 
community was unacceptable. He said, 
“We are building a bridge for you - and it means they will go to that village and 
do their work or their development or whatever… the aid communities were not 
happy, it was a matter of neutrality.”  
He went on to assert that: 
“In Afghanistan, people, ordinary people, I’m talking, not the politicians, the 
people are not in favour of the military people - not only the Americans, Russians 
were here in this country and before the Russians, the British were here. They 
invaded. The general image of these super powers is not so good in the minds of 
the people here in this country.” 
On his feelings about the U.S. plan to drawdown military forces in 2014, AB 
asserted that he is not worried by the U.S. plan to withdraw forces due to Afghanistan’s 
past experiences with the transfer of power:  
“I don’t have any fear because we have already past two such transfers of power 
and things like that; in 1992, we had Mujahidin come into power and in 1996, 
Taliban came. In 2001, this new government, so 2014, it’s not, I think a big 
issue.”  
One area of concern according to AB is with Afghanistan’s neighbors and noted that:  
“One thing that the people are afraid of is our neighbors, Afghanistan neighbors 
will definitely show themselves strong, and bring their puppets again in power. 
That’s one thing people are expecting to happen.”  
When asked which Afghan neighbors he was referring to, his response was direct:  
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“Pakistan and Iran, they will increase their support to the groups in terms of 
money, in terms of weapon, in terms of everything.” 
Asked if this would be a potential problem for Afghanistan—again, quite 
emphatically, he asserted:  
“Of course, problems! Even right now, even though we are one year before 2014, 
there is a tremendous downfall in funding - funding has diminished … decreased! 
In most of our projects right now, we have problems. The only hope is for funding 
to be kept in the same level like it was two or three years ago. The joblessness and 
unequal distribution of the revenues, these were the main things that caused past 
skirmishes and fighting. If I have a job and I can feed my children, I will not be 
going to join any group. Who would want to go at night and blow themselves up 
in roadside bombing? If they have a decent life, I think nobody will choose to do 
that. Besides, there is also some very strict training by some elements in our 
neighborhood; they’re explaining that this is like a holy war. If they kill 
themselves, they will be going to Janna. So those kinds of propagandas, 
joblessness and all these things together will create problems.” 
AB’s advice to the United States of America is to channel the money that will be 
spent to drawdown the U.S. Military forces from Afghanistan into assisting local civilian 
projects in Afghanistan. He argued that:  
“They are using a lot of money on the military drawdown. If they use it in civil 
affairs, there will be no fighting. I can guarantee this myself. Just, let us say, just 
10% of the cost that they were using on militaries. If they use it on the civil, there 
will be no fighting.” 
63 
 
On his message to President Barack Obama, AB said,  
“I just would like to thank him for his decision to withdraw the troops. That’s his 
good step, also not to cut off funding for Afghanistan. Otherwise, I think there will 
be another disaster in this country. That’s what we are expecting. In 1994 and 
’95, Kabul was destroyed. Why? Because the American government made a very 
big mistake. When Mujahidin came to Afghanistan, the Americans thought, Oh! 
We defeated the Russians so time to leave; however, Afghanistan still needed their 
support, but they left. I know money was coming from Saudi and the Gulf states 
and so that was a big mistake they did at that time. That is why Afghanistan 
turned to those kinds of things like a place to train terrorists.” 
Asked if he thought that the mistakes of the 1990s could be repeated, he asserted that:  
“They’re already doing the same. They’re already committing it like when they, 
you see, cut off the funding. Like, we are a small organization. I was in a meeting 
two weeks ago and about 3,560 de-miners are on standby positions. That is a 
clear indication of what could happen to those young de-miners when they cannot 
support their families. So definitely, there will be some groups out there waiting 
to recruit them in exchange for some bread for their children.” 
His message to the American people is to help the people of Afghanistan develop 
their own economy and help them build their infrastructure:  
“Not in terms of military force, we want their financial support, their technical 
supports, and to support the military of our country. If our national police and the 
military are supported, it will be much cheaper and it will be much easier, for the 
whole world.” 
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AB’s message to Afghan’s people is to:  
“Stay calm so we do not lose all that was achieved. Like 1,000,000 girls who are 
now going to schools and more boys are going to schools and colleges. Now we 
have paved roads, keep it intact. Now we have schools. Do not ruin them. Keep it 
intact and maybe your future generation, a knowledgeable generation, not like the 
generation of our age. I grew up in this situation; I was 17 when the Russians 
invaded Afghanistan. Now I’m 49 and all I have known is war.” 
On the source of terrorism, AB believes that America knows the true source of 
terrorism. He argued that:  
“The main thing is to work close with those countries that have the seeds of 
terror. If they work with them, I think this problem will be solved. If they make it 
inactive, not to grow, once something is grown then the control is difficult. But if 
something is inactivated in the seed form of it, then I think there will be no 
problem. We will have all peaceful villages and this is the necessity of the time.” 
When asked which countries he considers to have the seeds of terror, he hesitated, 
as if unsure if it was alright to say it, then reluctantly, he sighed:  
“Everybody knows that the cow is black, but the milk is white…where Osama bin 
Laden got killed.” 
After our interview ended, and I thanked him for the opportunity to talk with him, 
our conversation continued. He talked about the Durand Line as a factor in Afghan 
relationship with its neighbors:  
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“To me, that’s the basic reason why our neighbors are not good with us. More 
than 100 years ago, this Durand Line, some people called it Imaginary Durand 
Line. However, some Afghan scholars did not find any written documents about 
this Durand Line and even it was not signed by the Amir Abdur Rahman who was 
the king of Afghanistan that time. They did not find in any museum, in any caliphs. 
Since there is no written document or proof, no Afghan government has accepted 
this. This is the main reason why the neighbors are trying to make Afghanistan as 
weak as they can. Another issue is India. President Karzai was recently asked by 
a reporter why India was allowed to have a consulate in Afghanistan. My main 
point is that they should not make Afghanistan the base of war for their issues. If 
they have problems with India, there are many channels to deal with their 
problems. Diplomatic channels or military channels, whichever option they 
choose, just keep their conflict away from Afghanistan.” 
Participant SP: 
SP was the first participant I interviewed; we met in her heavily fortified home-
office. After many failed attempts to operate my Marantz professional recorder, I had to 
make a decision to proceed with my first interview without a recorder and rely on only 
hand written notes for the interview.  
SP is an interesting woman known for her strong political viewpoints. She has a 
reputation for being quite outspoken and unwavering on her points of view. We sat in her 
living room with my interpreter. She welcomed me to her office and to Afghanistan, 
saying,  
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“The war is very harsh; it’s been unfair to the people of this country. For the past 
thirty-five to forty years, wars in Afghanistan have been imposed on the people of 
this country. Our geography has made it easy for wars. Afghanistan has been a 
victim of wars between super powers. Our people’s backwardness has been due to 
the super powers not wanting this country to prosper. Rival groups have 
disrupted developments.”  
She said that since 1965, she has been fighting for the rights of women—for 
democratic organizations to fight for the rights of Afghan women:  
“Our efforts have allowed Afghan women to become members of Parliament – 
opposed by fundamentalists who have fought against equal rights for women. Due 
to our efforts, Parliament was forced to withdraw from past positions and allow 
women equal rights – equal protection under the law, and freedom of speech.” 
SP posited that during the Taliban regime, her organization and other women’s 
groups were forced underground, but they continued to work for the rights of women.  
“Our organization was working secretly during the Mujahedin and Taliban 
regime and we were forced underground but we could successfully continued to 
our fight for women’s rights. After the fall of Taliban regime, women got access to 
their relative rights and freedom for equality with men; according to Afghanistan 
constitution, and the rights of women to vote, participate in Parliamentary 
elections, and seek employment in different governmental sectors. 
Until 2005, women had good achievements in different area; especially in 
reducing violence against women, but after 2005 violence increased against 
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women and currently, violence, insecurity and corruption are on their highest 
level, which has affected activities. 
“The Taliban brought us catastrophe never witnessed anywhere in the 
world; cruelty, violence, barbarism, rape, group rape, kidnappings, cutting 
women’s breasts, and openly forcing women naked and killing their husbands in 
front of them. Total dehumanization of women and the women are forced to marry 
them.” 
Asked how the war on terror affected her ability to continue to work for women’s 
rights, SP noted that:  
“After 2002, opportunities for Afghan women to seek more rights; go to school, 
and get an education increased. Hope was created among women and all Afghans 
– liberation from the fundamentalists. We had new constitution, and good things 
started to happen, until 2005 when everything started to change. The U.S. and 
their allies changed their support for the fundamentalists. Azhar Ebrahimi, 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary Genera, played positive role in 
empowerment of Mujahedin (fundamentalist.) and in their participation in power 
and benefited the fundamentalist organizations who were working against 
women’s rights. Majority of the international aid went to the war lords, and little 
was given to the women’s groups. International aid, infrastructure needs were 
neglected.” 
When asked if she was hopeful, she responded by asserting that Afghanistan 
needs development, not war. She argued that:  
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“If people have no opportunities for their future, they turn to terror. From the 
beginning I called for more humanitarian aid. The source of terror was never in 
Afghanistan, but in Pakistan, but since Pakistan is an ally of the U.S.”  
Her hope is that the borders are protected against terrorism after the U.S. drawdown in 
2014.  
On Afghan readiness for U.S. drawdown in 2014, SP asserted that Afghanistan 
can make the changes needed by:  
“Dismantling human rights violators and bring fundamental change to 
government.”  
She posited that the country has made several achievements since the U.S. invasion:  
“For three years, law on violence against women.”  
SP is hopeful that the drawdown could become a positive outcome for Afghanistan, if the 
U.S. and the international communities will:  
“Repair economic lives, enforce laws, and eliminate war lords; this will give hope 
to the people – they must support the civilians – the Afghan people. Yes there is 
hope…”  
Asked what she perceived to be the biggest challenge facing Afghanistan, she 
responded that:  
“The biggest challenge is to completely leave us alone; we cannot establish peace 
militarily.” 
Her message to President Obama is that the  
“Amount of money being spent on removing U.S. troops, if spent on social 
services, security, and civil society could make the most to weaken and dismantle 
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the sources of terror, abuse of human rights and women’s rights and freedom, 
and not allow Afghanistan to become centre of terrorism again.” 
SP’s message to the American people:  
“Help Afghan people, especially Afghan women, but ask for accountability from 
Afghan government and any group receiving assistance. Afghan people are very 
grateful for the generous support – please don’t stop now…” 
Her message to the people of Afghanistan was motherly and direct:  
“Be vigilant; don’t be abused or deceived by fundamentalists and criminals 
against democracy who operate under the name of religion. The enemy of 
Afghanistan is Pakistan. Respect the women of Afghanistan, who are your 
mothers, sisters and daughters – they want to work shoulder to shoulder for the 
prosperity of Afghanistan.  
She ended the interview with the words: “Just Peace!” 
Participant AG: 
When AG first came to Kabul in 1992, he had just been promoted to Company 
Representative in the Kabul branch office; however, sixteen days after his arrival to 
Kabul, he said that war started in Kabul City. This unforeseen situation forced him to 
change focus, and he started distributing food and providing shelter to people displaced 
by the war. Many Afghans had to be moved to shelters in mosques around Kabul: 
“We distributed food to both sides; food to opposition and to government people. 
This was the civil war; argument between people and different organization. We 
completely lost our buildings…Kabul city was completely destroyed”  
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AG went on to assert that the civil war cleared the way for the Taliban to come to power, 
but in a rather peculiar way, he seemed to be arguing with himself that the Taliban were 
not terrorist, and went as far to say that their regime was very good: 
“We did not say that the Taliban are not good people or terrorists, we do not say 
this. The Taliban also was very good, they performed their regime and the time of 
their government was very good. We didn’t say that these people are terrorists or 
something else.” 
AG decided to define terrorist activities:  
“Terrorist activities are activities that want to weaken or try to destroy the 
government of Afghanistan; the political system, the government system and other 
economic or social sectors of the country. They try to destroy and weaken the 
people’s spirit. This is called a terrorist activity. Terrorists took over Kabul and 
different big cities of Afghanistan and they spread fear among Afghans and this 
had a negative effect on our Afghan government and made Afghan government 
weak.” 
AG asserted that a lot has been achieved since the U.S. and the international 
forces came to Afghanistan; however, he cautioned that a lot still needs to be done—he 
was one of the representatives that went to Japan to participate in the Afghan 
Reconstruction Program. This was an appeal to the international community; he shared:  
“Donors pledged 41.5 billion dollars in funds for the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan. The terrorist attacks from different negative organizations tried to 
weaken the implementation of many programs, but we see positive evidence in 
different schools and rehabilitation sectors. A different change came to 
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Afghanistan, but we can’t say that’s enough because Afghanistan was completely 
destroyed and this kind of fund is much less for it.” 
Asked what he considers the biggest challenge facing Afghanistan, his response 
was swift:  
“The biggest challenge in Afghanistan is the security problem, there is no peace 
and the people are not safe.”  
AG argued that terrorism is not in the culture of Afghan people:  
“International sources bring their terrorists to participate and start activity in 
Afghanistan, this is not the culture of our people, and Afghan people were never 
terrorists. International terrorists come to Afghanistan and set-up offices and 
organizations. The terrorists and Taliban attacked many people who lived in 
cities and many people who spent their lives in rural areas and villages, they are 
uneducated, and so when the Taliban got in government, they took advantage of 
those people who were uneducated.” 
He asserted that:  
“Afghan people are honest Muslim people and kind people; terrorists take 
advantage of their kindness and they start different terrorism activities such as the 
one that destroyed the World Trade Center in America. These activities are 
international terrorism activities, not Afghan local terrorist activity.” 
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However, AG insisted that the Taliban is not a terrorist organization, emphatically 
noting:  
“I’ll repeat again, Taliban are not terrorists, they are a good organization, good 
people and they are just opposite of the system, and we want peace in Afghanistan 
and also want Taliban to participate in the system. We hope that the Afghan 
government and the U.S. government will support and cooperate with them and 
try to bring peace - the Taliban should be allowed to participate in Afghan 
government and political system.” 
AG is hopeful that after the U.S. troops leave Afghanistan, international 
communities should assist Afghanistan to rebuild and maintain a stable and peaceful 
nation: 
“International community should support Afghanistan and its different sectors, 
and they should not leave Afghanistan alone so that the situation in 2001 is not 
repeated. We hope they will support us and the NGO sector will be able to assist 
those people where the government is not able to reach, mainly in rural and 
different border areas, and villages.” 
AG expressed concern over problems with bordering countries; he asserted that: 
“Afghanistan still has problems in the security sector with neighboring countries. 
It’s impossible that Afghanistan will be stabilized after 2014 when the troops will 
quit. We need security and a peaceful environment in Afghanistan. The 
international community should support and train Afghan security and military so 
they are able to enforce the laws in the country and control Afghan borders.” 
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AG wants President Obama to give the same attention to Afghanistan as he does 
the U.S. He argues that if the proper attention is not given to assist Afghanistan in 
maintaining internal security, securing its borders, and rebuilding its infrastructure, it is 
likely to fall back to a haven for breeding terror as the world witnessed in 2001. He 
asserted that:  
“Afghanistan will go back like before, the terrorists will come back – different 
international terrorist organizations will move into Afghanistan like before. If 
Afghanistan is allowed to become the center of international terror, it would 
mean the international terrorism beat America.”  
To the American people, AG expressed his gratitude:  
“As an Afghan citizen, I am much thankful for American nation, because the 
American people pay their own tax to the government and the government uses it 
to fund programs in Afghanistan. So we are much thankful to the American people 
and our wish from you is don’t leave Afghanistan alone.” 
To the Afghan people, he challenged his fellow country men and women to put 
their country first:  
“Think about your own country, positive not negative, and try to take part in the 
development of the country and help bring it to that level of other developed 
countries. Let’s stop the fighting and give attention to the education sector and 
help educate our people. Afghanistan is the center of Asia…” 
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Participant RS: 
I met RS in her office suite where she was working with some young Afghan 
women. They were very hospitable, providing me and my interpreter with Afghan 
pastries and green tea. As we arrived, one of the ladies ushered us into a sitting room 
where the interview was conducted. After the interview we were given a tour of the 
facility and introduced to the women. On the hallway wall hung two large, rectangular 
blue framed prints in Arabic: STOP THE VIOLENCE and a second: EQUAL RIGHTS IN 
AFGHAN CONSTITUTION. 
RS is the founder of an organization that focuses on providing training and 
advocacy for human rights for Afghan women. Her organization was started in the 1990s 
during a time she described as,  
“A time that no woman, even men were free, and they were not allowed to breathe 
open air. At that time, the doors of all institutions were closed and no one had the 
opportunity to work, go to school, or to find a job to take care of their families. So 
being college educated and enlightened, I had to think of another alternative, how 
to serve the people…So that was what motivated me to establish this 
organization.”  
She argued that the love for her country and dedication to the people of 
Afghanistan kept her in Afghanistan during the Mujahidin and Taliban rules: 
“Despite all the atrocities, hardships, and suffocations, because of the love for 
my country and for my people, I did not migrate to another country.”  
Asked what sustained them during those years, RS replied,  
“Love; the love I have for my people, for my homeland, for my country.”  
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RS asserted that during these periods women remained active; few women were 
elected to the Parliament, including RS, and she insists that the presence of women in 
Parliament brought healthy competition to the Parliamentary process. She claimed that:  
“Because women did not want to show that they are less active, incapable than 
men. So this was a kind of positive competitive environment.”  
She posited that:  
“The members of the parliament at that time were very much integrated with the 
communities, with the people, with the society and they were involved with the 
people. For example when they were going from home to office, they were using 
the public transport. Except the chairman of the parliament and his deputy who 
had cars … the rest of the members of the parliaments were behaving like 
ordinary people; like porters and shopkeepers - No special privileges and benefits 
like they enjoy today.  
She argued that it would not be correct to assume that all the changes in women’s rights 
have occurred in the last ten to twelve years: 
“Even before that, there were educated women who were involved in all types of 
social activities and they were very brave women.”  
RS posited that over thirty years ago when she was a student at Kabul University, her 
professors were from West Germany, and they were very good professors. She argued 
that if the atmosphere in Afghanistan had been conducive to change, the condition of the 
people would have been different. She noted: 
“I think the country, myself and all the people in the county will have developed 
much, much better in a natural manner, but as I said, unfortunately, this curtain 
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of terror spread all over the country and basically affected all people including 
women. At that time, according to constitution, both man and woman can equally 
participate in all electoral, political and all other types of activities.” 
Asked what kind of hope she had for the future, she noted that a lot of work had 
been done in Afghanistan in almost all sectors within the last twelve years. She referred 
to this interview as a sign of progress: 
“Your presence here and now sitting together with us in the interview, this is a 
good manifestation and a big achievement. During the Taliban, for example, you 
cannot come and sit with a woman like this and talk to a woman like this. Even 
radio, we couldn't switch on radio to listen to news at that time. You will be 
arrested and no one knows what fate you will have to confront.” 
Remembering how things were in Kabul before the arrival of NATO troops, RS 
asserted that:  
“NATO forces in this country, I can say it’s a blessing. We had witnessed those 
times of war and hardships, almost in every street of this city, there was 
conventional war between rival groups and fortunately most of the people were so 
happy with the arrival of the NATO troops.”  
However, she noted that the people’s expectations were high as they expected the U.S. 
and NATO troops to fix many of their problems: 
“We expected a lot more and much better from the troops and from the inflow of 
so many resources into the country, but unfortunately, it didn’t happen as people 
had expected. 
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Asked about her feelings of Afghan readiness for the U.S. drawdown of forces in 2014, 
she replied by acknowledging that Afghanistan has seen many regime changes, and 
argued:  
“Unfortunately, this is a vital fact that during most of the changes of these 
regimes, all the people mainly the women have suffered more as a result of the 
change of regime.” 
She asserted that terrorism is:  
“Imposed or brought from outside the country.”  
And she argued that Afghans are like nationals of other countries. She maintained that:  
“They enjoy the same kind of mentality and will power and decisions like other 
human beings do and they are good people. They’re all educated people, they are 
determined people. Our people and our youth can defend our country and women 
can also assist in the establishment of peace in this country. First, this is an 
imposed war by foreigners, by foreign countries especially as I mentioned before, 
Pakistan and other countries that would impose this war in our country and we 
have good sources, we have good manpower, we have very good talents to utilize 
the resources, but unfortunately, these people do not allow our people to live in 
peace. This country has the ability if the foreign countries allow us to help in the 
reconstruction of our country and restoration in peace and stability of our 
country, otherwise these people have the ability and they have the tolerance to 
help themselves. Although it is a small and poor country, we have strategic plans; 
this small country is well recognized and has signed a lot of strategic contracts 
with different countries who will help according to those agreements. So, there is 
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no ground to worry much if foreign intervention is seized and the U.S. and 
international communities countries help us to stop the intervention of foreign 
countries. 
On what she felt was the biggest challenge facing Afghanistan, she stated that the 
election was number one:  
“The first dire challenge of this country is the forthcoming elections. I can say 
that it will be one of the major challenges to the future of this country about which 
we can worry and so there will be consequences which we cannot think about. 
Another challenge is that those people who nominate themselves for presidential 
elections and also provincial elections, should be tolerant and respectful of their 
opponents; the losers should accept and cooperate wholeheartedly with the 
winners. If this does not happen and the losers do not help for the benefit and the 
interest of the entire nation, then this would be another conflict.”  
A third challenge she saw regards the Afghan strategic plan, which she claimed 
was signed by Afghan government and other countries around the world: 
“We hope that this will not remain on paper. We hope this agreement will be 
materialized. If this does not happen, then this will also be a challenge.” 
RS’s message to President Obama is for the president to use his office and his 
leadership in the world to influence nations that are working against the progress and 
development of Afghanistan. She asserted that:  
“President Obama is a leader of a strong country, and a leader of coalition of 
nations that should help stop intervention of those countries who oppose the 
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people of Afghanistan and who have imposed this war and instability on the 
people of Afghanistan and stop their aggression and oppression – they should 
look for the terrorists and those troops in other places especially in 
neighborhoods of Afghanistan. Pakistan is a very aggressive country; intervenes 
in affairs of Afghanistan, but most people now realize that Pakistan’s intervention 
is aggressive to this country and most of the people… local people and also 
people around the world now realize that this is the truth. This is a fact, not only 
Pakistan, but other countries that also finance terrorist organization 
organizations. We hope that President Obama will put pressure on them to stop 
supporting the terrorists.” 
Her message to the people of the United States was consoling with empathy and 
appreciation for sacrifices made on behalf of Afghanistan: 
“First of all, my condolences and my sympathy with the bereaved families who 
have sent their sons and daughters here to serve and help in the security of this 
country and those who have lost their sons and daughters in the war on terror, 
our dear sympathy to them. And secondly, that we can say that those who sent 
their sons and daughters as a result of very good will, pure will for a very pure 
purpose and objectives, which is to help the innocent people, the defenseless 
people of this country, this is very appreciated.  
RS’s message to Afghan men and women is unyielding and speaks to the core 
values of her people: 
“We ourselves should build our country and make decisions for ourselves; other 
people cannot build our country. The British people came here and we saw what 
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they did. They did not build our country. They came here and they left. Russians 
came with so much heavy power but then they left. Now we see that the troops of 
around 34 countries and also the civilians of 34 countries are here and they want 
to help, but we can see that with all these heavy military equipment, they still 
cannot annihilate terrorism. I call on my people at this point; our country of 
Afghanistan is once again engaged in a historic test. And the people of the world 
are looking at us wondering what we are doing. We hope that our people will 
leave behind all the differences, sociopolitical and cultural, and become united to 
help each other to restore peace, stability, and development... I think we have the 
ability. 
At the end of the interview, I thanked her for the opportunity, and she graciously 
accepted and jokingly apologized, saying that she was sorry if she talked too much,  
“Because I am not diplomatic,” she joked. 
Participant AA: 
I met AA in his office with two of his male colleagues. All three spoke English 
and did not need an interpreter. AA asked if his colleagues could participate in the 
interview, which I agreed to. He is a middle aged man in his mid-to-late fifties and his 
colleagues were younger men in their mid-to-late thirties. They run an Afghan NGO that 
was established in the mid-1990s during the Soviet invasion. AA said the organization 
focuses on:  
“Education and capacity building for vocational skill training for women and 
youth development, community development, rehabilitation, and humanitarian 
assistance, peace building and conflict resolution.”  
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AA asserts that during the Soviet war and the Afghan civil war, which lasted over two 
decades,  
“The government was not able to assist people, therefore, we established to work 
with reliable people especially in the field of education, so the main objective was 
to help our poor people in Afghanistan.”  
He further posited that his organization has developed good working relationship with 
donors,  
“We have a good reputation among the donors, and we have projects and work in 
all Afghanistan, so it’s a good value for us that I think we have a good 
reputation.” 
On the changes that have taken place since the arrival of the U.S. and Allied 
forces, AA argued that the times were different: 
“During the times of Taliban and Mujahidin we didn’t have a stable government 
and there was a lot of fighting, a lot of discrimination, and everything was 
suspicious, and our infrastructure was destroyed. So if you compare then with this 
time, a big change has come to Afghanistan. We have government, everything is 
okay.” 
Asked to name some of the things that made a difference, the main thing he said was 
support from the international community. He hopes that the international community 
remains in Afghanistan and continues to support the Afghan people: 
“We hope that the international community does not leave, so that they continue 
to support our people, maybe we will have a good future. We need support of 
international community from security side and financial side.”  
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Responding to what has been some notable setbacks, AA asserted that a lot of 
developments have taken place since the U.S. and international forces arrived; however, 
he noted: 
“If you look day by day, the security is bad. Bombarding the community with 
women, children, and poor people, this has created bad effects.” 
Another issue that he sees as a setback for Afghanistan is the issue of brain drain. 
He posited that many Afghans leave the country for more secured environment. AA 
argues that: 
“Nowadays, our business people and all other people are leaving Afghanistan, 
they cannot do business here. They cannot invest here, so this is very bad for the 
people of Afghanistan. We should try to remove this idea from the people. For 
example, we have salary for a soldier at $200, if you increase this salary to $400, 
maybe our army will be more motivated. If you give them good weapons, this will 
also have good effect to them.”  
He shared an example of how the lack of funding is affecting Afghan NGOs: 
“Actually last night I was meeting with NGO director at the Ministry of 
Economics. He said after two months, more than 200 NGOs will be closed due to 
no funding, because international community funding is now going directly to the 
Afghan Government. But the government cannot provide help to the rural areas, 
the remote area. NGOs have the capacity to work in the remote areas, and bring 
assistance directly to the people, so we requested from international 
humanitarian community to cease relations with Afghan government and support 
the local NGO sectors.” 
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Warning on consequences of not maintaining a strong Afghan economy, AA 
asserted that:  
“If the person is jobless, especially young people, they will go to another 
direction. If they are not working in Afghanistan they will go to Pakistan and they 
will join with the Taliban or terrorism. So this is a big problem. Nowadays it’s 
very important for the government of Afghanistan and international community to 
create jobs for the people, so they are able to support themselves and their 
family.”  
Asked what he considers the biggest challenge facing Afghanistan after the U.S. 
drawdown in 2014, he thought for a moment and said,  
“If they go out, maybe Pakistan will directly attack Afghanistan, maybe terrorism 
will come back to Afghanistan and there will be no chance for Afghans to 
participate and get education or other opportunities; and they will kill a lot of 
people. They will destroy the buildings; destroy our businesses, and our 
infrastructure. Many people are now trying to leave Afghanistan because of this 
reason.” 
After a moment of sigh, AA argued that the civil war is still going on, implying 
that Iran and Pakistan do not have good relations with Afghanistan: 
“So maybe people think that it will be dangerous for us. If the Afghan army is 
equipped with modern weapons, maybe it is our job that we should defend our 
country, our people.” 
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Asked what message he had for President Obama, AA’s response was firm and 
direct: 
“You should not leave Afghanistan.”  
He called for a gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, arguing for: 
“Step by step you’ll strengthen our army and then withdraw some of your forces, 
and then the Afghan defense will be strong. We should be 100% sure that Afghan 
people can defend themself, and then you can finally withdraw all forces from 
Afghanistan. If it’s really what America wants, the first thing is to destroy the 
source of terrorism, strengthen our army and then the problem will be solved.” 
AA’s plea to the American people was: 
“You should help us to develop our infrastructure and to enable us to earn with 
our own hands. Not to make us like a human society that when you leave, then we 
will not be able to earn on our own. If you are a friend of Afghanistan, as we have 
committed that you are our friend, you will help and enable us to earn our living 
and build our infrastructure on our own.” 
On his message to the Afghan people, AA made it very blunt and direct, 
appealing to their pride as Afghans: 
“This is our country. It is our responsibility to defend our country, we are 
Muslims. We believe in Allah. They will create for us problem, they will solve our 
problem. We believe that everything is from Allah.”  
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At the end of the interview, I thanked AA and his colleagues for participating in 
the study, and asked if there was anything that they would like to add; one of the 
colleagues was quick to share his experience: 
“I am working in the community as a project manager for different projects. 
Whenever I’m talking with people in the remote areas, all of them talk about the 
insecurity – that there is no security in their communities. They believe that all 
these things are created by the foreign people, by Americans, by British, and by 
Pakistanis. The foreigners are supporting the terrorists in the remote areas who 
are coming from the neighboring countries. All of them believe that if the foreign 
people leave Afghanistan, maybe the security will be better.” 
Participant ABD: 
I met ABD in his office with my interpreter. He immediately began the interview 
by informing me that there were two sides to the effects of the war on terror on the people 
of Afghanistan. He said, 
“The positive aspect and the negative aspect - the positive answer is that the 
situation that prevailed during the Taliban regime, and before the Taliban 
regime, has fundamentally changed because the people have found a proper, and 
more suitable environment to breathe freely. For example the educational system 
was completely dysfunctional at that time, but now we can see that the 
educational system is running well, and Afghan boys and girls are going to 
schools. Also the Afghan population, which was taken hostage by a few people, 
now they have been rescued and have become free. We also witnessed that some 
changes have occurred in the economic life of the Afghan population.”  
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He posited that since the war on terror: 
“Ethnic differences which existed during the previous regimes have been 
eliminated to some extent. For example, ethnic differences between Tajiks and 
Pashtuns, as well as linguistics and tribal differences have diminished. Now the 
people have been sensitized. Their awareness has been raised. They know now 
about the constitution, the laws of the country. For example they can now look 
forward to the next five years for new elections with the possibility to vote for 
someone different if the current leaders are not doing their job. During the 
Islamic emerge of Taliban; they were just a handful of people who came to power 
and they ruined the country. They governed the country, the entire nation, but a 
lot of the citizens of Afghanistan never saw them or knew what they looked like. 
He came to power and he disappeared just like others before him, they also came 
by force and reigned over these people by force. But now these people have this 
kind of mentality that this is a constitutional government and they have the right 
to elect their leaders, and the courage to vote.” 
Asked how hopeful he was about the future of Afghanistan, he answered in the 
affirmative: 
“I’m very much hopeful because I have witnessed the change of many of these 
regimes since the time of Soviet Union. I was a student when the Soviet troops 
occupied this country. After the Soviet withdrawal, I have also seen the conducts 
and misconducts of the other regimes. I can say this confidently that I’m really 
hopeful for the future because of the differences, the changes that have happened 
compared to previous regimes.” 
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Asked what he felt were the big challenges facing Afghanistan, he spoke of the 
fact that there were no retributions for crimes and atrocities committed during the Taliban 
and Mujahidin regimes. He argued that the oppressors from the past regimes are now in 
power: 
“The people who have created negative image among the general public, among 
the population of the country, they came to power after 2001. The public 
mentality was that those people who were the oppressors, who have committed all 
sorts of crimes and done all sorts of cruelty to the people, will confront justice, 
but unfortunately that didn’t happen. They are the owners of the government. 
They are the powerful. Now the people’s only hope is that maybe these criminals 
will die by natural death or they get too old and unable to stay in government.”  
ABD decried the ways in which the war lords and the people in power prior to 
2001 used and manipulated humanitarian resources for their own benefits. He asserted 
that:  
“Humanitarian aid which was intended for the grassroots; for the poor people 
and needy people, was looted by all these kind of criminal people, warlords and 
powerful people”  
He argued that the corruption was fuelled by the Afghan government and the 
contractors: 
“It’s because of all the contracts and all the things they took, and distributed all 
the funds and resources amongst themselves. If the general public are certain or 
assured that those people who betrayed their trust are not allowed to continue to 
benefit from government and international contracts, I can certainly say that the 
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situation will improve very well. The people hoped that the international 
community will help us to stand on our own feet. But unfortunately, what the 
people were expecting from the international community didn’t happen. So these 
people lost hope.” 
Asked how he thought hope could be restored to the Afghan people, he said: 
“Well, the rule of law is very clear in Afghanistan. Afghanistan as you know is a 
traditional and religious society, but traditional cannot suffice for the solution of 
all problems and neither can religion can address all the issues. So, how can we 
integrate both tradition and religion to the rule of law? For this purpose, we have 
promulgated a number of very good laws for the benefit and interest of the whole 
nation, the entire population of the country. Unfortunately, these laws for the 
welfare and well-being of the Afghan society cannot be implemented because the 
power still exists in the hands of those people who have already broken the law, 
who have been criminals; the warlords who continue to oppress the Afghan 
people. If the U.S. government and the international communities, through their 
influence, can oblige the Afghan government to bring these people to justice, then 
we can say this can be implemented and it would give hope to the people.” 
On his feelings regarding Afghan readiness for the U.S. drawdown of forces from 
Afghanistan in 2014, ABD insisted that the international community cannot afford to 
make the same mistake that was made before 9/11/2001: 
“In my personal opinion, the international community cannot repeat the mistake 
of former Soviet Union, who abandoned the country. Then surely Afghanistan will 
take the same path as they took before 2001. Key point that I would like to convey 
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is that this is not an Afghan war; it is not a war by Afghans. Also, it is not a 
religious Islamic war. Rather, this war is a war by the neighboring countries. If 
tomorrow, our neighboring countries make the decision to stop this war, then I 
can assure you that the next day, there will be no war in this country, no fighting. 
This is a regional issue, a regional conflict. There is a claim that if the 
international troops drawdown, Afghanistan can turn back to a safe haven for Al-
Qaeda. No, it’s not the truth, Afghan mentality cannot accept any kind of external 
power, be it Russians or Al-Qaeda or Western powers. After the start of the war 
on terror, Afghans took their guns, their rifles and dismantled those Al-Qaeda 
troops and other hostile troops who live in their hideouts around the country, so 
by their own guns, Afghans eliminated them. They despise them.” 
Asked what his message was to President Obama, ABD began by noting short-
comings with the President: 
“One of the problems of President Obama is that he has ignited the fight in the 
region and he wants to abandon this region in flames. First, if I were in President 
Obama’s place, I would have given a very clear message to all the people that we 
will never leave this regime. Secondly, terrorism infiltrates from centres beyond 
the borders of Afghanistan. And I would have declared to these terrorist centres 
anywhere they are that we will come after them. If he would convey these two 
messages to the people of Afghanistan, we can hope that the situation will 
improve. Otherwise, the situation will be worse than the situation which existed in 
1992. We have a proverb in Afghanistan, it says; when you lift a piece of stone, if 
you find out that you are powerless, you cannot lift it, kiss it and leave it in its 
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place. In the beginning, in 2001, they knew that they could not lift the stone, they 
should have kissed it, should not have come to Afghanistan. But now they have 
actively intervened in this situation, they have come to Afghanistan and they 
should not abandon it. The whole area is engulfed in the fire particularly 
Afghanistan and I think he has to put out this fire. I do not mean that the U.S. 
should never leave, there cannot be perfect peace until the foreign troops leave 
the boundaries of Afghanistan, but before leaving they should put off this fire.” 
ABD recounted his observation on the first air strikes by American and coalition 
troops; he was on the way to a village outside of Kabul. He counted 
“667 army trucks of Taliban loaded with weapons and armed personnel leaving 
the city of Kabul. So what happened to them? Where did they go? Later they came 
to my village and I asked them where they went, because they wanted to buy some 
drinking water. They said, ‘we went to Khost and from Khost, we will cross 
border to Waziristan and they will not chase us in Waziristan.’ The point is that 
the Taliban are not sure about the goodwill of the international community; 
whether they are really here to help the people. I know people who are benefiting 
from all types of services, able to go to school; they use internet and other 
facilities they enjoy. But the parents or elders, they are in the war season, the 
fighting season. They come and fight, you see. So the point here is that the public 
perception is that the international community is actually not here for the well-
being, for the welfare, for the peace and prosperity of our people, but here for 
their own objectives.” 
91 
 
Asked what he meant when he said President Obama should not abandon the 
region in flame, he replied with: 
“I mean the Durand Line, but I do not want to trust the Durand Line itself. I want 
to trust the centres, the training centres; terrorist training centres here, this area, 
that side of the border. From this area, the flames of war and fighting infiltrate to 
Afghanistan, but also to some parts of Pakistan as well. So this area, they should 
deal with. They should not leave this region inflamed.” 
When asked who the enemies of Afghanistan are, his immediate response was: 
“Intelligence. Intelligence services of neighboring countries.”  
Then he said,  
“I have a question for you. Where was Osama bin Laden killed? This area which 
is called federal area, tribal area where these training centres exist, but this area 
is not under the direct control of the federal government - these people are not 
controlled by the central government of Pakistan. The people who have control of 
this area also want that this area to be inflamed. The Pakistani policymakers have 
repeatedly declared this fighting between the Taliban and Afghanistan Jihad; a 
holy war. But the same Taliban, when they fight in Pakistan, this is a treachery. 
This is not a Jihad. This is treachery. This is betrayal. 
Elaborating on what he meant by “intelligence war” as the enemy of Afghanistan, 
he argued that:  
“If Mullah Omar, the leader of Taliban, Engineer Hekmatyar the leader of Hizb-
i-Isslami and Haqqani die today, do you think that the war and these flames of 
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war would be extinguished and the war will end? No. Because Mullah Omar is 
one person, but behind him, there is 10 Mullah Omars. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is 
one person, but behind him, there are 10 of Gulbuddin Hekmatyars. Haqqani is 
one person, he is quite old. They call it Haqqani Network, but he is one person, 
and not able physically to do something. That’s why this war will not end. That’s 
why I’m saying it is intelligence war. It’s not Afghan war.” 
Asked what would be his message to the people of Afghanistan, he emphasized 
the condition that has existed in Afghanistan for decades: 
“Afghanistan is a war-stricken country. So the law is the only source for hope. I 
want the Afghanistan people to act according to the law, to help in the 
implementation of the law of the country. For example, the attack which happened 
yesterday, what could the government do? The government cannot predict people. 
So the people themselves, they should be tolerant and they should not lose hope 
and help in the implementation of the law.” 
Participant RMD: 
RMD was the founder of an Afghan NGO in 1990, which was based in Pakistan, 
and worked with Afghan refugees who had been displaced during the Soviet invasion and 
the Afghan civil war. He shared: 
“At the beginning we just voluntarily did some activity for Afghan refugees 
without the support of donors. And now this organization is a great mission 
organization, which is working in many other provinces of Afghanistan. Our 
headquarters is here in Kabul and we have eleven offices. Our main activities are 
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education, community peace building, community organization, advocacy, and 
community health programs.” 
Asked what the challenges are now compared to the 1990s, he argued that:  
“It was difficult time, but to be honest, it was not as difficult as this moment 
because during the communist regime, the Taliban, and the Mujahidin times, the 
process to provide help to needy Afghans was easier than now, because now the 
government bureaucracy is very difficult. Several projects are taking more time to 
get missions from the government and provide help to the people. The security 
situation is also not good for NGOs to work in Ghazni or Kandarhar, and other 
provinces. So every other day, some of the staff of the NGOs are kidnapped by the 
enemy, but by the help and support of the community, some are released. It’s not 
easy to work now as an aid worker in Afghanistan.” 
Responding to the question of what he perceived to be the main challenge facing 
Afghanistan, RMD reiterated his earlier point: 
“The main challenge is security because most areas are too insecure for the 
government to go in, but the NGOs are able to go there and service the people. 
For example, our organization is working in five districts of Kandahar and in 
Ghazni; these two provinces are very insecure. But fortunately, the NGOs have 
the support of the community. This is a very good sign for NGOs. In some areas, 
the government does not exist, but still the NGOs are working there especially for 
health programs or MSP program, which are the mission programs of 
Afghanistan. And to be honest, now Afghan civil society or NGOs are very 
supportive of the government. Unfortunately sometimes, the government does not 
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always support the Afghan NGOs, even though they are the main implementers of 
major government programs. For example the health salaries program, and the 
mission solidarity programs - Afghan NGOs are the implementation partners for 
both programs; covering secure and insecure areas of Afghanistan. This is the 
reality of the situation.”  
He made the argument that NGOs and CSOs are the main implementers of 
government programs in rural insecure areas of Afghanistan, asserting that: 
“NGOs have credibility in the communities - They are working for us…The 
people are very supportive of the NGOs, but they do not trust the Afghan 
government.” 
Asked why the lack of trust with the government, RMD posited that:  
“This is a big problem in Afghanistan. The first problem is that the government is 
not honest with the people. The main issue is corruption, because of their own 
interest, because of the interventions of war lords. The government employees are 
working for themselves, not to support the people. I give you an example, 
sometimes the people have conflict, maybe a land issue and they want to solve it 
through the government system, it takes months and years especially if the conflict 
is with someone powerful. Sometimes, the people are happy to go to the Taliban 
to solve their problem and the problem is solved in one or two days. But in the 
government system because of corruption, it takes years and a lot of money 
needed to pay bribes.” 
He accuses the Afghan Government of being “inefficient and corrupt.” 
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Responding to why the Afghan NGOs have been able to gain and maintain trust 
with the people, RMD noted that:  
“Afghan NGOs have been serving the communities for many decades during the 
different regimes. NGOs are independent bodies, and they are not at the side of 
the Taliban or at the side of the government; they are just there to assist the 
people in need. They share their plans with the community and involve the people 
in the decision making to solve the real needs of the people. For example, we have 
28 clinics in Ghazni, and we have the health services for very poor people in the 
village. They know that they will lose these services if anything happens to our 
organization, so they are very protective and supportive of NGOs. If any of our 
staff is threatened or kidnapped, the community will come together to take action 
for their release.  
Asked where the insecurity is coming from if the communities are trusting of the 
Afghan aid workers, he emphasized that:  
“The enemy or the Taliban are still alive - the insecurity is not coming from the 
community, the insecurity is coming from the Taliban or from those who are 
involved in war. They want to make money. Kidnapping NGO workers is one 
source of making money for them.” 
Asked if he was hopeful that things would get better in Afghanistan, he took a 
moment to ponder on his response, stating that no one could answer such a question 
because as he noted: 
“The situation is very complicated.”  
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He argued that: 
“The military strategy is not clear; we don’t know what they are doing in the 
future… Are they staying or are they leaving?  
The second issue is the Afghan government: 
“The Afghan government system at the moment is very corrupted. They do not 
have any strong strategy to take action against the enemy. And unfortunately, we 
are not sure about the quality of the army and the police. They are not committed 
to helping the people and they are not committed to keeping peace in 
Afghanistan.” 
The third issue has to do with the upcoming election in 2014:  
“Will Karzai return to power? Are the same people also coming to power again, 
after the election?” 
Finally, he raised the issue of neighboring Pakistan and Iran: 
“These countries, they are supporting the Taliban” he said, “Is the international 
community taking action against these countries? If not, what will happen? To be 
honest, Pakistan is a more powerful country than Afghanistan, they have 
interventions and training areas for the enemy or the Taliban - for example, 
yesterday’s attack which happened in the middle of Kabul. These are questions 
that are causing uncertainty in Afghanistan. Since the last 12 years, the life of the 
people did not change; the poverty rate is still the same, and the social service is 
still the same. This makes the people afraid of what will happen if the 
international community pulls their support and leaves Afghanistan. When the 
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people have no hope, they cannot feed themselves and their families; the number 
of the Taliban is increasing because when the people are poor and cannot help 
themselves, the Taliban is active and recruiting. The people do not have any 
chance.”  
RMD continued to argue his point that the government of Afghanistan is not 
prepared and not a match for the more prepared Taliban, even though the government has 
more resources and should be able to overpower the Taliban militarily. He argued that:  
“In the surrounding district, there are big number of police and big number of 
armies, but it takes only 25 to 35 Taliban to cause damage and uncertainty in the 
districts. We have two types of Taliban. The first is the local Taliban, which is 
often made up of local gangs fighting against government. Their goal is to make 
money. The Afghan government knows that, yet they are not taking any actions 
against them or trying to arrest them. The other Taliban come from outside of 
Afghanistan and they want to destroy the bridges and cause major panic to bring 
mistrust between the people and the government. Unfortunately, the government 
is not fighting for the people.” 
Asked what the international community can do to help the Afghan government 
maintain control of the rural areas, RMD jokingly replied with a question:  
“What they can do in the future or now?” 
The investigator retuned with the question: What can they do now? RMD claimed that 
the international community in Afghanistan is unable to properly assist the government 
because the communities are from different nations, so they are not working as one 
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cohesive force. He posited that the international communities have different agendas and 
different objectives: 
“UK has their own agenda. America has its own agenda, and some of the 
European countries have their own agenda. They should have a strong and 
collective action and strategy to fight against terrorism, to fight against the 
Taliban and to bring pressure on neighboring countries of Afghanistan. Also, they 
should put pressure on the government of Afghanistan to bring an end to the 
corruption, to end poverty, and stop the continued influence of the war lords.”  
He argued that the international communities have spent billions of dollars in 
Afghanistan, yet the people remain poor, their lives have not changed, and noted:  
“Most of the people are poor and they don’t have any food or social services from 
their government or from the international community. The people of Afghanistan 
are angry and tied of the corruption and the mis-management of funds that should 
be used to assist the poor and needy Afghan families. A lot of money is used to 
pay foreign and Afghan contractors and government officials – very small 
percentage is used for the poor people’s needs. Afghans do not have trust on this 
government. The people are very afraid of what will happen to this society after 
2014 when the international community will leave Afghanistan, because they do 
not trust the Afghan government.” 
Asked if he was implying that the Afghan government and the Afghan securities 
were not ready to take over and maintain peace after the U.S. drawdown in 2014, RMD 
asserted that:  
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“If the situation continues like this, yeah, the people of Afghanistan will have no 
hope for peace. But we have a good sign from Italy, Germany, and Australia. 
They want to train our army and provide them with military equipment to fight 
against enemies of Afghanistan. But the big problem is the misunderstanding and 
mistrust between the government of Afghanistan and the government of America. 
For the last two years, they are talking about the strategy; agreement should be 
signed between Afghanistan and America.” 
When asked if he had a message for the President Obama, his initial response 
was: 
“I cannot talk with President Obama. He’s far away from here… But if I’m 
talking to him,” he said, “The first thing I will ask is for the troops to not leave 
Afghanistan, because if they leave Afghanistan, once again, this area will be the 
centre of terrorism, because it’s a complicated geographical land area, Iran, 
Pakistan, China, and many Asian and Arab countries will keep this area for Al-
Qaeda and terrorism. Before they leave, they should invest here and help bring 
peace here. They should not forget the people of Afghanistan, these people are 
very poor and some of them do not have a piece of bread to eat, they need a lot of 
support, and the support should come through the right way. Unfortunately, the 
contractors from the U.S. are eating all the money and not serving the people. 
The local NGOs are committed to provide services to rural communities; we just 
need the help of the international community to provide us with the funding to 
meet our obligation to our Afghan people who need all your help.”  
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RMD’s message to the Afghan people is to work together and build Afghanistan. 
He is quite resolute on his claim that it is not up to the international community to build 
Afghanistan. He called for Afghans to take 
“Strong action against all injustice and to bring pressure on Afghan government 
and the international community to have a fair election. Help each other and 
work together to build one strong Afghan society. Take part in the upcoming 
election. I know that the international communities are not building this country, 
we must build our country.”  
Participant EIJ 
I met EIJ in his office with my translator. We were well received with hot green 
tea and Afghan pastries. We were later invited to join him and his colleagues for lunch, 
but we were unable due to another interview engagement. 
Responding to a question of how things have changed since the war on terror, EIJ 
shared: 
“After 2002, a lot of improvement happened in the life of the Afghan people. After 
the formation of the government in 2001, humanitarian activities increased, a lot 
of construction companies were established in different parts of the country and a 
lot of people had work. PRTs -Provincial Reconstruction Teams were providing 
and funding projects and almost everybody in the provinces benefited. So these 
activities continued until about 2009 when the PRTs decreased their activities, 
which eventually forced many provinces to close their activities; causing many 
people especially the youths to become jobless.”  
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He posited that after the PRTs closed, the Afghan government ordered to close all the 
construction companies and blamed the PRTs and the donors for providing funds directly 
to Afghan NGOs, instructing them that: 
“They should not give funds directly to Afghan NGOs, or CSOs; instead the funds 
should go through the Afghan Government.”  
EIJ argued that the government policy contradicted humanitarian and donor principles, 
because he said that: 
“Donor organization policy does not require NGO funding to be made through 
government institutions. So this created a lot of problems between the Afghan 
government, the donors, and the Afghan NGOs.” 
EIJ continued to make the case against the new government policy of not funding Afghan 
NGOs directly, but through the Afghan central government. He insisted that: 
“The NGOs are not working to make profit, it's on their mandates, but the 
government wanted to have the money for themselves. However, we know of all 
the issues with the Afghan government and corruption. They claim that they want 
to support the private sector, so they are creating more construction companies 
and the new projects are funding through government, but still the corruption 
level is very high. This is affecting many Afghan NGOs as activities continue to 
decrease.” 
EIJ believed that Afghan NGOs have played very important roles in Afghanistan; 
he asserted that Afghan NGOs: 
“Always have a good relationship with the people because they are from the 
people and they work for the people. They consult with the people, and they use a 
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participatory approach to address local issues, community issues and problems. 
I’ll give you an example; there was an irrigation project in a very insecure village 
that the government could not dare to step in. But this NGO went in to the village 
and carried out irrigation activities for the benefit of the people with the support 
and assistance of the people.” 
Explaining how Afghan NGOs interact with the communities, he posited that:  
“Before they start activities, they go to the area and make an assessment with the 
village people. So the people have so many needs. They collect the needs, they do 
the assessment and they prioritize the needs to determine which one is most 
pressing and begin to address the problem in that order. Through consultation 
with the people, they find out the problem and then they try to help resolving the 
issue together with the people. For example right now, we are constructing three 
clinics in the country, and each of these clinics is situated 100 to 150 kilometers 
from the center of the province. So we talked with the people because for the 
construction of the building we need a piece of land, and the people allocated us a 
piece of land in one of the old graveyards and now the work is continuing there 
and we hope that in the next two months, we’ll have the whole clinic ready for 
service. But if it were the government seeking a piece of land for the clinic, we 
will not have it - that would take much time. Because of the direct contact with the 
community, they name their needs in their province. So they were ready to give us 
that piece of land, and now we are in the process of providing their needs. There 
is no Afghan government in that village, but the Taliban is there, but because the 
community is directly working with the NGO, the Taliban does not say anything 
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because people in the village are working. They needed the project according to 
the work place need assessment we had done.”  
Asked if this type of working relationship with the communities could be 
developed with the Afghan government, EIJ’s response was not optimistic; referring to 
the government he asserted that:  
“We have them like enemies. They are very hostile to the NGO people. And we 
don’t know for what reason, they are not cooperating with the NGOs as 
necessary. Because of the prevailing corruption in the government, when we want 
to get something approved, we have to spend a lot of money to pay off the corrupt 
people. So this is one problem. But with the community, it’s no problem because 
the community is not corrupt. With the communities, they assist in the resolution 
of the problem, but with the government, they are very unprofessional. 
Unfortunately, nowadays every project has to go through the government; you 
have to meet the demands of these corrupt officials. They don’t care if it’s for the 
welfare, or the wellbeing of the country, or for the interests of the people. It 
doesn’t matter how your project is useful for the people, all they care about is 
feeding their own pockets.”  
Asked why the insecurity against Afghan NGOs continues to increase in light of 
the good relationship developed between NGOs and the communities, EIJ posited that:  
“Security is a big challenge; on the one hand it is caused by the Taliban and the 
terrorist, and on the other hand, the high rate of unemployment amongst the youth 
today. The youths are jobless, they cannot find work, and this is a very serious 
problem for Afghanistan. There are no opportunities for the youths; this is an 
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important factor of insecurity. If we are able to provide job for people so they 
won’t participate in any illegal actions, I suppose, they won’t go to the terrorists. 
When they have jobs, they have money for their consumptions and they can take 
care of their families.” 
Responding to the question, who are the terrorists, EIJ was quite direct in his answer:  
“Yes of course Taliban are the terrorists, and the people who are supporting the 
Taliban. But in the villages, where people have no work, no hope or opportunities 
to make a living, yet they must find means to provide for their families. If the 
government is not able to have access to the people in the villages, but suppose 
the terrorists or the Taliban have access to the people. The terrorist or Taliban 
are able to provide them with food and money to take care of their families, they 
are going to listen to the Taliban and do what the Taliban wants them to do.”  
Asked what he thought of Afghan preparedness for the drawdown of troops in 
2014, he said,  
“People feel hopeless. People are disappointed when they hear that in 2014 the 
drawdown of the international troops will begin, because they have seen the 
situation in the 90s and they see that these powerful people, the commanders, will 
create the same situation again in Afghanistan, especially in Kabul. The general 
public mentality is that if the foreign troops leave the country and abandon 
Afghanistan like they did in the past, the situation will get worse and they will 
have no hope. But it is a transition, and we have to make ourselves ready for the 
transition. However, if the international community does not stop their assistance, 
there won’t be any big issue for us, because once again people will be engrossed, 
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will be involved in activities, they will have job, they will have money. We need 
the international community to continue their support because still we need it.” 
Asked who the enemies of Afghanistan are, EIJ’s response was swift: 
“Clearly I say that the enemies of Afghanistan are two neighboring countries; 
Pakistan and Iran. They do not want Afghan people to live in peace and 
prosperity, and they have spies and intelligence here to disturb the normal and 
peaceful life of the people. They want us to have unstable government so that they 
can find their benefits under such kind of government, because every day over 
45,000 Afghans travel to neighboring countries for goods and services not 
available in Afghanistan. So a lot of Afghan businesses go to our neighboring 
countries.” 
EIJ talks about business people and government officials whose families live 
outside Afghanistan; he argued that some have dual citizenships: 
“They are dangerous because their families are living abroad comfortably, their 
children don’t know about suicide attacks, bomb blasts, the miseries of the people 
they cannot see. Their families live a good life and these people are not interested 
in the peace, development, and stability of this country. This is just my personal 
opinion.” 
Asked who are the friends of Afghanistan, his response was that: 
“Those people in governments who assist people of Afghanistan, who serve the 
people of Afghanistan, who help our people and who do not want to abandon and 
forget Afghanistan and try to help in different ways and different sectors. It is also 
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a reality that during the past recent history of this country, the Americans and the 
allies have been the best friends of the Afghan people. Despite making some 
mistakes, they have provided good services for the people of this country and the 
people consider them as friends. And I do not say this in front of you because this 
is from my heart. They helped us in the construction of the rules, and now we have 
rules in the country, now we have good health terms in the country, we have 
educational centers and schools and we have a very modern communication 
system, such as mobile phones and internet services. Before 2011, Afghan people 
did not know about internet.” 
Regarding his message to President Obama, EIJ was diplomatic:  
“First of all, I wish good health for President Obama and I want him not to forget 
Afghanistan, to assist our country, our army, our police, and our people, to 
strengthen our security and help our reconstruction and development. We need 
security, but most of all we need improvement in our education so we can improve 
ourselves and be able to stand on our own feet. We depend on the knowledge of 
foreigners who are coming in Afghanistan who are the advisors of the ministers 
or our president and so on and so forth.” 
To the American people, he is thankful for the sacrifices made on behalf of 
Afghanistan and the Afghan people: 
“To the people of United States of America who have helped us, who have 
sacrificed their services and the lives of their sons and daughters, for the service 
and peace and security of this country. You have sacrificed life and blood for the 
people of our country, for that we are very grateful.” 
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To the Afghan people, he calls on them to: 
“Unite, and to join hands in the establishment of peace and security in 
Afghanistan, and also the reconstruction and development of the country. Become 
educated; do not to be misled by misinformation and provocations, and to 
distinguish between friends and enemies. If Afghans are educated, we are sure 
that the enemies of Afghanistan will not be able to take advantage of them.” 
Focus Group Participants 
At the beginning, focus group participants were given post-it notes and instructed 
to list their perceptions and feelings about the following issues: Insecurities and violence 
against Afghan aid workers, Challenges from U.S. drawdown of forces in 2014, and the 
Effects of War on Terror on Afghan aid workers. Participants were given fifteen minutes 
to write, and the post-it notes were collected and taped on walls outside the conference 
room. Participants were instructed to walk around and examine entries on the post-it 
notes and mark the number “1” next to any entry of their choosing. Most participants 
walked around and viewed the post-it notes on the wall; however, no markings were 
noted on any of the post-it notes. The following are the categories with the themes that 
participants listed on the post-it notes. 
Category: Insecurity and Violence against Afghan Aid Workers 
P. In insecure areas, people call aid workers spy of the Americans 
P. Before the U.S. Forces arrived, Afghan aid workers were able to work among 
the people, but after the arrival of the U.S. Forces, the Afghan aid workers were 
perceived to be helpers of U.S. Forces. 
P. The West pushed workers, people think 
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Category: Challenges from U.S. Drawdown of Forces in 2014 
P. Security situation might worsen if the Afghan national forces are not fully 
equipped. 
P. Interventions from neighboring countries will increase 
P. Insecurities will increase 
P. Resurgence of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan 
P. Weak local security and governance capacity 
P. Interventions from other nations, polycentricism, resurgence of insurgent and 
innocent killings 
P. Funding opportunities may decrease 
P. Cost of living may increase 
P. Reduction in humanitarian aid funding  
P. Rise in unemployment as job opportunities decrease 
P. Economic, military, and political transition 
P. Anarchy after withdrawal of foreign troops 
P. Intervention from neighboring countries 
P. Increase in security problems 
P. Pull out will affect aid workers’ engagement in Afghanistan 
P. Survival of present government, survival of the CSOs, and decrease in funding 
P. Change in economic activities 
P. Rise in insurgency 
P. People lost hope due to perception of unrealized objectives  
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Category: Effects of War on Terror on Afghan Aid Workers 
P. Created new opportunities 
P. Insecurity spreads in Afghanistan by Western politicians 
P. Security concerns increased for aid workers 
P. International forces failed to bring security to Afghanistan, thus aid workers 
were negatively affected 
P. NGO expectations on security were not met 
P. Security has been major challenge for NGOs – aid workers kidnapped and 
killed 
P. Civilian casualty high, and insecurity is major problem 
P. Insecurity hampered aid service to needy communities 
P. Security has been major challenge 
P. Access to communities  
P. Development programs designed by donors and international communities, not 
matched with actual needs of the Afghan people 
Focus Group Discussion 
1. Concerns Over U.S. Drawdown of Forces in 2014 
Female Speaker 
“In 2005 I was able to go to Kharwar district of Logar, but now I cannot work 
inside the cover. For me as an Afghan, if the Americans drawdown it will not 
change anything, they did not come here to support Afghans, they came for their 
own agenda, and they will go by their own agenda.” 
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Male Speaker 
“With the withdrawal of American forces in 2014, there may be many 
complications, but the basic ones are unemployment and economic transition. 
Foreign aids will decline as foreign troops withdraw, and many international 
organizations will leave Afghanistan, causing a decline in economic activities. As 
the International Military forces withdraw, responsibility for Afghan security will 
shift to the Afghan National Forces. However, the insurgents are beginning to 
take on our forces, so how will the Afghan National Forces be able to secure the 
country without the ISAF?” 
Male Speaker  
“Political transitions - in April 2014 the Presidential elections will take place in 
Afghanistan during the same time the Americans are drawing down forces, this I 
believe will bring some sort of chaos and belligerence because there is always 
conflict in Afghan presidential election. There is no concern for people’s right; 
there is no concern for the widow who is walking outside the streets scavenging 
woods to cook some food for their child. There is no concern for an orphan whose 
father was killed in the corresponding conflict of radicalism and extremism.”  
Male Speaker  
“After the drawdown in 2014, what I think we need is the military transition from 
ISAF forces to Afghan Forces. However, we need a good political transition of 
the government; we want the International community to maintain impartiality 
during the elections in Afghanistan. Any interference from the International 
community in the election will highly affect humanitarian aid workers in the 
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villages and communities. Afghanistan needs technical support from the 
international community to have good governance, transparent, and fair election 
in Afghanistan.”  
Female Speaker 
“The Americans have implemented their own agenda in Afghanistan. For me as 
an Afghan, we are already here, we are leaving in insecurity; after 2014 we will 
still be living in insecurity because they did not have the agenda to support 
Afghanistan, they have their own agenda, to have their base. Finally they have 
their base in Afghanistan, now they want to go back home, but the problem is still 
here; lots of civilian causalities. We are victims.”  
Male Speaker  
“For me these are important issues that we will face, in general the drawdown 
may worsen the law and order situation and the security situation in Afghanistan. 
The capital flight component is a very important problem, economic decision has 
started, civil war definitely will be there; increase in interference from the 
neighbors; political instability, brain drain will also be there, downsizing in aid 
from the International community for the civil societies, so their survival would be 
at stake. Definitely, the number of civil society organizations will be decreased to 
a minimum level. Law and order situation will be severely devastated and also we 
will lose the achievements of the past years. 
“The brain drain means the technocrats, the professional people, the 
academics, scientists and economists - they will all leave Afghanistan for safer 
places with greater opportunities. As we are the veteran or eye witnesses of the 
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last civil war in Afghanistan, during those 30 years, there were no intellectuals, 
no economists in Afghanistan. Many migrated to Pakistan or to the other 
countries. There are no investment opportunities anymore, the people are afraid 
of what could happen after 2014. Everyone in Afghanistan is of the opinion that 
the institutions will be devastated after 2014; this will definitely affect the whole 
system whether it is the security or the government.” 
Male Speaker  
“I believe that the civil society activists, the NGOs and the local communities 
have been in conflict with Afghan politicians, warlord and regional powers, even 
before the arrival of the U.S. and International forces. This conflict has continued 
since the occupation, and we expect it will continue after the U.S. and the 
international forces leave in 2014.”  
Male Speaker  
“After 2014, if the international communities will leave Afghanistan, I believe 
there will be restrictions in funding for aid programs. Many Afghan NGOs will 
close down their activities and engagement in Afghanistan. But who will be 
affected? I think the people, the beneficiaries; the poor people will be affected. 
My request is that the International community will continue their financial 
support of Afghan aid programs after 2014.”  
Female Speaker  
“Not a lot of money comes to the aid community in Afghanistan from the 
International Military Forces. Most of the aid comes from non-political aid 
agencies, not the military. If we continue to have funds from non-political 
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organizations who are honestly interested in the development of Afghanistan, the 
drawdown of forces in 2014 will have little or no effect. So, if the military are 
going, they can go.” 
Female Speaker  
“I believe that funding for Afghan NGOs will decrease if the International Forces 
leave Afghanistan in 2014. During the past 12 years, we have developed many 
programs and a lot has been achieved. Reductions in funding will create many 
problems in Afghan economy; we could lose many of the things that have been 
achieved as different people and different political and social ideologies of the 
past begin to return to Kabul.”  
Male Speaker  
“Regarding the pull out of Western forces in 2014, I think it will not have any 
particular effect on Afghan NGO’s, since there is no direct working relationship 
with Western troops. NGOs design their own projects according to their own 
constitution…” 
Male Speaker  
“President Obama’s plan to drawdown U.S. forces from Afghanistan in 2014 will 
affect many things in Afghanistan. First of all, this drawdown will immediately 
weaken Afghan forces readiness to be equipped to protect Afghan people because 
the U.S. government is giving these arms and weapons to Pakistan. Such a move 
will destabilize the security of Afghanistan. This is a very bad situation right now, 
and it will become worse after the withdrawal of the international community and 
their forces from Afghanistan. It will negatively affect Afghanistan.” 
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2. Role of Afghan NGOs since War on Terror 
Male Speaker 
“NGOs and CSOs have played very important roles during the last twelve years, 
but sadly enough, some have been involved in corrupt activities that have affected 
the trusting relationship NGOs and CSOs have enjoyed with the people. The 
people of Afghanistan depend on the aid community to be honest and not corrupt 
like the government officials. If the NGOs are not honest to provide better service 
for the people of Afghanistan to achieve goals and to do what the fund was given 
for, this will be a big blow for the hope of the Afghan people. This is their hope 
for a stable society. This is a big problem. Money is coming from the donors, but 
going to Dubai. There is no benefit for the people of Afghanistan. Only a few 
people benefit from aid fund to help the poor people; they put it in their pockets. 
For what reason? We need accountability from NGOs.”  
Male Speaker 
“When the Russians invaded Afghanistan, millions of Afghans took refuge in the 
neighboring countries, particularly in Pakistan. At that time, the international 
forces rushed to the ground for the assistance of the refugees and other needy 
Afghans inside Afghanistan. That was the beginning of aid activities in 
Afghanistan - they started to deliver services to the refugees in Pakistan as well as 
those inside Afghanistan. 
“In 1988 the International community and the United Nations encouraged 
some qualified Afghans to establish Afghan NGOs to take the lead role in 
providing aid to needy Afghans. About 15 Afghani NGOs were established 
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including some Arab NGOs and together, they started their aid work in 
Afghanistan. Well, they were very active inside Afghanistan. Particularly the 
Afghan NGOs who are on the ground and delivering humanitarian services to the 
people of Afghanistan. But the situation changed after 1992 when the 
international community abandoned Afghanistan, paving the way for the 
Mujahidin to come to Afghanistan. That is why the terrorism, Al-Qaeda and 
Talibanism came to Afghanistan. That was, I think the, the fault of the 
International communities led by the United State that they failed to fulfill their 
commitment when they abandoned Afghanistan. After the Mujahidin, the Taliban 
came to Afghanistan, believe me, this was the period of underground activities in 
Afghanistan. There were no International NGOs in Afghanistan due to the 
Taliban, only the UDP was allowed to operate here - I think the editor was Mr. 
Jordan; he was the only staff in Afghanistan. But the NGOs were very active, they 
were engaged in the entire aid activities - everywhere they can go. There was 
security, I think if they could upgrade their operation or their activities all over 
Afghanistan because there was security, there was no killing – aid workers felt 
secured. But the insecurity started in 2001 when the International Forces came to 
Afghanistan.” 
Male Speaker 
“To be very specific I think the role of the NGO in civil society is to make 
awareness and to create an environment that will foster change in society. If we 
look into the enrollment rate of education; we have 9 million children going to 
school. Many NGOs have played very important roles in promoting the awareness 
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and importance of education to the people and the communities to send their 
children to the school; both females and males, because they hadn’t been doing 
that during Taliban time. Many NGOs also played important roles in adult 
literacy. And now that we are practicing democracy, NGOs and CSOs play very 
important roles in building political awareness in the communities. 20,000 
community development concepts at the village level and they established the 
CDCs and democratic process. We have elected government, we have parliament, 
and we have commission consultants. NGOs played a very important role in 
informing the people and motivating the people to participate in the elections by 
providing them access to polling stations.”  
Male Speaker 
“In my opinion, the very significant role of Afghan NGOs is the delivery of 
humanitarian aid services to needy Afghans in secure and insecure villages and 
communities around Afghanistan. Due to the present security situation, our 
government and other international supporters are not able to deliver services to 
the needy people in certain environments. Besides, I agree with my friend that 
some civil societies are acting like a bridge between communities and 
governmental authorities. But in my opinion, this is a very risky task that 
sometimes puts aid workers in danger.”  
Male Speaker  
“Generally, the CSOs play major roles in the field of education, health, access to 
justice, good governance, anti-corruption, peace and contribute to the solution, 
the elimination of violence against women, human rights, and the democratic 
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process. As a result of these efforts, we have some significant achievement, which 
have significantly improved the social condition and quality of life of our people. 
In fact, human capital has been developed as a result of work done by CSOs and 
NGOs with literacy rate, which has been increased because of the literacy 
intervention in different adult populations in the communities. As the Minister of 
Education mentioned, there are 63 million school-going children in total. Now the 
government is more transparent, the people are able to evaluate the performance 
of their leaders; we can see their policies, how they’re implemented, and whether 
the policies address the needs of the people. The civil society organizations and 
the NGOs play a vital role in this regard in the bridging between the community 
and the government.” 
Male Speaker 
“The Afghan NGO’s and the CSO’s have played key roles in the society because 
of their presence and persistence to work and continue to provide aid to needy 
Afghans in difficult parts of the country with high insecurity problems. They have 
helped a lot of people; five years back, NGO’s were weak, but now the country is 
really strong.”  
Male Speaker 
“I believe that the role of the construction companies have been very weak. One 
out of ten, 1/10th part of the funds will be spend in Afghanistan; most of the 
construction money will go out of the country. It doesn’t mean for the stability of 
Afghanistan. You build a road today and it will be destroyed within two or three 
months, even the cement or the concrete that they used; just one spill of water, it 
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starts to show its quality. So this is a main issue in Afghanistan and the role of the 
workers are so weak in the construction companies because of the corruption and 
the lack of quality control, no one cares about the future stability of the buildings 
in Afghanistan. Now the CSOs are working for the social accountability and 
providing information on anti-corruption.”  
3. Insecurity is a big problem 
Researcher: Some of you have also alluded to the idea that Afghans are not terrorists. 
Okay. The argument was made that Osama Bin Laden was not killed in Afghanistan. 
Alright! My question is, if that is true, which we know he was killed in Pakistan, but if it 
is true that there is no terrorism here in Afghanistan, the key question for me becomes 
what are the reasons, therefore, for the increased insecurities and violence against 
humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan? Where is that coming from? 
Male Speaker 
“The big reason why people are thinking that terrorists are in Pakistan and 
increasing attack against the aid worker in Afghanistan in a short sentence, aid 
worker countries don't want Afghanistan and the people to have a stable country. 
If the question of terrorism in Afghanistan was asked two or three or four decades 
ago, this would be in fact true but there are reasons that terrorist are… terrorism 
is brought to Afghanistan. Before I mention in the last question radicalism and 
extremism was used as a tool by the western countries, U.S. and rest of its allies 
bring terrorism to Afghanistan through these tools and question that terrorists are 
not in Afghanistan, that is a fact. They are not actually pinpointing and finding 
the right country with terrorist activity. Actually, the hard house and the hard bed 
of terrorism is our neighboring country Pakistan. That has been interfering from 
a decade mostly from the last decade and targeting our many entities; 
governmental entities, political entities, educational entities but the reason for the 
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insecurities are not…from only this hard house and hard bed which is our 
neighboring country, many other countries are intervening in our country, they 
have their interests. Before… three decades or two decades ago, the world 
warriors and many great nations were suggesting and contemplating that their 
Constantinople conquer the western countries and the Asian countries but 
nowadays Afghanistan has been made an apogee for… in order to conquer other 
countries, actually it’s a war not on terrorism because if it would be a war on 
terrorism, their leader has been killed about a year ago but the main focus is on 
their empire.” 
Male Speaker 
“I think to be very specific…in fact it’s a reality that… I think before September 
2001, the people of Afghanistan were not related to either Taliban or Al-Qaeda, 
but after that … this type of issues got to Afghanistan but if the situation would 
continue what could happen? Suppose the situation continues, definitely there 
would be insecurity, insecurity of Afghanistan. In insecure environmental 
situations the aid workers do not work properly, they cannot engage their work 
properly and they cannot deliver services…And from the other side if there is 
insecurity in Afghanistan so the aid will be decreased, the job employment for 
Afghans will be decreased and finally, the people of Afghanistan will be 
negatively affected. I think Pakistan has two main reasons for keeping terrorism 
in this country. First, they have an issue with … Kashmir issue between Pakistan 
and India. Second one is Pakistan does not like to have a terrible country beside 
its side which is Afghanistan #1. I think very soon the water … the water level will 
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… because it is very important. We have a loss of water level… they are using our 
water for irrigation, for their land for these things. If we have a stable powerful 
government in Afghanistan and so we will do in this country. Very soon we will 
have lots of … we will have control of the water; we can use our water for our 
own objectives. So Pakistan would not like it. Besides that, we have a good 
relation with India. Pakistan never wants another country beside it, to like India, 
something like this, because they’re afraid from that…If we have a stable 
Afghanistan and with a good relation with India, this will make the situation twice 
as bad.”  
Researcher: Thank you. Where is the insecurity coming from? Why do we continue to 
see more violence against humanitarian aid workers? Where do you think it’s coming 
from? 
Male Speaker 
“From my point of view, this again has external factors, which get cozy in 
connection with our neighbors and perhaps to some other countries also. As was 
mentioned by our colleagues, in particular, a neighbor country cannot tolerate a 
stable, progressive, developed, and independent Afghanistan. The main issue 
covered in these phenomena is the durian line and the issue of Pashtunistan in 
addition to Pakistan’s control over the rulers in Afghanistan. That’s why we have 
witnessed the heavy coverage of the conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
in the media, and the clashes in the recent days on the durian line between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. This was also stated in Hamid Karzai‘s statement 
addressing the nation that Pakistan had repeatedly requested him to discuss the 
durian line issue and Mr. Karzai has clearly told them that this is not the time to 
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discuss it. This shows that there is mistrust between Kabul and Islamabad, which 
could possibly lead to fears from Pakistan that Afghanistan may be developed in 
the future, where border line issues continue to create conflict between the two 
countries. This situation is not ideal for Pakistan; hence it is important for 
Islamabad that the Taliban remains viable. Osama was targeted there; all the 
other terrorists are out there, the international community exists in Afghanistan. 
If the international community can finger point any terrorist based stations in 
Afghanistan, they have to come in front of the media and say that in this province 
or in that district, in this village, or that village. So, Pakistan with all those 
intentions in mind want to raise people there, brainwash people there, send them 
from there to here, tell the people that Afghans are non-Muslims, it's time for 
Jihad, you have to fight the foreigners, you have to fight the Afghan 
government…This is intended to keep the Afghan Government and the struggles 
of the international community weakened.” 
Male Speaker 
“Insecurities in Afghanistan started when America and the coalition forces came 
to Afghanistan. America did not want the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, why will 
Russia now allow America to be here in Afghanistan? All the nations in 
Afghanistan are here protecting their own national interests. Russia does not 
want America occupying Afghanistan or having influence over middle Asia. Also 
China as a major economic power does not want America in its border, and 
China thinks that if America remains here, the Muslim travelers in China will rise 
against Chinese Communist Government. Many countries want us to push back 
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on America; it’s not only Pakistan, not only Iran that are causing the insecurities 
in Afghanistan.”  
Male Speaker 
“Main point is insecurity, which is fueled by high unemployment, and culture of 
systemic corruption. Many nations are making Afghanistan an apogee for their 
conflicts, specially the neighboring countries. Whenever any Western country 
wants to intervene in a Muslim country, they use radicalism and extremism as a 
pretext; however, these ideologies have origins outside of Afghanistan. Since the 
arrival of the NATO led ISAF, the neighboring countries have been intervening in 
Afghan affairs. We have not created war or terrorism; Osama bin Laden was not 
an Afghan, he was an Arab.”  
Male Speaker 
“In recognition of the result of the Bonn Conference in 2001, many people 
including the aid workers hoped that there would be security in Afghanistan. That 
the International Forces will bring security to Afghanistan, but unfortunately this 
did not happen; they failed to bring security to Afghanistan and the aide works 
were affected negatively. For example, in 2005 or 2003 I could go to every part of 
Afghanistan, but now even you cannot go to the Maidan Shahr.”  
Male Speaker 
“Based on my point of view as an Afghan living in Afghanistan, the challenges 
that we have been faced with the problems that we have been witnessing for over 
30 years were created for us from the top. Either development or international 
community or within the ordinary Afghan, the issues come from the top. Even 
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when we compare the Taliban era to this time, with the overwhelming support of 
the international community, I think my colleagues who are sitting around the 
table, will all agree with me that security situation in Taliban’s time was much 
better than the security today in Afghanistan. They would agree with me even if 
you would have bags of gold with you and go wherever you want to go and 
nobody would dare to stop you or take something from you. Nobody would dare 
to put you down. Nobody would dare to ask you where you work, what you do or 
something like that. You would have been able to travel to different parts of 
Afghanistan with full confidence. However, there were limitations as my 
colleagues would agree, during the Taliban era, people were not free to pursue 
their dreams and live independently. Unfortunately, the Taliban fighters were not 
Afghans, most were born outside Afghanistan, and they were recruited and 
controlled from foreign countries. They were not really from among the people of 
Afghanistan. I would also say with confidence that at that time, the belief was that 
there was no border between Islamic countries; there were even some people in 
Pakistan who thought that Afghanistan was the 5
th
 province of their country. We 
have heard about conflicting issues in Afghanistan; between Afghans, but 
instructions on how to resolve them were received from Islamabad. I have heard a 
story of someone who was arrested in Kabul at that time by Taliban and he was 
released by instruction from Islamabad. On the order hand, the existence of 
international community in Afghanistan, under the theme of supporting Afghans 
was really about the war against terror. Like you know, at first if we think there is 
no proper definition even for terror. What do we mean by terror? Terror is a 
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person who terrifies people. A terrorist could be anybody. We do need to have a 
proper definition for terrorism. If terrorism means to keep an innocent person 
locked up, the definition could go much wider and much broader. For example 
during the era of communists in Afghanistan, even Dr. Najibullah was willing to 
have peace talks with Mujahidin at that time, but they did not accept it. He was 
surrounded from all sides and finally the government collapsed. Kabul was 
occupied by Mujahidin at that time with support from Pakistan, and from 
America, which provided Mujahidin with weapons and money. In my opinion, our 
biggest mistake as a people was that we did not support our leaders at that 
time…”  
4. A Major Issue of Trust 
Male Speaker 
“Another thing which is affecting the aide work in Afghanistan is that the Afghan 
NGOs in the very beginning established good relations with the people of 
Afghanistan. Because they were working very closely with the people in the 
communities, they were able to design programs based on the needs of the people. 
But when the PRTs came to Afghanistan, this trusting relationship with the 
Afghan community was affected very badly; aid workers were confronted in 
villages and communities and asked if they had a gun, or weapons on them. This 
suspicion affected the relationship between Afghan aid workers and the Afghan 
communities.” 
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Male Speaker 
“Since 1980, Afghan NGOs have been working in Afghan villages and 
communities. After the arrival of the international troops, Afghan NGOs were the 
only ones that could go into certain insecure communities that the International 
NGOs could not go. The main role of the Afghan NGOs on civil society has been 
the bridging between the people, communities, international communities as well 
as the local governments. Afghan NGOs have been the main implementers of aid 
programs and project in the villages and rural communities around Afghanistan, 
including those designed by the international communities and the Afghan 
government. They have established good relations with the people. The people 
trust them and they are able to work even in insecure areas. The challenge for the 
Afghan NGO is how to get more benefits to needy Afghan people.”  
Female Speaker 
“It is true that Afghan aid workers have established good and trusting 
relationships with the Afghan communities, but on the other hand, we lost our 
reputation in the community because some NGOs were receiving funds from 
organizations that did not have the best interest of the Afghan people. The people 
know which countries are supporting Afghanistan and in what manner they are 
providing their support. If the money is coming from U.S. Military or from PRTs, 
the people know their aims; why they came to Afghanistan, their objectives, and 
what they want to achieve. We’re losing our reputation day by day because of the 
objectives of some aid organizations. These organizations are operating on their 
own interest, and not in the interest of Afghan people.”  
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Researcher: Can you expand on that? How does that affect the reputation?  
Female Speaker 
“Some Afghan NGOs, who are receiving money through PRTs and implementing 
PRT projects, are looked at by the people as not being honest and trusting with 
the Afghan people. The people know that they are implementing PRT objectives. 
For example, PRTs sometimes give money to build mosque, but the people know 
that PRTs have no interest in expanding Islam, but for some particular reason 
they are giving money to build the mosque here.”  
Male Speaker 
“Before the U.S. and the NATO forces came to Afghanistan, the Afghan people 
believed that the International NGOs were working with us and were here to help 
us. They didn’t mind who was controlling the gun; whether it was the Talib or 
Mujahid. After the coalition forces came here, the International NGOs started 
aligning themselves to their different national interests. They started operating by 
their national policies and objectives; no longer focused on providing 
humanitarian aid to assist desperately needy Afghan people who have become 
victims of the war on terror. So the people lost their trust on the International 
NGOs. Many of the International NGO projects are now implemented through the 
strategies and stipulations of their home countries. This is a major issue of trust 
and accountability; there is no quality control, there is no follow-up of their 
projects, there is no impact assessment for the projects, and that’s why people 
have lost trust and no longer rely on the International NGOs. The question that 
most Afghan people are asking is that the Taliban was toppled within 48 hours by 
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the U.S. and International Forces, and they occupied the whole country in 2001, 
how come now, the Taliban have been very strong and powerful? American 
troops came within two nights and conquered the whole country, but now, more 
than 100,000 troops from NATO and other countries are here in Afghanistan and 
we still have insecurity. So the people are asking, how come now there is no 
security in Afghanistan? The Afghan people do not trust any troops even the aid 
workers. This is the biggest issue. So if you compare with 10 years ago, 
Afghanistan should be more stable and secure, but every day the security is 
getting worse.” 
Male Speaker 
“America thought that if Russia controlled Afghanistan then we will start up 
another scenario by the name of Pakistan. That’s a big problem between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. America planned how to defeat Russia to prevent their 
progress. They made a lot of agendas, a lot of strategies. They supported the 
Mujahedeen for their mission. And also they provide money. They provided the 
military supply and the other countries who were involved in the business of fuel, 
Arab Countries; they all put their money to support of America. They have that 
big investment to protect, to save their business in Afghanistan. Yeah. So finally 
America become victor…they got the victory and then the next scenario was to 
create an unstable government under the leadership of Mujahedeen. But their 
plan was for the Mujahedeen government to fail because they have the next plan - 
first to give a bad name or a bad point of view from the Islamic Government for 
the people of Afghanistan throughout; this is Muslim leaders. What are they 
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doing? That was the…the keys, a bunch of keys for dispute. And second they had 
another plan to create a military force like Taliban, they named after by the 
suggestion of Saudi Arabia and MI-6 England and America CIA. Did provide this 
plan together to provide and later force to attack Mujahedeen government and to 
remove them from power. This was the second scenario. And after that Taliban 
came to…the push back of the Northern Alliance to North of Afghanistan people 
saw a lot of economy weakness, a lot of society problems. So they once again, the 
experience of such a government that was commonly played Muslim leaders. This 
all was how to bring a new idea for the people of Afghanistan for example 
democracy. People of Afghanistan were looking for a new sort of government that 
will provide a better life for them. The coalition force, the international 
community, so for example I can see how NATO and all those country who are 
members of NATO - how they came to Afghanistan. This was not only to bring 
democracy for our country. Not only to have a democratic government, to provide 
better life for the people. They are all big project. For example the pipeline of gas 
from Turkmenistan to India. This is a big project. All the agents working there 
have the agendas of their countries. Especially those NGOs, they’re foreign 
not…Afghans. For example, what Russia wants? What China wants? What does 
India want? And what American or Western countries want? The centre for 
Western country is from the Middle Asia to the East…the South of Asia. For 
example, we have to draw a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan to 
Pakistan, India and Bangladesh to Indonesia. It’s a big economical project. They 
have their economy entrust in the world. The war against terror…” 
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5.  Corruption and Mismanagement 
Male Speaker  
“If the United State gives funds to USAID, and USAID gives this money to United 
Nations. United Nations gives this money to International NGOs, and the 
international NGOs give some of the money to the Afghan NGOs. Then the 
Afghan NGOs will implement the project, but only a fraction of the original 
amount will reach the intended beneficiaries of the aid. This is because the 
Afghan NGOs do not have direct access to the funds. This is a big challenge for 
Afghan NGOs and CSOs.” 
Male Speaker 
“I believe that if we are to bring about real peace in Afghanistan, a real peace for 
humanity throughout the world, we must remain honest in our policies and our 
strategies. If we are spending money and if we are initiate developmental 
programs, but if they are not honest, I think it would be difficult to achieve our 
objectives. The positive side with the presence of the international community in 
Afghanistan was that a huge amount of money was poured into this country. 
Although obviously we see this as a positive point, but based on my experience, 
we also witnessed a lot of disadvantages with this. For example, we did not have 
high rates of corruption in Afghanistan in our history. A huge amount of money 
came, but it caused high levels of corruption throughout the country where the 
development is involved, where international community is involved – 
unfortunately, even some civil society organizations were also involved. My 
colleagues would argue with me that we did not have so many civil society 
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organizations in Taliban’s time. If you will investigate, you will find some donors 
who do not consult with the Afghan Government. They develop their programs 
unilaterally, and seek agencies to implement them. The government is not in the 
picture, the people are not in the picture. The problems of the people are not 
identified, and so, they are not met. For example, if someone gets sick and goes to 
the doctor, first of all, the doctor will diagnose the problem and then based on the 
problem, prescribe the medicine. In our case, it’s the other way around, there are 
no diagnostics, there is no effort at identification of the real problem of the 
people, but instead, they continued spending money on programs and projects, 
under the pretext of development for the people. If there is honesty, there would 
be success. If there is no honesty, there is not going to be success at any level. As 
far as the U.S. and the international forces drawing down in 2014, I think if there 
is honesty taken into consideration, the foreign troops leaving will have impact, 
and their staying will have impact. If there is no honesty considered, there will not 
be any impact, and their leaving will have no effect on the Afghan people.”  
Male Speaker 
“The other issue of why this corruption came into Afghanistan and why the 
Afghans are involved in it - the high ranking levels of the decision makers are all 
robbers and non-competent people. And as we see the commanders involved, they 
are just observing new participants when they are working in the authorities on 
the high levels. So that causes what? Increase of instability of Afghanistan, no 
security and then the high level of corruption in Afghanistan and the community is 
also not encouraging…” 
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Male Speaker 
“I guess NGOs and CSOs played it good role, but they also played a deficit role - 
they were also involved in corruption, accounts, in addition to that, this deficit 
working of the services …the society or Afghanistan. People are all involved in 
corruption, so the need for NGOs because government was corrupt. NGOs have 
to be created to apply and implement the services for the people. If they are not 
honest, as they are, most of the NGOs are not honest to provide better service for 
the people of Afghanistan to achieve goals and to do what the fund was given for 
them. We need honest NGOs. After 2014 and each year ahead, for a long time, 
and for a stable society, there is a need for accountability, which includes what 
and how it will be accounted. This is a big problem. Money is coming from the 
donors, and going to Dubai. There is no benefit for the people of Afghanistan. 
Only a few people printed this agenda, just do this and this, and finished, over, 
and they put it in the pocket, for the few guys, where is the reason, what was the 
reason? We need the NGOs with our honest impacts. We have to go to that 
accountability for each of the organization. Not only NGOs, governmental 
organization and NGOs have to support accountability.” 
6.  Human Rights and Rule of Law 
Female Speaker 
“If the Taliban are true Muslims - Islam does not stop girls from going to school, 
Islam does not stop girls from getting education, Islam does not stop girls from 
going to work, but this is the Islam that was created by America and Pakistan. 
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They create this vision of the violation of human rights, and the violation of 
women rights for the Taliban.”  
Male Speaker 
“Yeah just in argument to comments on the issues just to with the, to do with the 
specifics corresponding the withdrawal or after the 2014 this situation of 
Afghanistan I have noted down some, for me is important issues that we may face, 
you know, in general it may worsen the law and order situation and the security 
situation in Afghanistan. In capital flight this is very much important problem, 
economic decision has started, civil war definitely will be there; increase in 
interference from the neighbors; political instability, brain drain will also be 
there, downsizing in the aide from the International community for the civil 
societies so their survival would be at stake. There is definitely the number of the 
civil security will be decreased to the minimum level. Law and order situation will 
be severely devastated and also we will lose the achievements of…” 
Themes 
Themes were derived from in-depth face-to-face storied narrative interviews from 
ten Afghan humanitarian aid workers—three women and seven men—and from a two-
hour focus group discussion panel of twenty Afghan humanitarian aid workers. The 
narrative face-to-face interviews generated six themes; each theme had four or more sub-
themes. The dominant themes from the interviews are as follows: insecurity is the biggest 
challenge; international communities should increase funding to Afghans; do not abandon 
Afghanistan; building trust with Afghan communities; corruption and rule of law; human 
sacrifice, and the cost of conflict. The focus group discussion generated seven themes; 
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each theme also had four or more sub-themes. The dominant themes from the focus 
group are as follows: many changes came to Afghanistan; Afghans are not terrorists, war 
and insecurities are imported from other countries; drawdown in 2014 may lead to chaos, 
but orderly transition may help avoid chaos; the U.S. and international community 
abandoned Afghanistan in the 1990s; insecurity is a big problem; Afghan NGOs have 
credibility and trusting relationships with Afghan communities; and corruption and the 
rule of law. 
Many of the themes and subthemes generated from the narrative face-to-face 
interviews and the focus group discussion overlapped and shared similar conceptions. 
Table 1 (Themes and Sub-Themes) shows the major themes and sub-themes for the face-
to-face interviews and focus group discussions. 
Table 1 
Themes and Sub-Themes 
INTERVIEWS FOCUS GROUP 
1. Insecurity is the biggest challenge  
 Insecurity started in 2001 
when the international forces 
came to Afghanistan  
 Afghans are not terrorists; 
insecurities are not from 
Afghan communities, but 
from Afghan neighbors  
 Other countries should not 
make Afghanistan the base 
for their conflicts 
 Youth joblessness and lack of 
opportunities lead to social 
unrest and insecurities  
 
1. Insecurity is big problem 
 Before the U.S. and 
international forces came to 
Afghanistan in 2001, there was 
security  
 Afghan aid workers negatively 
affected by the international 
communities’ inability to bring 
security to Afghanistan 
 Every day the security is getting 
worse  
 Key role of Afghan aid workers 
is to deliver services to insecure 
areas 
 Security situation in Taliban’s 
time was much better than the 
security today in Afghanistan 
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2. Do not abandon Afghanistan  
 We cannot lose what has 
been achieved  
 Thankful to Americans for 
their sacrifice, do not 
abandon Afghanistan  
 Help us develop our 
infrastructure with our own 
hands  
 
2. The U.S. and international 
community abandoned Afghanistan in 
the ’90s 
 When the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan millions of Afghans 
took refuge in the neighboring 
countries, particularly in 
Pakistan 
 Terrorism, Al-Qaeda, and 
Taliban came to Afghanistan 
 
3. Building trust with Afghan 
communities  
 Afghan NGOs have 
credibility and trusting 
relationships with Afghan 
communities  
 Military incursions into 
Afghan communities cause 
mistrust 
 Military strategy is not clear 
– international community is 
not cohesive  
 Mistrust between the 
government of Afghanistan 
and the U.S. Government 
 
3. Afghan NGOs have credibility and 
trusting relationships with 
communities 
 Afghan NGOs established good 
relations with the people of 
Afghanistan 
 Collaborations with PRTs 
affected trust with Afghan 
communities 
 Afghan NGOs do not have 
direct access to funds 
 Funding source may affect 
Afghan NGO credibility in local 
communities 
 
4. Corruption and Rule of Law  
 Rule of law and equal rights 
for women and all Afghans  
 Afghan government is 
corrupt and inefficient 
 Acceptance of election results 
and respect for political 
opponents 
 
4. Corruption and Rule of Law 
 Unemployment, cronyism, 
nepotism, and official 
malfeasance 
 No quality control, no project 
follow-ups, and no impact 
assessment of projects 
 High level of corruption in 
Afghan governments and 
institutions 
 NGOs and CSOs must also be 
accountable 
 The problems of the people are 
not identified; they are not met 
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5. International communities should 
increase funding to Afghans  
 Increase funding to avoid 
disaster after drawdown of 
forces in 2014 
 International donors not 
helping to fund Afghan aid 
programs  
 Funding increased in 2001  
 Used personal funds to start 
humanitarian aid agency  
 
5. Drawdown in 2014 may lead to chaos, 
but orderly transition may help avoid 
chaos 
 Economic, military, and 
political transition 
 Make peace not war with 
Taliban 
 Reduction in aid funding 
 Increase in interference from 
neighboring countries may lead 
to political instability and brain 
drain 
 May lose what has been 
achieved 
6. Human sacrifice and the cost of 
conflict  
 Every Afghan family has lost 
someone to war 
 Sacrifices on behalf of 
Afghanistan  
 Brain drain as professionals, 
experts, and intellectuals 
emigrate to other countries 
 
6. Many changes came to Afghanistan 
 Infrastructural development 
 Development of human capital  
 Social justice and equal rights 
for women 
 Good governance and rule of 
law 
 
 7. Afghans are not terrorists; war and 
insecurities are imported from other 
countries 
 We have not created war or 
terrorism 
 America and Pakistan created 
Taliban for Afghanistan 
 The base of terrorism is in 
Pakistan, not in Afghanistan 
 Osama bin Laden killed in 
Pakistan 
 
 
For the efficacy of this study, I used the following themes to best represent and 
give meanings to the most significant aspects of all the face-to-face interviews and focus 
group discussions that yielded the thirteen themes noted above: Security/Insecurity; 
Funding; Trust; Abandonment; Achievement; and Interventionism. These six themes and 
their sub-themes will be discussed in the following section. As I discuss the themes and 
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the sub-themes, direct quotations from the participants are used to support the themes, 
and the participants’ voices from their stories are annotated in quotes and italics. To 
provide clarity and richness to the themes, occasional references are made to existing 
literature and research studies that validate the stories and experiences of Afghan aid 
workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. Also included are some instances where participant’s 
stories contradict other participant’s accounts, or contradict existing literature. In the 
following section, I analyze each theme with a fundamental objective of giving voice to 
the narrators of these dominant narratives. I believe that these themes are exhaustive and 
best represent the perceptions of the participants of this study. 
Security/Insecurity. The words security and insecurity were used 
interchangeably by most of the participants in the study to convey the same feeling of 
concern for safety. They often spoke of security in the context of insecurity or feeling 
insecure, and vice versa. The issue of security or lack of security was always at the core 
of this research study and has framed the main issues that have guided this narrative 
study.  
All interview participants, including the focus group participants, viewed the 
security situation in Afghanistan, particularly in the rural areas of the country, as one of 
the major issues facing the Afghan government and the people of Afghanistan. Much of 
what is said about the need for security is a manifestation of the insecurity that permeates 
all sectors of Afghan society.  
Sub-Theme: Insecurity is the biggest challenge. The main underlining issue in 
Afghanistan is the lack of security; hence, the United Nations and other experts have 
termed the condition in Afghanistan a complex political emergency, where there is 
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“considerable breakdown of authority” such that government institutions no longer have 
the capacity to protect its citizens from insurgents who operate with impunity (United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1999, p. 6). The issue of 
insecurity extends beyond attacks on innocent civilians; it is systemic—a structural 
collapse of law and order with rampant corruption, indicative of an underdeveloped third 
world nation where the citizens yearn for change and structural development, but the 
leadership and the powerful lack the capacity and the will to create and enact meaningful 
change to protect and improve the lives of its citizens. 
AB felt that the biggest challenge facing Afghanistan is that there has been no 
retribution for crimes and atrocities committed against Afghans during the Taliban and 
Mujahedeen regimes, and argued that the oppressors from the past regimes were now in 
power with no indications that they will relinquish governing power to a more forward 
thinking and progressive generation of leaders. According to AB, the former war lords 
who oppressed the Afghan people and “committed all sorts of crimes and done all sorts 
of cruelty to the people” are now the ones running the government. He believes that the 
people’s only hope of eventually governing their country with progressive leaders who 
are more interested in making a difference for all the people of Afghanistan is that these 
“criminal will die.” 
SD saw the correlation between insecurities and the lack of law and order or the 
inability to enforce existing laws that are meant to protect the people and provide a 
pathway for the development of Afghanistan. She agreed that the major challenge facing 
Afghanistan is the insecurity and suicide attacks. Her organization’s focus was to educate 
Afghan women, so they were able to set up the first “intensive education” center in the 
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area, but they experienced difficulties due to insecurities in the area, not only as a result 
of the Taliban presence in the area. She was also disappointed to discover that most 
Afghans were not willing to send their daughters and their sisters to school for fear of 
reprisal from the Taliban or others in the communities. 
“We wanted the women to be educated and this school was running very well. It 
was the first one in that area. The area was insecure; the Taliban presence was in 
that area, so the school was stopped.” 
For RMD, the biggest issue facing Afghanistan is the kidnapping of humanitarian 
aid workers. He said that even though the communities rallied to their aid, nobody wants 
to be kidnapped, so in the end the poor and needy Afghans suffer from deprivation of 
their basic needs. According to RMD, the “security situation is not good for NGOs to 
work.” He said that Afghan humanitarian aid workers were kidnapped frequently, 
making it very difficult he said, “…to work now as an aid worker in Afghanistan.” This 
issue of violence against humanitarian aid workers in Afghanistan was one of the key 
factors that prompted this investigation into the lived experiences of Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers. 
A focus group participant said that the lawlessness and the structural violence that 
undermines the Afghan society create an environment that is enticing to their neighbors 
whose goal is to create mayhem among the people and destabilize the political and 
economic sectors by interfering in Afghan affairs. However, he felt that much of the 
insecurities in Afghanistan are fueled by “high unemployment” and a “culture of systemic 
corruption.” He claimed that many nations are making Afghanistan an “apogee” for their 
conflicts, particularly referring to the neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran. 
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AA sees the military incursions into Afghan communities by the U.S. military and 
NATO troops, as the major set-back since the war on terror. Even though the arrival of 
the U.S. and NATO troops brought investments, developments, and opportunities to 
Afghanistan, he argued that military incursions into Afghan homes affected relationships 
between Afghan aid workers and the local communities; 
“Bombarding women, children, and poor people in communities has created bad 
feelings among Afghan communities.” 
AA shared an experience during a visit to an Afghan community; he said the 
people blamed the foreign forces for the insecurities, including Pakistan, and claimed that 
the U.S. and NATO forces are encouraging and supporting the military interventions 
coming from neighboring countries. His hope is that when the U.S. and NATO forces 
leave Afghanistan, “maybe, the security will be better.” AA said that when he talks to 
Afghans in the rural communities, many of them are worried about the insecurities in 
their communities, and they blame “America and their allies” for bringing this condition 
to their country. 
Sub-Theme: Every day, the security is getting worse. Several studies and reports 
have shown that the violence in Afghanistan has progressively worsened since the arrival 
of the U.S. and NATO forces, and pointed to the rise in violence perpetrated against 
humanitarian aid workers in complex political emergencies such as Afghanistan, 
Somalia, and Sudan. According to the recent Aid Worker Security Report (Harmer, 
Stoddard, & Toth, 2013), Afghanistan had the highest number of attacks on aid workers 
in 2012, with a number of 56 attacks compared to second place South Sudan with 21 
attacks, with Syria coming in third with 18 attacks, and Somalia and Pakistan tied for 
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fourth place with 17 attacks. The report questions whether Syria is likely to “drop off the 
‘most dangerous’ list, or become like Afghanistan, where aid workers are used as proxy 
targets” (2013, p. 3). A focus group participant articulated the point of view that security 
has worsened since the arrival of the U.S. and NATO forces, and argued that security was 
better in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime. He made a comparison between the 
Taliban era and the current period with the U.S. and NATO troops, indicating that in the 
Taliban era people felt safe walking around “with a bag of gold” without feeling 
threatened that someone might attempt a robbery. He said, “…nobody would dare to stop 
you or try to take it from you.” However, he also acknowledged the high cost of such 
security provided by the Taliban. With the heavy-handedness of the Taliban security 
enforcement and the loss of individual freedom and liberty, they created an atmosphere of 
fear and intimidation. He asserted: 
“You would have been able to travel to different parts of Afghanistan with full 
confidence. However, there were limitations as my colleagues would agree, 
during the Taliban era, people were not free to pursue their dreams and live 
independently.”  
He made the argument that the Western troops were in Afghanistan for the sole 
purpose of executing the war on terror and not for the progress of Afghan people: “the 
existence of international community in Afghanistan, under the theme of supporting 
Afghans was really about the war against terror.”  
Another participant from the focus group echoed this point of view—that the U.S. 
and NATO forces have not been able to bring security to Afghanistan—saying that 
people expected that their presence in Afghanistan would bring peace and security to the 
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Afghan people. He stated that during the early stages of the U.S. and NATO operations in 
Afghanistan, it was safe to travel to different parts of the country without fear of 
violence, but now, he said, “You cannot go to the Maidan Shahr.” 
Another focus group participant saw the lack of security as a super power design, 
a certain belief that the first world purposely does not want peace in Afghanistan, so they 
(the U.S. and Russia) intentionally created these conflicts. He argued that:  
“Insecurities in Afghanistan started when the coalition forces came to 
Afghanistan. America did not want the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, why will 
Russia now allow America to be here in Afghanistan? All the nations in 
Afghanistan are here protecting their own national interests. Russia does not 
want America occupying Afghanistan or having influence over middle Asia. Also 
China as a major economic power does not want America in its border, and 
China thinks that if America remains here, the Muslim travelers in China will rise 
against Chinese Communist Government. Many countries want us to push back 
on America; it’s not only Pakistan, not only Iran that is causing the insecurity and 
struggles against America.” 
These are examples of narratives that are constructed from historical, social, and 
political conditions in environments. I am reminded of the many conspiracy theories that 
have often been used to explain phenomena in the American experience—such as the 
notion that the September 11 attacks were orchestrated by the U.S. government as a 
pretext to start wars in the Middle East, or that crack-cocaine and the AIDS virus were 
purposely developed to affect and destroy the African American communities, or even 
the more recent controversy of President Obama’s place of birth, which some continues 
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to argue that he was not born in the United States. In a University of Chicago research by 
Oliver and Wood (2014), they define conspiracy theory as: 
Narratives about hidden, malevolent groups secretly perpetuating political and 
social plots and calamities to further their own nefarious goals. (Davis, 1971, as 
cited in Oliver & Wood, 2014, p. 1). 
This University of Chicago study finds that “conspiracism” as they labeled it was not 
simply an “important form of public opinion, but expressive of some latent principles 
behind Americans’ political beliefs” (Oliver & Wood, 2014, p. 3). In other words, this is 
how some people express and construct meaning to explain phenomena that they 
experienced. Oliver and Wood conclude that conspiracy theories can help us understand 
how individuals perceive and ascribe meaning to events and phenomena that shape the 
world in which they live (2014). 
A focus group participant wondered why Afghanistan continues to struggle with 
insecurities with all the efforts and military might of the U.S. and NATO troops. He had a 
sceptical view of the force presence in Afghanistan and questioned its commitment to 
maintaining security and protecting the Afghan people. He remembered when the 
Americans first came to Afghanistan; he said the Taliban was “toppled within 48 hours,” 
and asked why the Taliban have become “strong and powerful.” My participants 
wondered why the U.S. and NATO troops continue to have difficulties with a less 
equipped, and less sophisticated Taliban. 
Sub-Theme: Afghans are not terrorists; insecurities are coming from outside 
Afghanistan. The belief that terrorism and insecurities that have been the main issues 
impacting lives in Afghanistan for many years, and even led to the war on terror, is not 
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home grown but foreign to Afghanistan. My participants claimed that the Taliban are not 
Afghans, after all, Osama bin Laden was not an Afghan, and that many of the Islamists 
and Jihadist come from outside of Afghanistan. Some have blamed the United States and 
its allies for not doing enough to stop the terrorists from entering Afghanistan. When I 
asked where the insecurity was coming from, RMD argued that the insecurity is not 
coming from Afghan communities, and blamed the Taliban saying that:  
“The insecurity is coming from the Taliban or from those who are involved in 
war. They want to make money. Kidnapping NGO workers is one source of 
making money for them.” 
AG argued that terrorism is not in the culture of Afghan people; he said that the 
terrorists and the Taliban focus on rural Afghans who are uneducated and take advantage 
of them. According to AG, the terrorists are foreign fighters from neighboring countries 
who come to Afghanistan and set up terror organizations. He said, 
“They take advantage of the people’s kindness and start different terrorism 
activities; such as the one that destroyed the World Trade Center in America. 
These activities are international terrorism activities, not Afghan local terrorist 
activity.” 
During my stay in Kabul, one of the attacks took place close to a compound 
where I had conducted an interview the previous day. RMD commented on the attack, 
asking how such attacks could still be happening in the middle of Kabul, the capital city 
of Afghanistan. According to RMD, the war on terror has been going on for about twelve 
years, but the life of the ordinary Afghan is not better; he said, “The poverty rate is still 
the same, and the social service is still the same.” Hence, he said the people are worried 
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of what will happen when the U.S. and NATO troops drawdown in 2014. He made the 
argument that: 
“When the people have no hope, they cannot feed themselves and their families; 
the number of the Taliban is increasing because when the people are poor and 
cannot help themselves, the Taliban is active and recruiting. The people do not 
have any chance.”  
For SP, her view is that Afghanistan needs development and not war, so people 
can find employment and be able to support their families. She argued that if people have 
no opportunities to earn a living and create better lives for their families, they are more 
likely to be seduced into terrorist acts. She insisted that the source of terrorism was never 
in Afghanistan and blames Pakistan for radicalizing Afghan youths. According to 
Burton’s basic human needs theory (1992, 1990, 1997), if people are frustrated from 
satisfying their basic need to provide for themselves and take care of their families, and if 
the structural violence denies them the ability to hope and diminishes their sense of 
identity, they will do whatever is necessary to fulfil their unmet needs, even if it means 
going against the social norms. Stern (2003) posits that such conditions lead to 
vulnerabilities that make individuals prime targets for jihadist and terror recruits.  
SP called on the U.S. and the international communities to help Afghanistan to 
develop its own security, so that Afghan forces are able to secure Afghan borders with its 
neighbors. She called on the people of Afghanistan to “be vigilant” and not to be 
“deceived by fundamentalists and criminals against democracy who operate under the 
name of religion.”  
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According to Stern (2003), leaders of terrorist groups will often use religion to 
appeal to the hopes and sentiments of vulnerable young men and women they seek to 
recruit and radicalize. 
On a hallway wall directly facing the entrance door into RS’s office hung a large 
framed writing in bold blue Arabic letters: “STOP THE VIOLENCE.” For RS, the 
violence is structural; it is not only against Afghan women, but against all Afghans. 
Sub-Theme: Bridging roles endanger Afghan aid workers. The dominant 
narrative from my participants is that Afghan NGOs have played critical and significant 
roles in the war on terror. Afghan humanitarian aid workers are said to be the main 
‘bridge’ between the local communities and the Afghan government, and between the 
local Afghan communities and the international NGOs. Several participants said that both 
the Afghan government and the international NGOs had difficulties building and 
maintaining good relationships with the Afghan communities. They claimed that in many 
instances, the Afghan aid worker is the only one who is able to go into certain rural 
Afghan communities where the Taliban has stronghold, but because the people 
desperately need the assistance from the aid workers, the Taliban is forced to look the 
other way and allow the relationship to flourish. RMD made the argument that NGOs and 
CSOs are the main implementers of government programs in rural insecure areas of 
Afghanistan. He made the argument that the people in the remote areas of the country do 
not trust the Afghan government, but they are very supportive of the Afghan aid workers. 
He said that the relationship between the Afghan aid workers and the communities dates 
back to past regimes.  
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“They know that they will lose these services if anything happens to our 
organization, so they are very protective and supportive. If any of our staff is 
threatened or kidnapped, the community will come together to take action for 
their release.”  
However, RMD warned that the insecurity creates unsafe conditions for Afghan 
aid workers, particularly in the rural provinces of Ghazni and Kandahar where he said aid 
workers are kidnapped “every other day.” Even though most of the kidnapped aid 
workers are released with the help of the community leaders, RMD insisted that it is not 
safe to work as aid worker in Afghanistan. He believes that the kidnapping of aid workers 
is simply a strategy by terror groups to negotiate ransom payment for aid workers they 
hold captive; he insisted that aid workers are perceived to be good targets for ransom. 
According to EIJ, Afghan NGOs have played very important roles in Afghanistan; 
he attributed this to the fact that the Afghan aid workers, unlike the Afghan government, 
have always maintained good relationships with the Afghan people. He argued that 
Afghan aid workers use a “participatory approach” to address and find resolution for 
community and individual issues. Most of all, he said, “they are from the community” 
and work for the benefit of the Afghan people. 
“I’ll give you an example; there was an irrigation project in a very insecure 
village that the government could not dare to step in. But this NGO went in to the 
village and it’s carrying out irrigation activities for the benefit of the people with 
the support and assistance of the people. There is no Afghan government in that 
village, but the Taliban is there, but because the community is directly working 
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with the NGO, the Taliban does not say anything because people in the village 
are working.”  
As I noted in an earlier section, NGOs are under pressure from the communities 
they serve to continue to provide aid services without risking their security, and pressured 
by the government to implement their programs; they are also under pressure from the 
military, donors, and different groups pressuring them to align with different strategies. 
In addition, they are pressured by “criminal groups and armed opposition groups (AOGs) 
who threaten their safety” (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al., 2008, p. 4). They compared 
the struggle between the NGOs and the military with being “engaged in a complex dance 
with shadowy partners whose moves are increasingly unpredictable and deadly” (2008, p. 
74).  
One of the things that AB pointed out during my interview was the nightly 
incursions by the U.S. military and NATO forces into Afghan communities. He felt that 
the military incursions affected perception of aid workers in Afghan communities and 
jeopardized the trusting relations the Afghan aid workers had developed with the 
communities over the years. AB feels that such incursions that cause the loss of life to 
Afghans in the communities could have significant consequences for Afghan aid workers 
after the pull out of U.S. and NATO forces. He argued that the people are not happy 
because the incursions or drone attacks cost them the loss of lives of their family 
members. He said that the talk in the communities now is that the Afghan aid workers are 
with “those people who were bombing the villages.” 
AB argued that when the U.S. and NATO troops leave Afghanistan, the Afghan 
aid workers will be treated as the ones who worked with the enemies that raided their 
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homes at night. He warned that the Afghan aid workers cannot afford this type of image, 
noting that at first it was the collaboration with the PRTs, which he felt was a disaster and 
contradiction with the humanitarian principle of neutrality and independence and created 
more precarious conditions for aid workers in Afghanistan. For that reason he and other 
Afghan humanitarian aid workers opposed working with the PRTs, and they were very 
happy to learn that the PRT program was halted in Afghanistan. 
A focus group participant agreed that the Afghan aid workers have played 
significant roles as ‘bridge’ for Afghan government and international NGOs to provide 
desperately needed aid in the Afghan communities; however, he pointed out that these 
roles might also be responsible for exposing Afghan aid workers in conditions of high 
risks that lead to violent attacks:  
“Due to the present security situation, our government and other international 
supporters are not able to deliver services to the needy people in certain 
environments. Besides, I agree with my friend that some civil societies are acting 
like a bridge between communities and governmental authorities. But in my 
opinion, this is a very risky task that sometimes put aid workers at risk.”  
Above all, the number one issue that the participants felt were responsible for the 
violent conditions is the issue of youth joblessness. They said that there are no job 
opportunities for the youths of Afghanistan; most of the youths are without jobs, and 
cannot find work to earn a living or support their families. They link the issue of 
joblessness to security—a key issue of basic human need—that if people’s abilities to 
fulfill their basic needs are frustrated, they will opt for other means to fulfill those basic 
needs, even if it means going against the social norm (Burton, 1990). 
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According to Stern’s (2003) interviews with Hamas leaders, they assert that 
conditions of joblessness and despair create favorable environments for recruiting 
jihadist, in their words, “Hardships always bring people back to God. It is like sickness” 
(p. 38). Stern posits that when people feel deprived and have no hope, but can see how 
others live in comfort and opulence, it is easy to understand why there is not a shortage of 
those who will volunteer for martyrdom (2003). 
AB believes that there is a correlation between not having opportunities for 
youths and insecurities. He said that if there are opportunities in Afghanistan for young 
men and women to have hope—to have opportunities to earn a living and be able to 
provide for their families—they will not be the ideal candidates to be radicalized into 
terror groups or jihadist training camps.  
Funding. Many of the participants saw funding as fundamental to maintaining 
stability in Afghanistan, and the lack of funding as a precursor to the violence and 
insecurities gripping their country. They argued that international funding is necessary 
and crucial for creating economic activities that will provide employment and 
opportunities for young Afghans, so they are able to earn a living and support their 
families. Such economic opportunities, AB believed, will deter young Afghans from 
fundamentalism and jihadist aspirations, which he said were preached to vulnerable 
young men and women by those he referred to as “some elements in our neighborhood” 
who are appealing to young Afghans about the holy war and martyrdom—that “if they 
kill themselves they will be going to Janna.” AB argued that “joblessness and unequal 
distribution of the revenues” were the main issues that caused past “skirmishes and 
fighting.” He maintains that if one has a job and he or she is able to feed themselves, and 
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provide for their family, they will not have the need to seek or join any jihadist or 
terrorist groups.  
However, AB was quick to point out that the war on terror brought many 
developments to Afghanistan. Speaking about how the arrival of the U.S. forces in 2002 
affected his organization, he noted that the arrival of the U.S. forces brought influx of 
economic activities to Afghanistan as many new businesses formed and old and dying 
businesses were revitalized.  
Sub-Theme: Afghan NGOs do not have direct access to funds. This issue of lack 
of direct funding by donors to Afghan NGOs resonated with many participants. 
Particularly during the focus group discussions, one could feel the intensity and passion 
in the room. Voices were raised and everyone, including the participant who introduced 
the topic by challenging the dominant notion that Afghan aid workers were the main 
implementers of aid programs in the mostly insecure environments, agreed that the 
Afghan aid workers were able to go into insecure areas that the Afghan governments and 
the international NGOs could not go, because the Afghan aid workers “established good 
relations with the people and the people trust them,” but the participant said that the one 
challenge for Afghan NGO management is to determine the actual percentage of the 
initial aid given that ultimately reaches the final beneficiary. He gave an example to 
illustrate his point: 
“The United State gives some funds or money to USAID. USAID gives this money 
to United Nation. United Nation gives this money to International NGO. The 
international NGO gives some amount of that to the Afghan NGOs. Then the 
Afghan NGOs will implement the project and then a small amount will go to the 
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direct beneficial of the product. So I mean the Afghan NGOs don’t have direct 
access to the funds. 
The focus group participants agreed that this is a big challenge and a major 
problem for the Afghan CSOs and Afghan NGOs and their Afghan aid workers in the 
field. Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al. (2008) alluded to the frustration and the 
dissatisfaction of local NGOs on several issues, particularly the debate on civil-military 
collaboration and NGO funding. The Afghan aid workers complained that often local 
Afghan NGOs were underfunded unlike the international NGOs. 
Many participants talked about the lack of funding available for them to start their 
humanitarian aid organizations; most participants used their personal funds, quite often 
funds from family savings, while some had to discontinue certain programs due to 
inadequate funding. SD said that she sought funds to start up a kindergarten for children, 
in order to help Afghan women so they have a place to leave their young children and 
babies while they went to work. However, she was not able to get funding, so she used 
her own personal funds to start it, but she still needed money to keep it open. 
Unfortunately, she did not receive any responses from the proposals she sent to donors. 
When I interviewed her in Kabul, she was still upset about not being able to keep the 
kindergarten open. She said that most Afghan women who work have no one to take care 
of their young children while they are at work. That was why she felt the need to set up a 
day care for young mothers, but unfortunately, she said,  
“No one helped, no organization assisted to fund this kindergarten and so I lost 
the kindergarten… they do not pay any attention to this pressing problem.” 
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RMD shared similar experience with donors not directly funding local Afghan 
programs. Unable to get funding, they started their aid organization in Pakistan, and now 
the agency has grown to several offices in Afghanistan. At the beginning, once he 
realized that the donors were not going to give him start-up money, they decided to start 
their organization by volunteering some services for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The 
agency has since grown to eleven Afghan locations with its home office in Kabul.  
“Our main activities are education, peace building, community peace building, 
community organization, advocacy, and community health program.” 
For AB, he said that funding activities increased with the arrival of the U.S. and 
the international military forces. According to AB, prior to the arrival of the U.S. and 
NATO troops, many Afghan aid workers were having difficulties raising funds: “all the 
other organizations were in a terrible situation like in 1999 and 2000.” However, after 
2002, with the arrival of the U.S., many projects saw a lot of growth. He said economic 
activities and opportunities increased for everyone: 
“After 9/11; many actors entered into Afghanistan, and the funding situation 
became very good to frankly speaking. In terms of reconstruction of the country, 
many things had happened.” 
AB feels that funding for Afghan projects has diminished since 2011, and this 
decrease in funding is impacting many local Afghan programs. In his bicycle program for 
the disabled, there has been no funding for the last two years. He said that it has been 
difficult trying to raise funds to run the bicycle program because “sometimes donors want 
their own kind of things and that was basically it.” AB recalled attending a conference in 
Jalalabad, Afghanistan; he said, “There were ministers and people from foreign affairs, 
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almost 160 countries.” He presented on the impact of the bicycle program for people 
with disabilities, but to his surprise, his program was never funded. He spoke proudly 
about the program accomplishments:  
“We graduated thousands of people from this program - more than 5,000 people. 
They are freely mobile now and they can work, they can have a job, they can 
complete their schools and so I’m satisfied.”  
AB postulated that the lack of funding has become a major problem as 
Afghanistan approaches the U.S. plan to drawdown forces in 2014. He feels that there is 
“tremendous downfall” in humanitarian funding and insisted that funding has diminished 
significantly. He shared: 
“In most of our projects right now, we have problems. The only hope is for 
funding to be kept in the same level like it was two or three years ago.”  
AA was quite optimistic, suggesting that his agency had “good reputation among 
the donors.” He said that his aid agency gets funding from donors, and they have been 
able to develop projects in different areas of Afghanistan.  
“It’s a good value for us; I think we have a good reputation.”  
When I asked him why he thought his agency has been able to get funds from donors, he 
attributed his success to maintaining a good reputation with donors. 
AB remembered the first time his agency received funding from the Afghan 
Refugees Funds based in London, England. He said, “We got $40,000 from them to start 
in Jalalabad.” 
According to AB, it all began when he presented his bicycle idea to other 
orthopedic doctors, and they liked the idea very much and encouraged him to implement 
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it. He also shared his idea with some friends from the U.S. who had come to Peshawar, 
Afghanistan, to bring medical help to the people. He said they all encouraged him, 
saying,  
“Doctor, go ahead with this, this is the perfect idea and they encouraged me a lot. 
And then I shared this with the other aid communities and then they said, go 
ahead with it. So the first time we got funding was from Afghan Refugees Fund 
based in London”  
Even though many participants agreed that funding for programs and projects 
increased with the arrival of the U.S. and the international forces, many of the 
participants who run their own NGOs said that they had to use their own personal funds 
to sustain some of their aid programs. 
Sub-Theme: Increase funding to avoid disaster after U.S. drawdown of forces 
in 2014. AA warned about the consequences of not maintaining a strong Afghan 
economy, echoing the argument made by Burton on Sites’ control theory (1973), in 
which he argues that the satisfaction and deprivation of individual human needs are the 
key sources of societal order and change. He insists that people will fight and risk dying 
to protect values related to need gratification. They argue that the desire to satisfy basic 
needs is so strong that people are willing to “step out of the real world into a world of 
their own” in order to seek the satisfaction of their basic needs or simply to “escape their 
complete frustration” (Sites, 1973, p. 10). Burton and Sites agree that if individuals are 
not able to satisfy their needs through legal, morally or socially justifiable means, they 
will seek other means necessary, including causing harm to themselves or others (Burton, 
1990, p. 96). According to Burton, basic human needs will be pursued without regard to 
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the consequences, even when it leads to conflict. Therefore, the desire for individuals to 
seek and satisfy their basic needs is a fundamental precondition for maintaining social 
order. He argues that any society’s ability to function is dependent on its individual 
citizen’s ability to fulfill their basic human needs (1990, 1997). AA argued that when 
people are jobless and have no means to provide for themselves, they will seek other 
alternative options. He said that “If they are not working in Afghanistan they will go to 
Pakistan and they will join with the Taliban or terrorism.” AA sees this as a major issue 
facing Afghanistan and the world. He believes that it is “very important for the 
government of Afghanistan and international community to create jobs for the people, so 
they are able to support themselves and their families” so they do not become prey for 
those who seek vulnerable men and women to recruit into terror groups. 
RMD appeals to the international community not to decrease funding to the 
private sector in Afghanistan. He argued that the local NGOs need the help of the 
international community to fund programs that provide and sustain basic needs for many 
poor Afghans. He pleaded with the international community not to forget the people of 
Afghanistan, and blamed the contractors from the U.S. whom he said were “eating all the 
money and not serving the people.” RMD assured the international community that the 
Afghan NGOs are “committed to provide services to rural communities.” What they 
need most, he said, is help from the international community to provide them with the 
funds to meet their obligation to the Afghan people who desperately need their help. 
RMD pleaded to the international community: 
“not to forget the people of Afghanistan, these people are very poor and some of 
them do not have a piece of bread to eat, they need a lot of support…” 
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AB warned that youth joblessness and the lack of opportunities were the main 
causes of past wars in Afghanistan. He said that “If I have a job and I can feed my 
children, I will not be going to join any group.” He argued that if one has opportunities to 
make a living and provide for their family, they will not be attracted to groups that “do 
roadside bombing or kill himself or blow himself or things like that.” AB feels that if 
these conditions of structural violence in Afghan society are addressed, it would be more 
difficult for “some elements in our neighborhood that are spreading propaganda about a 
holy war and going to Janna.”  
AB believes that the U.S. and the West are spending a lot of money on military 
strategies to fight terrorism in Afghanistan. He challenged the Western leaders to spend 
“just 10% of those cost that they were using on militaries on civil affairs in Afghanistan,” 
and he is promising that such strategies will take away the incentives for terror. As a 
result, he said, “there will be no fighting.” AB’s message to President Obama is not to 
abandon Afghanistan; he insisted that Afghanistan still needs U.S. assistance and support 
in “building up the national police and the military,” financial support, and technical 
support to create opportunities for people to be able to earn a decent living.  
SP appealed to the people of the U.S. to help Afghan people, “especially Afghan 
women,” but she insisted on “accountability” from any group that is receiving funding 
assistance. She said that Afghan people are very “grateful for the generous support – 
please don’t stop now.” She challenged the Afghan humanitarian aid community to insist 
on transparency and accountability. 
Sub-Theme: The influx of funds also created corruption and greed. Many of the 
participants talked about the influx of money into Afghanistan with the arrival of U.S. 
157 
 
and NATO troops in 2001, and all sectors of the Afghan society experienced sharp 
increases in funding and business activities. This included the humanitarian aid agencies, 
which AB said were experiencing low to almost no funding activities in the late 1990s 
before the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops. He said that many of the Afghan NGOs 
were closing their doors prior to the arrival of the U.S. and the foreign troops; however, 
after 2002, many business organizations and humanitarian agencies “new actors and old 
actors” come to Afghanistan. He said that a lot of developments have taken place since 
the arrival of U.S. troops to improve the lives of many Afghans.  
A focus group participant talks about the influx of funds into Afghanistan after 
the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops; however, he said that along with the increase in 
funding came widespread corruption in all sectors of society, including the humanitarian 
aid community. He insisted that Afghanistan did not have a history of corruption prior to 
the U.S. arrival and the influx of “A huge amount of money.” He blamed the international 
community for the current high rates of corruption and maleficence in the Afghan 
society, and he called on the Afghan humanitarian aid community to condemn those 
within the aid community that are misusing funds that were meant to benefit Afghans in 
desperate need. 
My participant claimed that claimed that some donors were not consulting with 
the government: 
“They develop their programs unilaterally, and seek agencies to implement 
them.” 
He argued that the Afghan government and the Afghan people were taken out of the 
picture, and that made it difficult to focus on the people’s business. Instead, a lot of 
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money was spent on programs and projects “under the pretext of development for the 
people.” He said, 
“If someone gets sick and goes to the doctor, first of all, the doctor will diagnose 
the problem and then based on the problem, prescribe the medicine. In our case, 
it’s the other way around, there are no diagnostics, and there is no effort at 
identification of the real problem of the people”  
The Afghan government and the Afghan NGOs disagree on how the Afghan 
NGOs are to be funded by international donors. The government wants all international 
funding to be directed through a government agency; however, the Afghan NGOs 
disagree. They seek direct funding from the donors. The NGOs argue that the 
government is corrupt and its agencies are inefficient. They contend that such a policy 
will delay assistance to people who urgently need help, and would increase the cost of 
providing desperately needed services because local NGOs will have to pay bribes to 
government officials. AA shared information from a recent meeting local NGO heads and 
the Ministry of Economic Development: that 200 Local NGOs will be closing in a few 
months as a result of a new policy by the Afghan government that foreign donors must 
now fund Afghan NGOs through the Afghan government—that Afghan NGOs can no 
longer receive funds directly from international donors. This angered the Afghan NGOs 
who argue that the government does not have access to the rural communities. They say 
that: 
“NGOs have the capacity to work in the remote areas, and bring assistance 
directly to the people, so we requested from international community to close 
relations with government and support the NGO sectors.” 
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Trust. The issue of trust is deep-rooted in the relationship between the 
participants of this study and the local Afghan communities who depend on them for 
most of their basic needs. Many of the participants’ narratives depicted insecure 
conditions that exposed aid workers to risk of violent attacks. Even when the aid workers 
were aware of the potential dangers and risk of attacks and kidnapping, they trusted the 
communities for their protection. Many participants described the relationship between 
the Afghan NGOs and the local Afghan communities as a “bridge”—referring to the 
Afghan aid workers as “implementers of aid programs” from the Afghan government and 
the international community. A dominant narrative used by most participants to express 
the theme of trust was: “We are Afghans and we are in the communities.” 
Sub-Theme: Afghan NGOs are implementers of aid programs and the people 
trust them. According to a focus group participant, since the 1980s, Afghan NGOs have 
been working in local Afghan villages and communities, distributing and providing 
desperately needed humanitarian aid to the people. Since the arrival of the U.S. and the 
international military troops, Afghan NGOs were the only ones that could go into 
insecure communities where the International NGOs and the Afghan government could 
not go. The main roles of the Afghan humanitarian aid workers have been as a “bridge” 
and “implementers” of aid programs and services from the Afghan government and the 
international communities to the local Afghan communities and villages.  
EIJ believes that Afghan NGOs have played very important roles in Afghanistan 
since the war on terror. He posited that Afghan aid workers have always had good 
relationships with the people of Afghanistan because he said, “they are from the people 
and they work for the people.” The dominant argument is that unlike the Afghan 
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government or the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the Afghan humanitarian 
aid workers “consult with the people”; they use a “participatory approach,” which 
invites the community leaders to become part of the problem-solving, allowing the 
communities and the local Afghan NGOs to work together towards a common goal for 
the benefit of the people. He said that at the beginning of every project, they develop a 
needs assessment to determine the community’s priorities, so they have a road map on 
how to address specific problems.  
“Through consultation with the people, they try to help resolving the issue 
together with the people. For example right now, we are constructing three clinics 
in the country, and each of these clinics is situated 100 to 150 kilometers from the 
center of the province. So we talked with the people because for the construction 
of the building we need a piece of land, and the people allocated us a piece of 
land in one of the old graveyards and now the work is continuing there and we 
hope that in the next two months, we’ll have the whole clinic ready for service.”  
EIJ argued that unlike the “Afghan government bureaucracies, which take too 
long to complete projects, the Afghan NGOs are able to work directly with the 
communities, so they are more efficient and better at developing new within the 
communities. 
“There is no Afghan government in that village, but the Taliban is there, but 
because the community is directly working with the NGO, the Taliban does not 
say anything because people in the village are working.”  
RMD posited that Afghan humanitarian aid workers have been serving the local 
Afghan communities for several decades during the different regimes that have occupied 
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and ruled Afghanistan. He noted that Afghan NGOs are “independent bodies” and do not 
take sides in any conflicts. NGOs are guided by their humanitarian principles of 
neutrality to provide help to all individual in need. RMD argues that Afghan aid workers 
involve the communities as partners in the projects, so community leaders are part of the 
decision making process and take active roles in resolving potential conflicts and 
determining the needs of the people.  
“We have 28 clinics in Ghazni, and we have the health services for very poor 
people in the village. They know that they will lose these services if anything 
happens to our organization, so they are very protective and supportive. If any of 
our staff is threatened or kidnapped, the community will come together to take 
action for their release.” 
Likewise, the community leaders are invested in the projects and services 
provided by the Afghan aid workers, so they have a vested interest in making sure that 
the aid workers are protected from harm.  
Sub-Theme: Afghan humanitarian aid workers’ roles cause distrust and expose 
them to risk. A focus group participant shared his opinion regarding the role of Afghan 
aid workers in the war on terror. He agreed with other participants that the Afghan aid 
worker is like a “bridge” connecting the communities with the Afghan governments and 
the international communities, most of whom are unable to reach aid beneficiaries in 
rural and insecure areas. However, he argued that the “bridge” roles might also be 
exposing aid workers to risks of violence. 
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“I agree with my friend that some civil societies are acting like a bridge between 
communities and governmental authorities. But in my opinion, this is a very risky 
task that sometimes puts aid workers at risk.”  
EIJ agreed with the assertion that Afghan aid workers are able to go into rural 
communities where the Afghan government agencies are not able to go because of the 
presence of insurgents. He argued that such roles could lead to risks of danger since there 
is no Afghan security presence in the rural areas; should the aid workers need protection, 
he posited:  
“There is no Afghan government in that village, but the Taliban is there, but 
because the community is directly working with the NGO, the Taliban does not 
say anything because people in the village are working.”  
Another focus group participant shared the point of view that from the very 
beginning, Afghan aid workers established credibility and a good working relationship 
with the local Afghan communities. He argued that this relationship was developed from 
close collaborations with people in the communities by working closely with the 
community leaders and designing programs to fit their specific needs. 
However, when the PRTs started the “Winning hearts and minds” program and 
Afghan aid workers began to collaborate with the PRTs on several projects, the people 
became suspicious of the aid workers’ allegiance to the communities, and the trusting 
relationship was affected. He said that aid workers were confronted in rural communities 
and asked if they had any weapons on them. The people became suspicious; and this 
began to affect the relationship with the Afghan communities. 
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AB further clarified this dilemma that the Afghan NGOs find themselves vis-à-vis 
their collaborative relationships with the U.S. military forces, which former U.S. 
Secretary of State, Retired General Colon Powell welcomed as “force multiplier” 
strategy for the U.S. (Ferris, 2010). On the other hand, this interaction with the military 
affects the long standing relationship that Afghan humanitarian aid workers had 
developed with their local communities. AB was quick to condemn any working 
relationships with the PRTs, arguing that such relationships created a “bad image” of aid 
workers in the communities. He said the people were associating the Afghan aid workers 
with the foreign military forces—“those people who were bombing the villages.” He 
warned that interactions with the PRTs or the foreign military forces could produce 
hostile responses from the communities when the U.S. and NATO troops pull out from 
Afghanistan in 2014. 
AB was critical of the PRT’s approach in dealing with the local communities. He 
argued that PRTs needed to be more sensitive to the community’s needs instead of 
dismissing their points of view or any concerns the community might have, and simply 
insisting that community leaders should welcome them: “After all, we are building a 
bridge for you.” He accused the PRTs of indifference and not treating the Afghan 
communities with compassion.  
From the review of current literature, Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al. (2008) allege 
that the military is driven by “Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM) theory”, which is 
seen as a “charity paradigm” for the “deserving poor” (p. 7). On the other hand, they 
claim NGOs have spent several years building understanding and service dedicated to 
eradicating the “handout mentality” and working to bring “ownership, involvement, and 
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empowerment” to the Afghan people (p. 7). They argue that the military should be 
cognizant of how their “charitable acts can undermine NGO activities” (p. 7) and 
relationships with the communities. 
According to AB, the people are suspicious of foreign military forces; he argued 
that Afghans have had negative experiences with foreign military troops, particularly the 
“super-powers.” AB said the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and before them were 
the British, who also invaded, and now the Americans. He said,  
“The general image of these super powers is not so good in the minds of the 
Afghan people.” 
A focus group participant noted on the post-it note that: 
“Before the U.S. Forces arrived, Afghan aid workers were able to work among 
the people, but after the arrival of the U.S. Forces, the Afghan aid workers were 
perceived to be helpers of U.S. Forces.” 
Another participant made this entry on a post-it note: 
“People call aid workers spy of the Americans.” 
The question that Strand (2007) posed in his article on “Ways to Regain Afghan 
Trust” is germane to this study:  
Why have NGOs become military targets and why has their reputation declined 
compared to the situation in the 1980s and 1990s? Why were people not coming 
out to greet us when upon arrival in a village, as they always did in the past? 
(Strand, 2007, p. 9, 11) 
Why? When I posed this question to my participants, the dominant narratives in 
response to the question centered on the conditions of despair—that “the people have lost 
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hope”—that what they expected is not what they got. They had expected that the 
“Americans” will solve all their problems, bring them new hope, get rid of the war lords 
and the foreign fighters, and stop the interventions from the neighboring countries, but 
instead they have insecurity, corruption, and “the people are not safe.” The people have 
lost hope.  
Sub-Theme: Corruption and abuse cause distrust. The main issue at the center 
of this theme is linked to the questions that Strand (2007) posed on why the people are no 
longer welcoming and why are they no longer trusting. As noted in the previous sub-
theme section, what the people were expecting from the “Americans” was not what they 
got, but in this sub-theme, it can be understood that maybe the people might have gotten 
more than they expected. EIJ asserted that after 2002, a lot of developments came to 
Afghanistan and created many opportunities for the people:  
“humanitarian activities increased as a lot of construction companies were 
established in different parts of the country and a lot of people had work.”  
Even the PRTs that my participants felt that were not working in the best interest of 
Afghans were providing and funding new projects and “almost everybody in the 
provinces benefited” from the influx of new economic activities. 
SP felt that hope was created among women and all Afghans—the arrival of the 
U.S. and NATO troops was a liberation from the fundamentalists for all Afghans. She 
said,  
“We had new constitution, and good things started to happen, until 2005 when 
everything started to change. The U.S. and their allies changed their support for 
the fundamentalists.”  
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According to my participants, the Afghans want to trust the U.S. government, but 
feel that the U.S. will always act in its best interest, even if it means abandoning 
Afghanistan like it did after the Soviet invasion. In this predicament, the Afghan aid 
workers enjoy the closest trusting relationship with the Afghan communities, but are 
under pressure from all sides of the conflict.  
As stated in the literature review section, the NGOs are now under pressure from 
the communities to “deliver without jeopardizing security.” They are under pressure from 
the host government to “implement national programmes”; under pressure from the 
“politician-donors and NATO representatives pressuring them to align with ‘hearts and 
minds’ strategies”; and pressured by “criminal groups and armed opposition groups 
(AOGs) who threaten their safety” (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al., 2008, p. 4). 
According to Donini (2011), the UN and NGOs in Afghanistan have to make very 
difficult and decisive choices; the local Afghan perception is that NGOs are in 
collaboration with foreign military forces and the Afghan government, perceived by most 
Afghans to be hostile to the Afghan people (2011).  
Another issue of trust has to do with the Afghan people’s lack of trust for the 
Afghan government because of the government’s inability to provide for the needs of the 
people and gain their trust. According to RMD, the Afghan government is corrupt and 
inefficient; the government does not work for the benefit of the Afghan people. He 
posited: 
“I give you an example; sometimes the people have conflict, maybe a land issue 
and they want to solve it through the government system, and it takes months and 
years especially if the conflict is with someone powerful. So the people are happy 
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to go to the Taliban to solve their problem and the problem is solved in one or 
two days. But in the government system because of corruption, it takes years and 
a lot of money needed to pay bribes.” 
The corruption and inefficiency of the Afghan government is perceived to be a 
major challenge by my participants. Not only is it wasteful, but as they acknowledged, it 
hinders development. This is an issue that many developing third world countries 
continue to deal with. 
According to AB, there were no retributions for crimes and atrocities committed 
during the Taliban and Mujahedeen regimes. He argued that the oppressors from the past 
regimes are now in power; these were the same people who took advantage of the Afghan 
people, oppressed them, and committed different atrocities against the people. He insists 
that the “warlords” regained power in 2001 after the arrival of the U.S. and foreign 
forces, and argued that: 
“They are the owners of the government. They are the powerful. Now the people’s 
only hope is that maybe these criminals will die by natural death or they get too 
old and unable to stay in government.”  
AB described how the warlords misused their power and abused humanitarian aid 
funds and took advantage of vulnerable Afghans in need. He said that the warlords 
manipulated humanitarian resources for their own benefits, asserting that:  
“Humanitarian aid which was intended for the grassroots; for the poor people 
and needy people, was looted by all these kind of criminal people, warlords and 
powerful people”  
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According to AB, the people were hoping that the international community will not allow 
the warlords to stay in power. He argued that the corruption was fuelled by the Afghan 
government and all the contractors:  
“It’s because of all the contracts and all the things they took and they just 
distributed all the funds and resources. If the general public are certain or 
assured that those people who betrayed the assistance support are not allowed to 
continue to benefit from government and international contracts, I can certainly 
say that the situation will improve very well. The people hoped that the 
international community, over 40 nations, are here and they will help us, they will 
assist us to stand on our own feet. But unfortunately, what the people were 
expecting from the international community didn’t happen. So these people lost 
hope.” 
Underneath the issues of trust is a deep suspicion of other nations, particularly the 
super powers or the first world nations. Most of the narratives have nuanced implications 
or suspicions of intent by the super power nations that have significant presence in 
Afghanistan that these first world nations are in Afghanistan for their own national 
interests, rather than for the benefit of the Afghan people. This sentiment is echoed by 
many participants. A focus group participant felt that the United Nations actually works 
for United States of America with the sole purpose of spreading “Americanism, and 
Americanization” around the world. However, he was quick to acknowledge all the 
achievements in Afghanistan. He said that since the arrival of the “Americans,” 
Afghanistan has seen many new developments, particularly in:  
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“Employment, economic changes, social relations between people, construction 
projects, educational exchanges like universities and colleges, schools were built, 
political organizations and elections, the governmental organizations were 
supported and aided by the CSOs and NGOs, medical rehabilitations. CSOs and 
NGOs have provided many medical facilities to different governmental hospitals 
in faraway and remote areas.” 
Nonetheless, he insisted that even though the changes and developments benefited the 
people of Afghanistan, the U.S. was still operating from its own interest. He believed that 
everything done by the “Americans,” even though many Afghans benefited from them, 
had to advance or be in concert with the “American agenda.” 
 One of the things that my interpreter pointed out as we drove through the streets 
of Kabul was the different schools set up by different countries. He would point at 
secured compounds, and he would identify them as American school, British school, 
German school, French school, Russian school, Canadian school, Chinese school, or 
Turkish school. Why all the different national schools, I asked. Who is attending these 
schools? And how does training young Afghans in all the different national ideologies 
and national identities help develop young Afghans into good Afghan citizenship that 
will lead to a peaceful and united Afghanistan? Based on the lessons learned from 
colonization this method of fragmenting society only leads to further disintegration and 
conflict among member of the different ethnic factions of society.  
A focus group participant had a different viewpoint on the relationship between 
the Afghan NGOs and the local communities. She argued that even though Afghan aid 
workers have established good and trusting relationships with the Afghan communities, 
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“we lost our reputation in the community because some NGOs were receiving funds from 
organizations that did not have the interest of the Afghan people.” She said that the 
Afghan people knew which countries were supporting Afghanistan and how they were 
providing their support. She cautioned Afghan NGOs to be mindful of their associations 
with the international military forces, insisting that “these organizations are operating on 
their own interest, and not in the interest of Afghan people.” She echoed the argument 
that the international communities were operating on their national interests, and not for 
the benefit of the Afghan people:  
“If the money is coming from U.S. Military or from PRTs the people knows their 
aims; why they came to Afghanistan, their objectives, and what they want to 
achieve. We’re losing our reputation day by day because of the objectives of some 
aid organizations.  
She said that some Afghan NGOs, which are receiving money through PRTs and 
implementing PRT projects, are perceived by the local communities as being dishonest 
and should not be trusted by the Afghan people. She insisted that the people know that 
they are implementing programs that support the PRT objective:  
“For example, PRTs sometimes give money to build mosque, but the people know 
that PRTs have no interest in expanding Islam, but for some particular reason 
they are giving money to build the mosque there.” 
She warned that the people are not fooled by such acts, and argued that collaborations 
with the military forces jeopardize well established trust between the Afghan aid workers 
and the local communities, and expose the aid workers to risk of violent reprisals.  
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A second focus group participant blamed the international NGOs for the 
breakdown of trust between the local communities and the humanitarian aid community. 
He asserted that before the U.S. and the NATO forces came to Afghanistan, the Afghan 
people believed that the International NGOs were working for the interest of the Afghan 
people. He said the Afghan people “didn’t mind who was controlling the gun; whether it 
was the Taliban or Mujahedeen.” But after the U.S. and NATO forces came to 
Afghanistan, the international NGOs started aligning themselves with their different 
national interests, and were no longer working for the benefit of the Afghan people. 
Therefore, he said that the Afghan people stopped trusting the international NGOs. Most 
international NGO programs are now implemented by local Afghan NGOs.  
The Afghan people have been through many regimes, many invasions and 
occupations, and have seen too many wars. They do not trust the Afghan government. 
They claim that the people in power were the former warlords who abused and took 
advantage of the people, and that the foreign military forces have incursions into their 
communities, which endanger their families. They accused the international communities 
of being fragmented with different national interests; hence, there is no cohesion among 
the different parties providing help, and a lack of consistency in the efforts provided.  
EIJ shared his thoughts about Afghan business executives and government 
officials whose families live outside Afghanistan. He claimed that some Afghans have 
dual citizenships, and argued that their dual citizenship makes them dangerous because:  
“Their families are living abroad comfortably, their children don’t know about 
suicide bomb blasts; the miseries of the people they cannot see.” 
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He argued that their families live well overseas and are shielded from the 
insecurities and the lack of opportunities in Afghanistan. He warned that these people are 
not interested in the development of Afghanistan; most he said are happy with the status 
quo. He said their children are born abroad and have no knowledge of the conditions in 
Afghanistan.  
Abandonment. This theme of abandonment forms from a sense of 
disillusionment felt by many participants that their country was abandoned by the U.S. 
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was defeated with help from the U.S. As Burton 
(1990, 1997) argues, when people begin to feel abandoned, their desire and need for 
identity and recognition are being frustrated and this leads to a sense of insecurity. Burton 
postulates that if these human needs for identity, recognition, and security are not 
satisfied, conflict will ensue (1990). He warns that the conflict will be so intense that “no 
suppressive means will contain it. Attempts to suppress it will lead, on the contrary, to 
exponential increases in conflict” (Burton, 1990, p. 231). This he warns could lead to 
total failure in society. 
Sub-Theme: Do not abandon Afghanistan like in the ’90s. A focus group 
participant shared that the situation changed in 1992 after the U.S. and the international 
community abandoned Afghanistan, paving the way for the Mujahedeen, Al-Qaeda, and 
Taliban to move in and take over Afghanistan. He said, 
“This, I think was the fault of the International communities led by the United 
State; they failed to fulfill their commitment when they abandoned Afghanistan.” 
Another focus group participant explained that after the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan, millions of Afghans took refuge in the neighboring countries, particularly in 
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Pakistan. This was the beginning of the international humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan, 
as major international organizations rushed to assist refugees and needy Afghans. He said 
that in 1988 the international community and the United Nations encouraged Afghans to 
establish local Afghan owned NGOs to take the leading role in bringing desperately 
needed aid to rural Afghan communities. About fifteen locally owned Afghan NGOs and 
some Arab owned NGOs were established, and together they started providing aid in 
rural Afghan communities, where most of the international NGOs could not reach. These 
local Afghan aid agencies became successful in reaching Afghans in very rural areas of 
Afghanistan. However, he said that when the Mujahedeen and the Taliban came to 
power, the international NGOs left Afghanistan, and the local NGOs became very active.  
“This was the period of underground activities in Afghanistan. There were no 
International NGOs in Afghanistan due to the Taliban, only the UDP was allowed 
to operate here - But the Afghan NGOs were very active, they were engaged in the 
entire aid activities - everywhere they can go. There was security…there was no 
killing, and aid workers felt secured. But the insecurity started in 2001 when 
America and International Forces came to Afghanistan.” 
AB agreed with other participants that the U.S. and international communities 
abandoned Afghanistan, hence the foreign fighters, including Taliban and Al-Qaeda, 
were able to intervene in Afghanistan. AB remembered what it was like; he said that in 
1994, Kabul was destroyed, and that the U.S. government made a big mistake: 
“When Mujahedeen came to Afghanistan, Americans thought, Oh! We defeated 
the Russians so time to leave this mission… but Afghanistan still needed their 
support. That is why this country turned into a place to train terrorists.” 
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AB thinks that the U.S. and its NATO allies are about to make the same mistakes as in 
the 1990s. He feels that the first sign of such mistake was when they started to cut funds 
for services. He warned:  
“Right now, 3560 de-miners are on standby positions to lose their jobs. Tell me, 
what will those de-miners be doing if they cannot support their families? You 
better believe that a group will show them other ways to find bread for their 
children.” 
AB argued that if the proper attention is not given to assist Afghanistan in 
maintaining internal security, securing its borders, and rebuilding its infrastructure, it is 
likely to fall back to becoming a haven for breeding terror as the world witnessed in 
2001. He insisted that different international terrorist organizations will return to 
Afghanistan as they did after the U.S. abandoned Afghanistan in the 1990s. AG pleaded 
with the international community not to repeat the mistakes of the past:  
“Our wish from you is don’t leave Afghanistan alone; not to repeat 1992 mistakes 
and stay with us. Not in terms of military force. We want their financial support, 
their technical supports.” 
He urges the international communities to help Afghanistan develop its 
infrastructure, so as to provide opportunities for its people. He said that Afghanistan 
needs the U.S. and its allies to train and support the Afghan military and the Afghan 
national security forces, so they can secure Afghan borders and maintain law and order. 
Sub-Theme: We cannot lose what has been achieved. The key focus of this 
theme is the realization that much has been achieved since the arrival of the U.S. and the 
international forces in Afghanistan, but the sacrifice has been high on all sides of the 
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conflict, particularly among Afghans. The consensus is that they, the Afghans, have to do 
whatever is necessary to preserve what has been achieved for all Afghans. The 
achievements are in education, infrastructure, law and order, communication, civil 
society, health, governance, human rights, and the rights of women and minorities.  
AB pleaded to fellow Afghans to stay focused on what they have achieved as a 
country; he said that over one million Afghan girls are now enrolled in school and a 
record number of boys are enrolled in colleges and universities. He pleaded to Afghans 
not to “ruin what has been achieved.” The roads are now paved, he said, and he hopes 
that maybe the next generation of Afghans will have better opportunities to build on what 
has been achieved. AB talked about growing up during the Soviet invasion: “I was 17 
when the Russians invaded Afghanistan. Now I’m 49 and all I have known is war.” 
AG challenged his fellow countrymen and women to put their country first, and 
make every effort to take part in the development of their country. He wants all Afghans 
to have a stake in the building of Afghanistan by working together towards their national 
goals: 
“Let’s stop the fighting and give attention to the education sector and be educated 
and help bring Afghanistan to that level of other developed countries.” 
RS referred to my interview with her and her female colleagues in her office, as a 
sign of major achievement in Afghanistan. She said that the fact that my interview was 
taking place is a “manifestation and a big achievement,” noting that during the Taliban 
regime, I would not have been allowed to interview her and her female colleagues. They 
were not even permitted to listen to radio broadcast. She said, “People were arrested and 
no one knew their fate or ever saw them again.” 
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RS remembered the way things were before the arrival of the U.S. and the NATO 
troops. She said people were “happy with the arrival of NATO troops.” However, she 
posited that the “people’s expectations were high” as they were expecting the U.S. and 
NATO troops to fix all their problems. According to RS, a lot of resources were brought 
to Afghanistan by the U.S. and NATO forces. She said, 
“We had witnessed those times of war and hardships, almost in every street of 
this city; there was conventional war between rival groups” 
AA said that during the Taliban and Mujahedeen regimes, Afghanistan did not 
have stable governments. There were civil unrests, and many Afghans faced 
discrimination because of their gender or their ethnicity. He said that Afghanistan has 
seen many changes and developments since the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops; 
they now have a stable government and the system is working. He said Afghans now 
have a chance to build on what has been achieved. 
Sub-Theme: Help us develop Afghanistan with our own hands. AA pleads to the 
American public to assist Afghans in the development of their infrastructure, so that 
Afghans play important roles in the development and learn how to do it for themselves. 
In his narrative, he pointed out that Americans are friends of Afghanistan; at the same 
time he makes it known that so far, what he is asking for, has not been achieved—to 
teach them how to build their own infrastructure:  
“Not to make us like a human society so that when you leave, then we will not be 
able to earn on our own. If you are a friend of Afghanistan, as we have committed 
that you are our friend, you will help us to enable us to earn our living with our 
own sources. So you should help us in that, it hasn’t been done so far.” 
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 AA argued that the civil war is still going on, implying that Iran and Pakistan do 
not have good relations with Afghanistan; however, he believes that if the Afghan army 
and security forces are trained and well equipped by the U.S. with modern weapons, 
Afghans will be able to secure their borders and improve security in their country. He 
called for a gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. The first step is to 
beef up Afghan security with training and equipment, and gradually pull out only when 
the Afghan forces are ready and able to take over: 
“We should be 100 percent sure that Afghan people can defend themself, and that 
time you can finally withdraw all forces from Afghanistan. If it’s really what 
America wants, the first thing is to destroy the place, the source of terrorism, 
strengthen our army and then the problem will be solved.” 
This theme—to help Afghans develop Afghanistan with their own hands—is a 
sentiment that is heard frequently in developing or underdeveloped countries, what some 
call the ‘third world’. The dominant narrative is that the ‘first world’ with good 
intentions, builds technology and infrastructure known as ‘turnkey’: when a project is 
constructed and turned over to the recipient as a completed product (“Turnkey,” 2014). 
However, the problem with this approach is that the recipient is usually not well informed 
on the process, is not part of the construction, or has no knowledge of how it was 
constructed, so he or she will not have the skills to maintain or optimize the product. So, 
what was intended to help the recipient may become a burden. What this theme is 
suggesting is that the Afghans be brought into the early stages of development as 
partners, so they can learn from the builders and become familiar with the stages of the 
development, understand the process, and acquire the skills to maintain and enhance 
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product performance and process. Thus, instead of giving them turnkey development, 
teach them how to replicate the development for themselves.  
Achievement. All ten interview participants and the majority of the focus group 
participants said that a lot of changes occurred after the arrival of the U.S. and 
international forces in 2001. Many participants spoke about achievements and transitions 
in the economy, politics, good governance, equal rights for women and all Afghans, 
education, employment, infrastructural development, and even social and cultural 
tolerance. However, many participants agreed that much still needed to be done. For 
many, the costs of the achievements have been high, both on Afghans and on the 
international communities. This section addresses the changes in Afghanistan since the 
war on terror, the significance of these changes to Afghanistan, and the impact they have 
on the lives of many Afghans.  
Sub-Theme: Many changes came to Afghanistan. AB told the story of how his 
bicycle program for disabled Afghans, prior to the arrival of the U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan, only had three kilometers of what he called “pot-holes,” which were caused 
by bombs and mines, on which to practice their biking. Now he said they have many 
thousands of kilometers of paved roads to practice and ride their bikes. When AB told his 
story to a group of American doctors visiting Afghanistan, he said the Americans did not 
believe him. Their reaction was: “this is the 21st century and you have only three 
kilometers paved road?” And he answered, “Yeah, it was potholes from Jalalabad to 
Torkham.”  
On the drive from Kabul International Airport, we drove down a newly built 
modern highway that runs from the airport in to town. This road, my escort said, was 
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built by the “Americans” (as he pointed to the new developments along the drive) since 
the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops, also letting me know that “they” (the 
Americans) built big projects, but he said that they (Americans) left them no guide nor 
expertise on how to maintain and duplicate them for new local projects.  
RS said this interview was a sign of major achievement in Afghanistan. She 
acknowledged that my ability to conduct this interview in her office, in the presence of 
her female colleagues, is a “good manifestation and a big achievement.” Contrasting this 
time with the Taliban regime, she said that I would not have been permitted to “come and 
sit and talk with a woman like this.” She said that I would have been arrested and “no 
one knows what fate you will have to confront.” RS maintained that people were not even 
allowed to listen to radio programs, but today, “people can breathe freely.” She said,  
“I can say it’s a blessing. We had witnessed those times of war and hardships, 
almost in every street of this city, there was conventional war between rival 
groups and fortunately most of the people were so happy with the arrival of the 
NATO troops.”  
According to RS, the people’s expectations were high. A lot of resources were 
brought into Afghanistan, and the people expected the U.S. and NATO troops to fix 
many of their problems, “but unfortunately, it didn’t happen as much as people 
expected.” 
AA remembered the unstable and chaotic times during the Mujahedeen and the 
Taliban regimes. He said Kabul was devastated; the entire infrastructure was destroyed 
from wars and ethnic conflicts. But he said that things are much better now—“a big 
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change has come to Afghanistan”—and they have a stable government in Kabul. For AA, 
“Everything is okay.” 
For ABD, the situation in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime had 
“fundamentally changed” after the arrival of the U.S. and the international military 
forces. He said that the Afghan people have “found a proper and more suitable 
environment to breath freely.” He argued: 
“The educational system was completely dysfunctional at that time, but now we 
can see that the educational system is running well, and Afghan boys and girls 
are going to schools. Also the Afghan population, which was taken hostage by a 
few people, now they have been rescued and have become free and some changes 
have occurred in the economic life of the Afghan population.”  
ABD also claims that ethnic, tribal, and linguistic conflicts, such as between 
“Tajiks and Pashtuns,” which existed prior to the arrival of the U.S. and international 
troops were no longer major conflict issues. He insisted that the Afghan people have been 
“sensitized” and their awareness has been “raised.” He said Afghanistan now has a 
constitution, and the people “can now look forward to the next five years for new 
elections with the possibility to vote for someone different if the current leaders are not 
doing their job.” 
The Afghan presidential election in April 2014 is perceived by many participants 
as a hopeful sign of what has been achieved. According to ABD, during the Taliban 
regime, the Afghan people did not see or get to know the men who were leading the 
country; they did not make themselves known to the people. Now he said the people have 
the right and the power to vote their leaders in and out of office. He asserted:  
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“They governed the country, the entire nation, but a lot of the citizens of 
Afghanistan never saw them or knew what they looked like. He came to power 
and he disappeared just like others before him, they also came by force and 
reigned over these people by force. But now these people have this kind of 
mentality that this is a constitutional government and they have the right to elect 
their leaders, and the courage to vote.” 
ABD is hopeful about the future of Afghanistan; he said he was a student during 
the Soviet Union invasion, and experienced a lot of misconduct during the Taliban and 
Mujahedeen regimes. Now he is confident and “really hopeful for the future because of 
the changes that have happened compared to previous regimes.” 
However, ABD feels that there were no retributions for crimes and atrocities 
committed during the Taliban and Mujahedeen regimes. He wants to see the oppressors 
from the past regimes punished for their actions and not be allowed to return to political 
power. He said that the Afghan public were expecting that these “oppressors, who have 
committed all sorts of crimes and done all sorts of cruelty to the people, will confront 
justice.” So the people are disappointed as most of these war lords are still in power. 
ABD claimed that these “oppressors” have political and economic powers, but he is 
hopeful that the “criminals will die by natural death or they get too old and unable to 
stay in government.”  
EIJ shared that after 2002 many achievements were made in Afghanistan and a lot 
of jobs were produced through the PRT projects. He said that after the formation of the 
Afghan government in Kabul in 2001, funding and humanitarian activities increased; 
many construction companies were established in different parts of the country, and a lot 
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of Afghans were able to find employment. “PRTs - Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
were providing and funding projects and almost everybody in the provinces benefited.” 
But EIJ noted that in 2006 when the PRT projects ended, many Afghans lost their jobs, 
“causing many people especially the youths to become jobless.”  
According to a focus group participant, Afghan NGOs and CSOs have played 
major roles in the areas of education, health, social justice, good governance, anti-
corruption, and peace building, as well as contributed to the elimination of violence 
against women, human rights, and the democratic process. As a result of these efforts, 
social conditions and the quality of life of the people have significantly improved. She 
posited that the literacy rates among women and the adult populations have increased, 
and the Afghan government has become more transparent. Now, he believes that the 
powers have shifted from the leaders to the people; the people he said are now able to 
evaluate the performances of their leaders and decide if to allow them another term by the 
power of the people’s vote. My participants warned that Afghan must remain vigilant and 
insist that their leaders abide by the “constitution; the laws of the country.” 
Sub-Theme: We cannot afford to lose what has been achieved. AB echoed a 
dominant narrative amongst the participants of this study that a lot has been achieved 
since the arrival of the U.S. and international forces, and a lot still needs to be done, but 
they cannot afford to lose what has been accomplished. AB, educated in Pakistan, called 
on Afghans to “stay calm,” to be patient and tolerant, so they can hold on to what has 
been achieved. He pointed to achievements in all sectors of Afghan life, particularly in 
education, which he acknowledged that over one million girls are now attending school, 
unlike during the Taliban time when it was illegal to send girls to school. His hope is that 
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Afghanistan will be a much peaceful and prosperous place for future generations. AB has 
spent most of his life in wars. He imagines a more tolerant Afghanistan:  
“Now we have paved roads, keep it intact. Now we have schools. Do not ruin 
them. Keep it intact and maybe your future generation, a knowledgeable 
generation, not like the generation of our age. I grew up in this situation; I was 17 
when the Russians invaded Afghanistan. Now I’m 49 and all I have known is 
war.” 
AB’s hope is that Afghanistan moves forward by learning from the past and not 
repeating the mistakes of the past generations. He echoed the fear of many participants, 
that if the U.S. repeats the mistake of the past and abandons Afghanistan, the “seeds of 
terror will return to Afghanistan.” AB warns that if the U.S. and its allies abandon 
Afghanistan, “surely Afghanistan will take the same path as they took before 2001.” 
ABD has a different point of view, insisting that Afghans are capable of 
protecting their nation. He refuted the assertion that if the U.S. and NATO troops 
drawdown forces in 2014, Afghanistan will return to being a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and 
terror groups. Instead, he perceives a different scenario: that Afghans will not tolerate any 
foreign troops occupying Afghanistan, including Al-Qaeda. He insisted that:  
“Afghan mentality cannot accept any kind of external power, be it Russians or Al-
Qaeda or Western powers. After the start of the war on terror, Afghans took their 
guns, their rifles and dismantled those Al-Qaeda troops and other hostile troops 
who live in their hideouts around the country, so by their own guns, Afghans 
eliminated them. They despise them.” 
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ABD suggested that the U.S. has a responsibility to protect Afghanistan, citing an 
Afghan proverb similar to the famous words of former Secretary of State, Retired 
General Colin Powell that “If you break it, you’ll own it” (as cited in Samuels, 2007, 
para. 1). ABD uses an Afghan proverb to explain why the U.S. must not leave 
Afghanistan until the fire is put out. He inferred that President Obama has ignited the 
fight in the region, and now he wants to abandon this region in flames. “We have a 
proverb in Afghanistan,” he said, “when you lift a piece of stone, if you find out that you 
are powerless, you cannot lift it, kiss it and leave it in its place.” He insisted that “they 
knew they could not lift the stone, they should have kissed it, should not have come to 
Afghanistan.” 
ABD said that President Obama should have given a “very clear message” that 
the U.S. “will never leave this regime” (the Karzai government). Secondly, he said that 
President Obama should have made it clear to any country that “harbors” terrorists, or is 
the “seed of terror,” that the U.S. will come after them, including putting an end to 
terrorism that “infiltrates from centers beyond the borders of Afghanistan.” ABD insisted 
that if the U.S. does not give proper attention to these concerns, the consequences could 
be worse than the “situation which existed in 1992.” He maintains that the whole area is 
“engulfed in the fire,” particularly Afghanistan and calls on the U.S. president to “put 
out this fire” before the U.S. and NATO troops pull out from Afghanistan. He insisted 
that “There cannot be perfect peace until the foreign troops leave the boundaries of 
Afghanistan, but before leaving they should put off this fire.”  
A focus group participant recapitulated the achievements since the arrival of the 
U.S. and NATO forces: the advances in education, health, access to justice, good 
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governance, anti-corruption, peace, human rights, the elimination of violence against 
women, the rights of women to education, work, and equal justice, the democratic 
process, and the people’s right to vote and elect their leaders. He posited that these 
achievements have led to significant improvements in the social condition and quality of 
life of the Afghan people. “In fact,” he said, “human capital has been developed as a 
result of work done by CSOs and NGOs with literacy rate,” and the literacy rate among 
adults has increased due to “literacy interventions” in the local communities. Now, he 
said that the Afghan people have been “sensitized” and awakened to the new ‘normal’ 
state of affairs in Afghanistan, they know their “constitution and the laws of the 
country.” The Afghan people now know that they all have the right to have an education 
as boys and girls are going to school in record numbers. SP said that Afghans want equal 
justice. 
Sub-Theme: Human rights and the rights of Afghan women. Even though the 
focus of this theme is on the fundamental rights of Afghan women for equal justice, still 
at the core, as one of the female participants pointed out, the rights of women in 
Afghanistan are intertwined with the rights and freedom of all Afghans. She explained 
that Afghan women will not be free until all Afghans are free to “lives of dignity.” The 
dominant narratives from the participants of this study, as they described the conditions 
that prevailed prior to the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops, were of horror, anarchy, 
and degradation of Afghan men and women. According to SP, during the Mujahedeen 
and Taliban regimes, her organization was forced to work underground and successfully 
continued the fight for the rights of Afghan women. She said the Taliban regime was a 
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“total dehumanization of women” and the women were forced to marry “criminals.” She 
said they brought them: 
“catastrophe never witnessed anywhere in the world; cruelty, violence, 
barbarism, rape, kidnappings, cutting women’s breasts, and openly forcing 
women naked and killing their husbands in front of them.” 
SP posited that after the fall of the Taliban regime and the arrival of the U.S. and 
NATO troops, Afghan “Women got access to their relative rights and freedom, and 
equality with men according to Afghanistan constitution.” This also gave women the 
right to participate in elections and the right to seek opportunities within different 
government sectors. 
The new freedom and rights of women created opportunities for Afghan women 
to go to school, seek higher education, and become educated, so they are able to compete 
with their male counterparts for opportunities. People became hopeful as they 
experienced the new freedoms, and the nation was rebuilding from many decades of war; 
however, in 2005 things started to change. According to SP, the U.S. and the NATO 
allies began to change their support for the fundamentalists. She said that Azhar Ibrahimi, 
Special Representative for the UN Secretary General, played a positive role in the 
empowerment of the Mujahedeen and in paving the way for their participation and return 
to political power. 
RS argued that it would not be correct to assume that all the changes in women’s 
rights have occurred in the last ten to twelve years. She said that even before the arrival 
of the U.S. and NATO troops, there were educated Afghan women who were involved in 
all types of social activism: “they were very brave women.” She asserted that over thirty 
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years ago when she was a student at Kabul University, her professors were from 
Germany (then West Germany), and she maintained that they were very good professors 
and that if they had been allowed to continue to train and develop young Afghans, the 
country might have developed “much, much better in a natural manner, but 
unfortunately, this curtain of terror spread all over the country and basically affected all 
people including women.” 
According to RS, prior to the arrival of the U.S. and NATO forces, both the 
Afghan women and Afghan men were not free, nor allowed to “breathe open air.” She 
said that during that Taliban regime, the “doors of all institutions were closed” and no 
one had the opportunity to work: the schools were closed, and no one had any type of 
social life.  
RS considered this interview with her and her female colleagues as a testament of 
the freedom and the rights of women in Afghanistan. She referred to this interview as “a 
sign of progress, a sign of what has been achieved.” She said my interview would not 
have been permitted during the Taliban regime. RS alluded to the many gains Afghan 
women have made in in the Afghan Parliament: “Our efforts have allowed women to 
become members of Parliament – opposed by fundamentalists who have fought against 
equal rights for women.” According to RS, the Afghan Parliament was forced to 
withdraw from their past positions, to finally granting women equal protection under the 
Afghan law. 
Interventionism. One of the dominant themes in this study is that Afghans are 
not terrorists—that terrorism comes to Afghanistan from outside its borders. Many 
participants pointed to Afghan neighbors—Iran and Pakistan—as the two main sources of 
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terror, but also blamed other countries aiding this phenomenon. They believe that the 
terrorism and insecurity in Afghanistan are caused by interventions mainly from foreign 
fighters who come into Afghanistan with the help of Pakistan and Iran, and they blame 
the U.S. and the NATO troops for not stopping these infiltrations of foreign fighters into 
their country.  
Sub-Theme: Base of terror is in Pakistan where Osama bin Laden got killed. 
They claim that the security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated since the arrival of 
the U.S. and NATO forces in 2002. Almost all the participants who had something to say 
about the source of terrorism blamed Pakistan for the insecurities and terrorism in 
Afghanistan. AG echoed this belief that terrorism was never in the culture of the Afghan 
people, claiming that international sources bring terrorism to Afghanistan: “this is not the 
culture of our people, and Afghan people never were terrorists.” He argued that the 
foreign fighters come to Afghanistan and set up their offices and terror organizations. AG 
concluded that the Taliban and similar fundamentalist groups prey on vulnerable 
members of society. He said, “they took advantage of those people who were 
uneducated.” These are the people who are likely experiencing challenges and having 
difficulties fulfilling their basic needs. They are, therefore, prime target for jihadist 
recruiting (Burton, 1990, 1997; Stern, 2003). 
Another dominant narrative amongst the participants of this study is that Pakistan 
and Iran have been acting with impunity, and without regard for the territorial integrity of 
Afghanistan. AB echoed this belief in his argument that America knows the true source 
of terrorism. When he was asked which countries he considers to be the source of terror, 
he hesitated, as if unsure if it was alright to say it… referring to the death of Osama bin 
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Laden in Pakistan: “Everybody knows that the cow is black, but the milk is white…where 
Osama bin Laden got killed.” I asked AB for clarification, and he responded with email: 
“This is a phrase or proverb that we use when we want to reiterate that something is 
proven and crystal clear to every person.” This Afghan proverb implies that the situation 
in Pakistan is so transparent; everybody knows that Osama bin Laden was killed in a 
compound at Abbottabad in Pakistan. Everybody, meaning the U.S. and NATO allied 
troops, knows where the jihadist training camps are in Pakistan, or what some have called 
the “seed of terror,” but my participants claimed that since Pakistan is an ally of the 
U.S., nothing gets done. Nonetheless, the U.S. and Pakistan share many similar interests. 
The U.S. can exert influence on Pakistan, but there is no willingness to do so—since 
2001 Pakistan has received over $10 billion in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) from the 
U.S. (Brennan, 2013).  
A participant from the focus group shared his point of view. He challenged the 
international community to “finger point any terrorist based stations in Afghanistan.” If 
they are able to find a terrorist base in Afghanistan, they should make it public—he was 
certain that the international community will not find a terror base in Afghanistan. He 
accused Pakistan of using propaganda tactics to lure young Afghans into jihadist training 
camps in Pakistan. He said young people are brainwashed to believe that Afghans are 
non-Muslims: “it's time for Jihad, you have to fight the foreigners, you have to fight the 
Afghan government.” This is their way of maintaining disorder within Afghanistan and 
undermining the efforts of the international communities in developing Afghanistan. He 
argued that the goal is to disrupt all the attempts of rebuilding in order to have: 
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“Afghanistan in a situation where it is in need for all the time, particularly to its 
neighbors so that they further prolong the durian line issue between Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.” 
Another focus group participant made a correlation between foreign interventions 
in Afghanistan and the insecurities that continue to threaten the lives of many Afghans. 
He argued that the issues of insecurities in Afghanistan pre-date the war on terror, 
implying that the powerful nations have interior motives in Afghanistan, that insecurities 
started when the U.S. and NATO troops arrived in Afghanistan. He said other nations 
currently in Afghanistan were there pursuing their own national interests, and made the 
argument that:  
“America did not want the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, why will Russia now 
allow America to be here in Afghanistan? Russia does not want America 
occupying Afghanistan or having influence over middle Asia. Also China as a 
major economic power does not want America in its border, and China thinks that 
if America remains here, the Muslim travelers in China will rise against Chinese 
Communist Government. Many countries want us to push back on America; it’s 
not only Pakistan, not only Iran that is causing the insecurity and struggles 
against America.”  
A participant of the focus group discussion blamed the U.S. and NATO for the 
continued interventions from Pakistan and Iran, insisting that Afghans never created 
terrorism. He argued that since the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops, Afghan 
neighbors have been intervening in Afghan internal affairs. He said that Afghans did not 
create the war on terror—that “Osama bin Laden was not an Afghan, he was an Arab.” 
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“Many nations are making Afghanistan an apogee for their conflicts, especially 
the neighboring countries. Whenever any Western country wants to intervene in a 
Muslim country, they use radicalism and extremism as a pretext; however, these 
ideologies have origins outside of Afghanistan.”  
RS’s message to President Obama is for the president to use his office and his 
leadership in the world to influence nations that are working against the progress and 
development of Afghanistan. She asserted that President Obama should lead a coalition 
of nations and do more to stop countries that are intervening in Afghanistan. She wants 
the U.S. to look more closely at Afghan border countries. She insisted that Pakistan is an 
aggressive nation that seeks motives that do not benefit Afghanistan, and wants President 
Obama to help keep Pakistan out of Afghanistan. 
Sub-Theme: Need for strong Afghan borders. This sub-theme corresponds with 
most of the major issues that my participants believe are responsible for the problems 
facing Afghanistan. They believe that if Afghan borders were fully secured to deter 
foreign fighters from coming into Afghanistan, the problem of insecurities will be 
significantly reduced or become non-existent. But they argue that Afghanistan does not 
have the infrastructure or the capacity to provide such a level of border security without 
the help of the U.S. and the international community. They are frustrated, however, 
because they believe that the U.S. knows that  well secured Afghan borders will stop on-
going activities from Pakistan that create insecurities in Afghanistan, but to their 
frustration, the U.S. is not willing to address the issue with Pakistan. 
AA believes that the Afghan civil war is still going on, implying that Iran and 
Pakistan do not have good relations with Afghanistan. But he is convinced that if 
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Afghans were well equipped with modern weapons, they will be able to defend their 
country against their aggressive neighbors. AA’s biggest fear is that if the U.S. and 
NATO troops pull out of Afghanistan without properly helping Afghans to secure their 
borders, he believes that Pakistan is likely to mount a military attack on Afghan border, 
or the Taliban or other jihadist group looking for a safe haven will come to recruit and 
operate. AA feels that such conditions will roll back all the achievements that have been 
gained under the U.S. and NATO troops. 
A focus group participant speculated on why he thought that Pakistan benefits 
from an unstable Afghanistan on its border. He suggested that Pakistan will not allow a 
good relationship between Afghanistan and India because of the conflict between 
Pakistan and India over Kashmir. “Any relationship between Afghanistan and India will 
threaten Pakistan and will not be acceptable to Islamabad.” He anticipates that soon 
Pakistan and Afghanistan will be in conflict over water supply. He said that Pakistan 
currently depends on water from Afghanistan for its land and soil irrigation. He warned 
that as Afghanistan becomes more independent from its neighbors, Afghan leaders may 
begin to seek better control of its resources, including water. AA believes that such 
prospects threaten Pakistan and force them to find ways to sabotage Afghan progress. He 
believes that a strong Afghan border is needed to repel potential aggression from Afghan 
neighbors. Other issues have to do with the conflict between Pakistan and India over 
Kashmir; AA posited:  
“Pakistan does not want to have a viable country on its border. Besides, we are 
developing a good relationship with India.”  
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Sub-Theme: They should not make Afghanistan a base for conflict. AB talked 
about the Durand Line as a factor in Afghan relationship with its neighbors. Over 100 
years ago, the Durand Line was a demarcation along the Afghan border with Pakistan 
that was drawn by the British and signed into a treaty in 1893 with the Afghan ruler Amir 
Abdur Rehman Khan. The treaty was for 100 years, and should have ended in 1993 with 
the territory turned over to Afghanistan; however, Pakistan has refused to do so, and the 
government in Kabul has refused to renew the treaty (Afghanistan’s Web Site, 2012).  
According to AB, Pakistan has been trying to get Afghan warlords and Taliban to 
renew the treaty, but this effort from Pakistan has not been successful. The Durand Line 
issue has been one of the key issues between Kabul and Islamabad. AB posited that some 
people have referred to it as the “Imaginary Durand Line.” AB insisted that this is one of 
the issues of conflict between Kabul and Islamabad. He maintains that there is no written 
document found on the Durand Line agreement anywhere:  
“Since there is no written document or proof, no Afghan government has 
accepted this. This is the main reason why the neighbors are trying to make 
Afghanistan as weak as they can.”  
Another issue that AB raised had to do with Pakistan’s conflict with India. He 
noted that President Karzai was recently asked by a reporter why India was allowed to 
have a consulate in Afghanistan. He warned that other countries should not make 
Afghanistan the base for their conflicts. 
“If they have problems with India, there are many channels to deal with their 
problems. Diplomatic channels or military channels, whichever option they 
choose, just keep their conflict away from Afghanistan.” 
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Dalrymple (2013) posits that when Pakistan thought that India was sending a 
military adviser to Afghanistan, Pakistan raised immediate objection to any sort of 
military aid or assistance from India to Afghanistan, calling it “unacceptable 
provocation” (2013, p. 3). He believes, however, that if Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan 
can find a way to mutually address the insecurities and uncertainty in Afghanistan, all 
three countries stand to benefit from a viable and stable Afghanistan (2013). 
For AB, the war on terror is not an Afghan war, and he took issues with the 
suggestion that after the U.S. drawdown of forces in 2014, Al-Qaeda will return to make 
Afghanistan a base for terror as it did before September 11, 2001. He made the argument 
that Afghan will no longer allow Al-Qaeda or any other group to reign over Afghanistan 
as before. He insisted that the current Afghan mentality will not accept any form of 
external power to reign over its people as before. He said, 
“After the start of the war on terror, Afghans took their guns, their rifles and 
dismantled those Al-Qaeda troops and other hostile troops who live in their 
hideouts around the country, so by their own guns, Afghans eliminated them. They 
despise them.” 
A focus group participant felt that the issue of Afghanistan was “polycentric.” He 
claimed that the countries in Afghanistan have no interest in the prosperity of the Afghan 
people. He accuses the West of using “radicalism” as a pretext for invading Islamic 
countries, and blames the U.S. and the international troops for allowing interventions 
from neighboring countries to continue to destabilize Afghanistan. He argued that 
Afghans have not created the war on terror, and suggested that Osama bin Laden was not 
an Afghan. He said, 
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“If you see the identification card of Osama bin Laden, he is not an Afghan, and 
he is an Arab. And war is brought to us, we have not created war.” 
Another focus group participant sees the war on terror as a conflict between 
Russia and the U.S. She accused the U.S. of helping to create the Taliban, insisting that if 
the U.S. goal was to fight terrorism, they should have started in Pakistan, which she 
referred to as “the root of terrorism.” She argued: 
“America always had a plan to come to Afghanistan to have their bases here. The 
attack on September 11, 2001 gave them a good reason to come to Afghanistan. It 
was their plan and now they have succeeded, they are not here to support us and 
they are not here to fight against terrorism.” 
Another focus group participant echoes the same point of view that the U.S. 
presence in Afghanistan was to make certain that Russia does not control Afghanistan. 
She argued that the “American” plan was to prevent the Soviet Union (Russia) from 
occupying and controlling Afghanistan. She said the U.S. supported the Mujahedeen with 
military equipment and money; hence, the Soviet Union was defeated. She claimed that, 
“Now they have come to Afghanistan to protect their investment.” However, according to 
my participants’ theory, Russia now wants to make sure that the U.S. does not succeed in 
Afghanistan. They perceive this conflict in Afghanistan as a conflict between the 
superpowers—between the East and the West—a struggle for who will be positioned to 
control Asia. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Implications 
In this final chapter, I reflect on my experiences in conducting this investigation 
and present the research findings, summarizing the themes that best represent the 
experiences of my participants and using selected quotes to illustrate my research 
findings and echo their voices. I also analyze the key research findings of this study by 
using the theoretical framework of Burton’s basic human needs theory to identify and 
understand the conditions that give rise to the conflicts that cause and form the themes. I 
also discuss the limitations of the study, contributions made to the field of conflict 
analysis and resolution, and future direction for further research. Again, actual names of 
participants are not used in this study to protect their privacy and maintain 
confidentiality.  
My face-to-face interviewees and focus group discussants have helped me to 
understand the lived experiences of my participants—the endemic and fundamental role 
of “structural violence” which gives rise to the conditions that create insecurities and 
expose Afghan humanitarian aid workers to violent attacks and experiences that frame 
their world views.  
Meaning Making 
Krauss (2005) posits that “The most fundamental aspect of a human social setting 
is that of meanings” (p. 762). That meaning is “transbehavioral”; hence, they do not only 
“describe behavior,” but they also “define, justify” and “interpret behavior” (Lofland & 
Lofland, 1996 as cited in Krauss, 2005, p. 762). The meaning making for this study was 
best informed through the theoretical framework of social constructionism—the idea that 
our reality is a construct of our own experiences, formed through interactions and 
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collaborations with other members of our communities through cultural, social, and 
historical contexts (Kukla, 2000; Pratwat & Folden, 1994). On several instances, I asked 
participants of this study how they felt about the war on terror, and almost always their 
responses seemed to beg the question of my definition of terror. Terror for them were the 
incursions by Western forces into their local communities; the drone attacks that killed 
and maimed their brothers, sister, sons, daughters, husbands, and wives; the Taliban and 
insurgent attacks that dared young men and women to go to school and seek Western 
education; and the fear of abandonment from the U.S. and NATO forces that can lead to 
the return of anarchy and destruction, which a female participant described as 
“Catastrophe never witnessed anywhere in the world.” She talked about the violence and 
cruelty of the Taliban—how the Taliban forced the women to take off their clothes, raped 
the women in front of their husbands, and forced them into marriages. 
As I tried to align the context of the phenomenon from which my participants 
drew their inferences and attributed meanings to the events of their experiences, the better 
I was able to understand and engage in meaning making together with my participants 
(Krauss, 2005). The process of meaning making was formed in the context of culture and 
social interactions with my participants. According to Krauss, knowledge constructed by 
individuals in a particular culture and time can be perceived as ‘true’ reality as it becomes 
acceptable by individuals and society, and becoming the social norm (2005). 
As the researcher, I was engaged in the context—being in Kabul, Afghanistan, 
and participating in the act of “being with” my participants in their lives to generate 
meanings of their experiences; developing themes and narratives that feature the words 
and experiences of my participants; and resulting in data analysis that is rich in findings 
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and meaning making (Krauss, 2005, p.767). When I asked a participant how he felt about 
the war on terror, he answered with an Afghan proverb that “When you try to lift a piece 
of stone, and you find that it is too heavy; you cannot lift it, you should kiss it and leave it 
in its place.” He went on to say that “In the beginning they knew that they could not lift 
the stone, they should have kissed it, and should not have come to Afghanistan.” The 
point and meaning my participant was making was not that the stone was too heavy for 
the U.S. and NATO troops to lift, but that the conditions in Afghanistan in 2001 should 
have alerted the U.S. and NATO of the fragile and inadequate state of the Afghan nation. 
Even former General Colin Powell warned: “if you break it, you will own it” (as cited in 
Samuels, 2007, para. 1). My participant went on to assert that “The whole area is 
engulfed in fire, particularly Afghanistan,” and warned that the U.S. and NATO troops 
have “actively intervened in this situation, they have come to Afghanistan; they cannot 
abandon it.” Even though many of my participants expressed the belief that the U.S. and 
foreign troops must leave Afghanistan in order for there to be peace in the country, they 
agreed that before leaving, the U.S. and NATO troops should put out the “fire,” which 
my participants saw as a consequence of U.S. and NATO intervention. 
Another participant reflecting on his memories of war in Afghanistan’s decades of 
military interventions and civil unrests used an Afghan proverb that “Sweets are not 
distributed in war; but bullets are exchanged.” He said that there are no good outcomes 
from war; he lost very close relatives in the wars, and spoke painfully about the loss of 
his older brother who was a graduate of Oxford University and was killed during the 
Soviet invasion. He believed that every Afghan family had lost two or three family 
members to the wars; most of them, he said, were “breadwinners for the families.” As 
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another participant said, “wars have been very harsh on our people.” According to the 
former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates (Gates, 2014), during his interview promoting 
his memoire Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, there are no military solutions to the 
Afghan conflict. This point of view has been echoed by several high ranking government 
officials and top ranking military strategists, including Retired General David Petraeus, 
former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and former Commander of U.S. 
Forces in Afghanistan (2010-2011). They all agree that there has to be a political 
solution. Indeed, war cannot be the solution to the many conflicts around the world. As 
the Afghan proverb implies, bullets are exchanged in wars, not sweets; people die in 
wars, people’s lives are destroyed, and the memories of these destructions live through 
many generations and ferment odium, which give rise to future conflicts.  
Participants point to the source of what they named as the challenges and the 
problems that the people of Afghanistan have faced and witnessed for over three decades. 
All of these they claimed have been “witnessed from the top.” One participant contrasted 
the eras of the Taliban and Mujahedeen, which he claimed were controlled from 
Islamabad, Pakistan, and the current Afghan government of Hamid Karzai, and which he 
claimed has been controlled by the U.S. and the international community. He cited a 
conflict situation that occurred in Afghanistan within the Afghan jurisdiction but was 
decided by orders received from Islamabad, Pakistan. He gave another example that 
occurred during the Taliban era:  a man who was detained in Kabul, Afghanistan by the 
Taliban security forces, but was later released by orders from Islamabad, Pakistan, the 
implication being that the decisions to carry out atrocities or acts of terror are made by 
orders from non-Afghans who are outside the Afghan borders. When I asked my 
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participants where terrorism against humanitarian aid workers was coming from, they 
answered that Afghans are not terrorists, that terrorism is coming into Afghanistan from 
outside its borders—from Pakistan, Iran, or jihadist fighters who they claimed are foreign 
fighters. Several participants informed me that “Osama bin Laden was not an Afghan, he 
was an Arab,” they said. One participant used an Afghan proverb that “Everybody knows 
that the cow is black, but its milk is white; where Osama bin Laden got killed,” he said. 
This was a reference to Pakistan as the source of most of Afghanistan’s problems, 
“having the seeds of terror.” But since Pakistan is an ally of the U.S., they accuse the 
U.S. of ignoring the hard facts of terrorism and the radicalization of young men and 
women for jihad. One participant suggested that the U.S. and Pakistan got together and 
created Taliban for the purpose of causing chaos and destabilizing Afghanistan. In order 
words, my participants suggested that the U.S. is aware of Pakistan’s behavior and role in 
radicalizing young Muslims for jihad, yet the U.S. chooses to not address the issue with 
Pakistan, but instead continues to see Pakistan as a partner in the war on terror.  
During the focus group discussion, one participant inquired from other 
participants in the group if they will agree that the security situation during Taliban 
regime was much better than the current security situation in Afghanistan now. He 
explained that during the Taliban regime, people felt safe to walk around the streets of 
Afghanistan with “bags of gold” without the fear of being attacked or robbed because 
nobody dared to steal from another person. However, he noted that such security from the 
Taliban came at a high price to the Afghan society. The implication is that the 
consequences of being caught stealing during the Taliban regime were catastrophic. As 
my participants noted, the punishment for stealing could mean death or the loss of body 
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parts. On the contrary, since the presence of the U.S. and NATO troops, the number of 
insecurities have been higher and have been the source of major problems, they said, but 
the Afghan people have freedom and they are independent. 
One participant spoke of insecurities in the context of military incursions into 
Afghan villages and communities by the U.S. and NATO forces, calling it “Bombarding 
the community with women, children, and poor people.” These incursions, he said, have 
negative impacts on Afghan aid workers who are confronted with the aftermaths, and 
forced into positions of trying to explain such deadly attacks on the communities. Often 
aid workers are unable to provide adequate explanations for the attacks that caused the 
loss of family members; this led to mistrust and the belief that insecurities in their 
communities “are created by the foreign people, by American, by Britain, by Pakistanis, 
by these people.” The participants claimed that these incursions caused loss of lives and 
affected the trusting relationships that had been developed between the Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers and the local communities. They insisted that the interactions 
between the foreign military, the PRTs, and the Afghan humanitarian aid workers created 
perceptions that gave rise to mistrust of the Afghan aid workers by the local 
communities. 
Three participants said that insecurities in Afghanistan began when the U.S. and 
the NATO troops came to Afghanistan. They argued that during the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the U.S. did not want the Soviet Union occupying Afghanistan: “Why will 
Russia now allow America to be here in Afghanistan?” They insisted that the allied 
nations in Afghanistan were there to protect their national interests, and claimed that 
Russia does not want America occupying Afghanistan or having influence over middle 
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Asia. Also, they claimed that China does not want America in its border out of concern 
that the “Muslim travelers” in China will rise against the Chinese Communist 
Government.  
Many explanations were offered throughout this study by participants in attempts 
to explain occurrences and why they believed certain things happened, or are happening 
to their country and the Afghan people. Some of these explanations fall within the scope 
of ‘conspiracy theories,’ which I address in detail later in this section.  
In a complex political emergency like Afghanistan, the Afghan humanitarian aid 
workers are under pressure from all the parties, entities, and organizations with special 
interests (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1999), 
involved in the war on terror in Afghanistan. According to Burton (1972), everyone 
enacts different roles as we carry out our different daily functions, and often my 
participants are forced into roles with different actors in the conflict. Making the analogy 
with actors on stage, Burton notes that the stage actors enact roles, and he argues that 
“they must deliberately act a part and not behave as they would in their own life” (1972, 
p. 72). In the same token, the Afghan humanitarian aid worker playing a role in a 
complex political emergency is deliberate and purposeful in being in the role.  
When I asked the participants of the focus group about the different roles Afghan 
aid workers played in the war on terror, many of the participants described the key roles 
of the Afghan NGOs as “bridge” and “implementers” of aid programs in Afghan 
communities. Many of the participants spoke of the ‘roles’ as issues of trust between the 
Afghan humanitarian aid workers and the Afghan local communities. One of the focus 
group participants said that after the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops, the Afghan aid 
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workers were the only ones who were welcomed in the local communities, noting that the 
security situations in most of the local communities posed great danger for international 
NGOs. As a result of the insecure environments, the Afghan NGOs and CSOs quickly 
assumed the roles of “bridge” and “implementers” of humanitarian aid programs for the 
international communities and the Afghan local and central governments, who did not 
also feel safe going into the local communities. As my participants noted, several rural 
communities were known to have Taliban members, while some were controlled by the 
Taliban. 
The Afghan aid worker by virtue of his/her nationality and membership in the 
local Afghan community finds himself/herself at the center of this conflict known as the 
war on terror, playing different important ‘roles’ with several stakeholders who have 
competing interests. The goal of the Afghan aid worker is to provide humanitarian aid to 
needy and vulnerable Afghans in very difficult conditions. However, in order to meet this 
objective, the Afghan humanitarian aid workers must play required ‘roles’ to seek funds 
and develop new programs; however, funds and programs come from outside the Afghan 
communities. Quite often the funds come from the international communities, which are 
perceived by some local Afghans to be hostile to the Afghan people. As Burton (1972) 
posits, “Each person is many people. Some we like, some we may not like” (p. 110). And 
these roles, which the Afghan aid workers play, may not be perceived favorably by local 
Afghans, thereby giving rise to perceptions that lead to mistrust by local community 
members. Some participants felt that Afghan aid workers who were receiving funds from 
PRTs and implementing PRT programs were being dishonest and should not be trusted. 
One participant said that “PRTs sometimes give money to build mosque, but the people 
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know that PRTs have no interest in expanding Islam, but for some particular reason they 
are giving money to build the mosque there.”  
As noted in my review of literature, the purpose of the PRT was for implementing 
the Winning Hearts and Minds campaign (WHAM). This was the U.S. military’s attempt 
at the use of softer and gentler approach to fighting terrorism. But the strategy quickly 
became a major fiasco, a very well-intended strategy that was poorly implemented. 
According to Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al. (2008), one of the key problems with the 
WHAM program was the frustration from local Afghan NGOs who complained that their 
input was not sought out in the civil-military debate, and pressed for the “Afghanisation” 
of the civil-military process (Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al., 2008, p. 5). They complained 
that often local Afghan NGOs were underfunded and undervalued unlike their 
counterparts with the international NGOs.  
One participant felt that the association with PRTs and the foreign military forces 
affected trusting relationships between Afghan humanitarian aid workers and the Afghan 
communities, while another participant shared an experience when he was confronted by 
Afghans in the rural communities and asked if he had a gun. They were suspicious 
because of his association with the PRTs in the area. According to the participant, he was 
seen in the company of the foreign PRT agents, but the people did not know the reason 
and content of their association. It could have been to benefit the community, but they 
perceived him to be working with the enemy, so he was not to be trusted. This rush to 
judgment on the side of the Afghan community posed great danger of hostilities toward 
the Afghan humanitarian aid worker. A focus group participant echoed a similar 
sentiment, acknowledging that even though the Afghan aid worker had developed a 
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trusting relationship with the communities, the people’s perceptions of the new ‘role’ 
with the international community was suspect and can potentially lead to violence against 
the aid worker.  
The participants agreed that their key role is the delivery of humanitarian aid 
services to needy Afghans no matter where they may be. Sometimes they have to go into 
very insecure environments to reach desperate aid beneficiaries. Due to the trusting 
relationships with the local communities, the Afghan humanitarian aid workers are the 
“bridge” and “implementers” of aid programs in insecure areas where the Afghan 
government agencies and the international NGOs are unable to reach. So they believe that 
maintaining the trusting relationship with the Afghan communities is crucial to making 
sure that critical services reach vulnerable individuals and families in local communities. 
The issue of adherence to humanitarian principles was discussed in my review of 
literature. Egeland et al.’s (2011) study showed that the “lack of respect for principles 
was third-largest contributor to insecurity” and warned that NGOs have conveniently 
“compromised a principled approach in their own conduct by closely aligning with 
political and military activities and actors” (p. 19). Incidentally, Stoddard et al. (2011) in 
their study which interviewed international NGO staff, the respondents believed that local 
and national NGO employees lacked proper training and expertise on conduct and 
humanitarian principles, and questioned their ability to handle difficult and often life 
threatening situations in complex political environments. However, my participants 
believed that the main reason they have been able to maintain trusting relationships with 
the local communities has to do with the NGO principles of neutrality. One participant 
said that Afghan NGOs are independent, that they do not take side in any conflict. He 
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acknowledged that his agency had been serving the communities through different 
regimes. They are not on the Afghan government’s “side” or the Taliban “side” or the 
U.S. military “side,” and claimed that they simply “share their plans with the community 
and involve the people in the decision making to solve the real needs of the people.” And 
if any of their humanitarian aid staff is threatened or kidnapped, the community will 
come together to seek their release from the Taliban. Some participants shared stories of 
their close proximity with the Taliban in rural communities that they served. They said 
that the Taliban were aware of their presence, but as long as they were providing needed 
services to the community, the Taliban did not pose any danger or problem to them. 
Due to the increasing risks of violence to their employees, international NGOs 
began to adopt the ‘remote management strategy’ which Stoddard et al. (2010) defined as 
“adaptation to insecurity, and an aberration from normal programming practice” (p. 11). 
They asserted that remote strategies were not meant to be a permanent or a standard 
situation; however, several international NGOs relied on local and national aid workers to 
maintain their presence and continued their aid activities in local communities, while the 
international NGO staffs oversaw operations from safer environment. Stoddard et al. 
(2010) questioned the morality and effectiveness of the remote management strategy, and 
wondered if the local Afghan NGOs were capable of maintaining high “levels of 
sophistication and quality” of aid programs when the remote management strategy was 
implemented (2010, p. 8). However, other studies showed that the local Afghan NGOs 
wanted more autonomy and sought comparable funding levels as the international NGOs. 
Several participants saw funding as a major challenge for the Afghan NGOs; they argued 
that the Afghan NGOs did not have direct access to funds and funding sources, and saw 
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this as a major challenge facing the Afghan humanitarian aid worker. One participant 
gave an example with a U.S. government funding for Afghanistan made available 
through the USAID. He said that instead of giving the money directly to the Afghan 
NGO, “USAID gives this money to the United Nations. United Nations gives this money 
to international NGOs, and the international NGOs gave some of the money to the 
Afghan NGOs.” He argued that the Afghan NGOs only end up with “a fraction of the 
original amount” to develop and implement aid programs to very needy local Afghan 
communities. My participants said that they were the ones in the communities who 
worked directly with the people and understood what their key needs were. They spoke 
about assessments that they developed in conjunction with the local community people, 
and how these assessments addressed the specific needs of the communities, yet funding 
the programs was not made directly to them; instead, it had to go through other sources 
which had no direct interest in the project. In the end, they claimed that this method of 
funding Afghan programs created waste and led to corruption and maleficence.  
Nonetheless, many participants still hoped that the international community will 
remain in Afghanistan and continue to support the Afghan people. One participant said 
that “Despite making some mistakes, the Americans and their allies have been the best 
friends of the Afghan people.” He said that Afghanistan desperately needs the support of 
the international communities in maintaining security and developing the Afghan 
economy, which many participants believed to be the key to reducing terrorism in 
Afghanistan and the rural areas bordering Pakistan. 
One of the criticisms against the international communities in Afghanistan was 
their inability to help the Afghan government become more sustainable. The participants 
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claimed that the international communities comprised of representatives from different 
nations who represent different national interests, and are not working as one cohesive 
force. Therefore, the participants argued that the international communities have different 
agendas and different objectives. One participant said that “They should have a strong 
and collective action and strategy to fight against terrorism, to fight against the Taliban 
and to bring pressure on neighboring countries of Afghanistan.” Another participant said 
that if the international community were working cohesively, they would have been able 
to “put pressure on the government of Afghanistan to bring an end to the corruption, to 
end poverty, and stop the continued influence of the war lords.” 
The issue of corruption was of major concern to my participants. Many felt that 
the arrival of the international communities brought in a lot of money and economic 
activities in to Afghanistan; however, these activities also led to the current state of 
corruption. They decried the ways in which the war lords and the people in power prior to 
2001 used and manipulated humanitarian resources for their own benefits. One 
participant said that “Humanitarian aid which was intended for the grassroots; for the 
poor people and needy people was looted by all these kind of criminal people, warlords 
and powerful people,” thus depriving help to the most vulnerable Afghans. He argued 
that the corruption was fuelled by the Afghan government and the independent 
contractors who they claimed were simply enriching themselves. The participants said 
that the Afghan people had hoped that the international communities in Afghanistan, 
which they claimed represented “over forty nations,” would have helped them, by 
empowering the Afghan people: “they will assist us to stand on our own feet. But 
unfortunately, what the people were expecting from the international community didn’t 
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happen. So these people lost hope.” Several participants also spoke of the PRTs and the 
presence of independent contractors among PRT personnel, whom they associated with 
corruption and misappropriations of funds.  
Conspiracy Theory 
As I listened to some of my participants and the meanings they ascribed to the 
conditions of their experiences, I am reminded of the many conspiracy theories that have 
often times been used to explain phenomena in the American experience—such as the 
notion that the September 11 attacks were orchestrated by the U.S. government as a 
pretext to start wars in the Middle East, or that crack-cocaine and the AIDS virus were 
purposely developed to affect and destroy the African American communities, or even 
the more recent controversy of President Obama’s place of birth, which some continue to 
argue that he was not born in the United States. In a University of Chicago research by 
Oliver and Wood (2014), they define conspiracy theory as: 
Narratives about hidden, malevolent groups secretly perpetuating political and 
social plots and calamities to further their own nefarious goals. (Davis, 1971, as 
cited in Oliver & Wood, 2014, p. 1) 
According to their study on conspiracy theories, 94 percent of the people sampled 
agreed to have heard that “President Obama was not born in the United States and does 
not have an authentic Hawaiian birth certificate,” and “22 percent of the sample” were in 
agreement with what is now known as the “Birther conspiracy” (Oliver & Wood, 2014, p. 
13). The University of Chicago study (2012) finds that “conspiracism” as they labeled it, 
was not simply an “important form of public opinion, but expressive of some latent 
principles behind Americans’ political beliefs” (Oliver & Wood, 2014, p. 3). In other 
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words, this is how some people express and construct meaning to explain phenomena that 
they have experienced. Oliver and Wood conclude that conspiracy theories can help us 
understand how individuals perceive and ascribe meaning to events and phenomena those 
shape the world in which they live (2014). 
Not unlike the American experience of interpreting events, my Afghan 
participants also interpreted events and phenomena that shaped their world in ways that 
they could best understand them, by using triggers from their own specific conditions that 
frame their own experiences, such as the historical, political, social, economic, and 
cultural conditions that have framed their experiences and perceptions of their world, and 
the world which they live. My participants referenced many narratives that some might 
dismiss as simply conspiracy theories without credible foundation—such as the notion 
that the U.S., Britain, and Pakistan got together to create Taliban to destabilize 
Afghanistan; that the war on terror is a war of the superpowers for who will control 
Afghanistan, and ultimately control the rest of Asia; that America made sure that the 
Soviet invasion did not succeed in Afghanistan, so Russia is making sure that the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan does not succeed; that the issue of the Durand line is the reason 
Pakistan will continue to make sure that Afghanistan does not become a viable nation on 
its border; that the war on terror is not about fighting terrorism, but about the control of 
oil; that Afghanistan is being used as a “proxy” for the Kashmir dispute between India 
and Pakistan; that Afghans are not terrorists; that terrorism comes to Afghanistan from 
outside its borders; and others that show Afghans as victims of circumstances induced by 
other nations, which are beyond Afghan control. Often such assertions from developing 
and less developed “third world” countries are dismissed as mere conjectures and 
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innuendos not to be taken seriously. However, the University of Chicago study on 
conspiracy theories by Oliver and Wood (2014) reveals that conspiracy theories show 
how individuals interpret and make meaning of their individual experiences, and the 
“tendencies of all people for understanding their political world” (p. 31).  
In a world with a long and violent history, Afghanistan is a South Asian country, 
“the size of France, Switzerland and Benelux combined” strategically located, and for the 
last thirty years has been “marked by appalling episodes of violence, war and genocide” 
(Khan, 2012, p. 201). It was first challenged by the British in the 19th century, but the 
British invasion was repelled by the Afghans in 1878 (2012, p. 210). In 1893 the Durand 
Line was used to create the border with India, allowing the carving out of Pakistan 
territory from Afghan land; the Durand Line is known as the “Imaginary Line” dispute 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan (p. 210). This dispute between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan is what my participants referred to as the Durand Line dispute. Another 
attempt was made by the British in 1921 but was again repelled by the Afghans. The 
country began to experience internal struggles and forceful changes of government and 
leadership. In 1978, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, causing the U.S. to side with 
the Afghans. 
The U.S. found a “conduit” for arms and military supplies to Afghanistan, in 
Pakistan, and this relationship gave Pakistan its status of “Frontline State” (Khan, 2012, 
p. 210). This, according to Khan (2012), was the beginning of Afghan religious 
fundamentalism and jihadism, which was referred to by my participants as the creation of 
Taliban for Afghanistan by the U.S. and Pakistan, for the sole purpose of destabilizing 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan quickly became a battle ground for the cold-war between the 
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United States and the Soviet Union (Khan, 2012). This was also referenced by my 
participant who felt that the war on terror was simply a war of the superpowers. He said 
that with the help of the U.S., the Soviet Union was defeated in 1989, and after the 
Soviets withdrew their forces, the U.S. decided to leave Afghanistan, thus opening the 
door for insurgencies. Eventually the Afghan civil war broke out, which a female 
participant described as “anarchy, never witnessed anywhere in the world.” She said 
Kabul was completely destroyed. According to Khan (2012), the men were “arrested, 
humiliated, and killed, and women were molested, tortured, and raped” (2012, p. 211). 
This was the condition that ushered the Taliban to power and created a haven for Al-
Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, and a base to launch the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
U.S. that killed over 3,000 people. Consequently, in October of 2001, the U.S. launched 
air strikes against Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden, declaring the war on terror, which 
is now the longest war in U.S. history (Dalrymple, 2013), lasting over twelve years and 
claiming the lives of over 2,144 U.S. military personnel who have so far paid the ultimate 
price (Crowley, 2013). Afghan civilian casualties of the war on terror are estimated over 
21,000 men, women, and children (Watson Institute, 2011). 
Civil-Military Collaboration 
The impact of civil-military relationships in complex political emergencies like 
Afghanistan was a key motivator for this research study. One of the questions that drove 
this study was how the interactions between the Afghan humanitarian aid workers and the 
U.S. and international military troops in Afghanistan have exposed the Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers to suspicion and violent attacks in local Afghan communities. 
From the section on literature review, it was noted that the military and humanitarian 
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communities have divergent interests and objectives with regards to delivering 
humanitarian aid to people in desperate need (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al., 2008). The 
military perceived their WHAM program as a charitable program aimed at the “deserving 
poor” (2008, p. 7), while the humanitarian aid workers, by virtue of their years of 
building understanding and trusting relationships with communities in need, tried to bring 
feelings of “ownership, involvement, and empowerment” to the Afghan people (2008, p. 
7). They argued that the military should be cognizant of how their “charitable acts can 
undermine NGO activities” (2008, p. 7).  
According to the report exploring Afghan perceptions of civil-military relations 
by Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al. (2008), one of the key issues from the Winning Hearts 
and Minds program was the dissatisfaction felt by local NGOs that the civil-military 
debate in Afghanistan did not include nor seek out the input of Afghan humanitarian aid 
workers. They believed that there should have been an “Afghanisation” of the civil-
military process (Azarbaiani-Moghaddam et al., 2008, p. 5), a feeling among the local 
NGOs that their opinions should be included. In addition, they complained that often 
local Afghan NGOs were underfunded unlike the international NGOs (2008). 
Referring to how the PRTs have impacted on the Afghan humanitarian aid 
workers, one participant shared that when the PRTs came to Afghanistan, the trusting 
relationships that had been built between the Afghan aid workers and the local 
communities were deeply affected, as the people became suspicious and accused aid 
workers of working with the foreign troops: “Oh you are the spies, you have a gun, you 
have a weapon.” Another participant felt that the nighttime military incursions into 
Afghan communities affect perceptions and the trusting relationships of Afghan 
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humanitarian aid workers in the communities. He said that after the incursions, it was 
difficult for Afghan aid workers to return to the communities and witness the aftermath 
and the grieving families who lost family members during the nightly military incursions 
by the U.S. and NATO troops as people mourned and buried their dead. 
Another participant talked about the many issues he had with the PRTs and 
foreign military forces. He said that they often felt that because they were building roads 
and bridges for the Afghans communities, they had a license to do as they pleased. He 
said that “the people are not in favor of the military people. The general image of these 
super powers is not so good in the minds of the people here in this country.” They gave 
an example of PRTs giving Afghan NGOs funds to build mosques in Kabul. One 
participant said that the local people were not “fooled.” He accused Afghan NGOs of 
implementing PRT objectives that were not in the best interest of the Afghan people, and 
felt that the association with PRTs and the foreign military forces were affecting the 
trusting relationships that were built between Afghan humanitarian aid workers and the 
Afghan communities.  
Focus group participants were given three categories and instructed to list their 
feelings and perceptions regarding each category. One of the categories was: Potential 
Challenges from 2014 Drawdown of U.S. Forces. The entries in this category were quite 
comprehensive, and they validated the following themes that were discussed in chapter 
four.  
Security/Insecurity 
Most of the interview and focus group participants felt that the drawdown would 
worsen the security situation after the U.S. and NATO troops leave Afghanistan. They 
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assert that “Afghan national forces are not fully equipped” to defend their country, so 
they believe that “insecurities will increase.” Some see a “rise in insurgency” and a 
weakening of “local security and governance capacity” as a result of the drawdown of 
forces in 2014. One participant predicted “anarchy after withdrawal of foreign troops.” 
The belief is that the enemies of Afghanistan are very motivated and capable of 
destabilizing Afghanistan by creating fear, disorder, and insecurities in all areas of the 
country with the presence of the U.S. and NATO troops. They believe that with the 
current strength and preparedness of the Afghan national security forces, without the 
backing of the U.S. and NATO troops, the Taliban and the foreign jihadists will easily 
overtake the current Afghan security forces and turn back all the achievements of the past 
twelve years under U.S. and NATO occupation. In other words, my participants fear that 
the Afghan security forces are not ready to take over securing their nation from the U.S. 
and NATO troops.  
Interventionism 
Participants expressed concern that “interventions from neighboring countries 
will increase” as a result of the U.S. and NATO drawdown in 2014, and they felt that the 
pull out of Western forces could lead to “polycentricism, resurgence of insurgent and 
innocent killings, and a possible resurgence of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan.” 
This issue of interventions from the neighboring countries, namely Pakistan and 
Iran, is seen by the participants as one of the major causes of insecurities in Afghanistan. 
The belief is that these interventions bring in foreign jihadists that commit atrocities that 
destabilize their nation. Some of the participants stated that the terrorists are not Afghans, 
insisting that they are foreign fighters from outside Afghan borders. 
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Funding 
Participants agreed that a U.S. and NATO drawdown of forces will lead to 
decrease in funding opportunities, and fear that the “cost of living may increase” thereby 
making life more demanding for Afghans who are already experiencing hard times—the 
thinking that such a drawdown will cause “reduction in humanitarian aid funding.” Still 
some participants believed that a force drawdown by U.S. and NATO will lead to “rise in 
unemployment as job opportunities decrease.” One participant expressed the belief that a 
decrease in funding will weaken the “survival of the present government” and the 
“survival of the CSOs.” 
According to my literature review, the Afghan economy is heavily dependent on 
foreign aid, most of which is humanitarian aid, and the majority of the aid assistance 
comes from the USAID. My participants fear that a drawdown of U.S. forces may also 
reduce or completely eliminate humanitarian aid support from the United States. Funding 
of the Afghan economy is perceived as being critical for maintaining law and order, 
providing opportunities to Afghan youths, and fighting the rise of jihadist tendencies 
among Afghan youths. They argue that if Afghans have the opportunities to make a 
living and provide for their families, they will not become viable recruits for the Taliban 
or foreign jihadists. 
Trust 
A group of participants felt that a U.S. and NATO drawdown of forces in 2014 
would affect aid workers’ “perception” and “engagement” in Afghan communities. 
They claim that “people lost hope” due to “unrealized objectives.” 
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The issue of trust with the Afghan people and communities continues to resonate 
in this research study. Strand (2007), in his article on “Ways to Regain Afghan Trust”, 
posed these questions: “Why have NGOs become military targets…? Why were people 
not coming out to greet us…, as they always did in the past?” (p. 9). One area that all my 
participants agreed on and spoke about passionately was the significance of the trust 
developed between the Afghan aid workers and the local communities. They were 
equally consistent on the role trust between the communities and the Afghan aid workers 
made them the “bridge” for the local communities and the Afghan government, and 
between the local communities and the international military and humanitarian 
communities. My participants claimed that even though the people lost hope due to their 
perception of what the arrival of the U.S. and its allied troops will mean for them, they 
still believed that their lives will get better because they trusted the Afghan humanitarian 
aid workers whom they referred to as the “bridge” and “implementers” of aid programs in 
local and insecure communities. With the drawdown of forces in 2014, my participants 
fear a backlash in the local communities; as the funds decrease and the living conditions 
become harder for the people, they are likely to blame and turn their frustrations to the 
Afghan humanitarian aid workers who they perceive as the agents or “bridge” between 
them and the international communities. 
Drawdown of U.S. and NATO Forces in 2014  
On June 22, 2011, U.S. President Barak Obama addressed the nation from the 
White House and highlighted his objectives for the surge: to send 30,000 more American 
troops into Afghanistan (Obama, 2011). The President told the American people that his 
objective was to “refocus on al Qaeda,” and to “reverse the Taliban’s momentum,” while 
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the U.S. military will focus on training Afghan forces so that they are ready to “defend 
their own country” (Obama, 2011, para. 3). He made it clear that the U.S. “commitment 
would not be open-ended” (2011, para. 3), stating that the U.S. drawdown of forces 
would begin in July 2013. “Our mission will change from combat to support. By 2014, 
this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for 
their own security” (Obama, 2011, para. 4).  
On Tuesday night, February 13, 2013 during President Obama’s State of the 
Union speech before a joint session of Congress, the president announced to the nation 
that “another 34,000 American troops” (Jackson & Michaels, 2013, para. 3) will be 
coming home from Afghanistan. The drawdown, he said will continue into the following 
year; “and by the end of next year, our war in Afghanistan will be over (Jackson & 
Michaels, 2013, para. 3). 
My participants shared their perceptions of how the drawdown of U.S. and NATO 
troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will affect the people and institutions in 
Afghanistan with dire consequences. The following are the concerns and 
recommendations that they shared. 
Gradual force drawdown to strengthen Afghan security and borders. They 
alluded to the danger of maintaining weak borders with Afghan neighbors, and asked for 
international forces to help strengthen Afghan securities forces, so that they are able to 
secure and protect the country from external interventions. Instead of a sudden pull out of 
forces, they asked for a gradual pull-out with intense training of Afghan military and 
security personnel before gradually pulling out and handing over security responsibilities, 
and eventually turning over all security enforcement when the Afghan forces are ready to 
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take control on their own and able to defend the country. One participant expressed the 
fears of most Afghans that “Afghanistan neighbors will definitely show themselves strong 
and just bring their puppets again in power.” 
My participants insisted that terrorism and insecurities in Afghanistan originated 
from outside the country’s borders with its neighbors. They blamed Pakistan and Iran for 
the interventions and pointed to jihadist training grounds in Pakistan that are known to 
train and radicalize foreign fighters that end up in Afghanistan. 
Invest and fund the civilian sectors. They asked for the international community 
to continue investing and funding the civilian sectors, particularly the humanitarian 
sectors, which they claimed has been the key engine of Afghan development. There is 
need to continue to provide uninterrupted basic needs for the most poor and vulnerable 
Afghans. They would like the international communities to continue providing advisory 
roles to the Afghan government so as to maintain good governance, law and order, and 
rid the government of corruption. Several participants talked about the Afghan 
government’s inability to care for its people. They claimed that the Afghan humanitarian 
aid workers created the “bridge” between the Afghan people and the Afghan 
governments, and argued that the people’s needs are met through the efforts of the 
humanitarian sector, not by the Afghan government. Hence, they advocated for direct 
funding of the humanitarian aid sector, to maximize services to the communities, and 
avoid dealing with what they claimed to be a corrupt Afghan government; they also 
accused the Afghan government of not having any programs that addressed the needs of 
the Afghan people, and gave examples of circumstances where the Taliban was able to 
provide help for people in rural areas where the government was not able to reach due to 
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insecurities. However, they insisted that Afghan humanitarian aid workers provided 
services in rural insecure areas, which sometimes expose aid workers to violence and 
physical dangers.  
Many participants feared that a drawdown of U.S. and NATO forces may lead to 
the closing of Afghan NGOs and humanitarian aid services that provided desperately 
needed help to Afghan communities. One participant expressed his fears of things 
returning to the past and the potential of losing what had been achieved since the arrival 
of the U.S. and NATO troops. 
In light of what has been witnessed in Iraq since the pull out of U.S. forces, it is 
very critical that these circumstances, that create conditions which lead to insecurities, are 
addressed so that systems are put in place to allow young Afghans to develop themselves 
and seek opportunities to provide for themselves and their families. One participant said 
that if a person has a job, and he or she is able to provide for their family, he or she will 
not be thinking of joining groups in Pakistan, or going to jihadist training camps in 
“Yemen” or “Kashmir, Pakistan” or “doing roadside bombing” or “blowing himself 
up.”  
According to Burton (1990), if people have no means of providing for themselves 
and satisfying their basic human needs, they are likely to seek other means that are 
outside the social norms. If the conditions that exist after the U.S. and NATO pull out 
from Afghanistan create the sense of hopelessness and despair for young men and women 
in Afghan communities, they will become easy targets for recruit into terror and jihadist 
groups. As Hamas leaders assert, poverty and the feeling of hopelessness provide 
opportunities for recruiting young jihadists (Stern, 2003). 
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Broker agreement with the Taliban. My participants asked the U.S. and 
international communities to help broker an agreement between the Taliban, the Afghan 
government, and the Afghan people, which will allow the Taliban to participate in 
Afghan political process so as to avoid backlash upon the U.S. and NATO drawdown or 
any possibilities of sectarian war. My participants claimed that the Afghan government 
forces will not be able to defeat the well-funded Taliban who control most of the rural 
communities and the Afghan borders: 
“If the government is not able to have access to the people in the village, but the 
Taliban provides them with food and money to take care of their families, they are 
going to listen to the Taliban and do what the Taliban is telling them to do.”  
One participant, even though critical of some of the actions of the Taliban, noted 
that “their regime and the time of their government was very good.” Another participant 
said that security was much better during the Taliban regime than with the U.S. and 
NATO troops. He insisted that people did not dare to steal from other people for fear of 
getting caught and the consequence; however, he noted that now, Afghanistan is insecure, 
but the people are “independent.” He said Afghans now have the right to vote, go to 
school, work, and the rights of women and minorities. 
A fundamental goal articulated by my participants is the need for “peace,” and 
some referred to it as “just peace” through education. They claimed that terrorism or the 
jihadist tendencies are not intrinsic to the Afghan culture, and argued that the sources of 
terror and jihad are foreign. However, the lack of education allowed terrorism to fester 
and grow, and so if they are “cut from their roots and not allowed to germinate,” he said, 
they can be controlled and eventually eradicated. One participant made the argument that 
222 
 
the Taliban preyed on people who were uneducated, alleging that during the Taliban 
regime, the Taliban took advantage of the people who were uneducated. Therefore, she 
said that education of men and women in Afghanistan is the key to attaining Afghan 
freedom and prosperity.  
Basic Human Needs Model  
I use the basic human needs theory advanced by Burton (1990, 1997, 1972) to 
frame and form a contextual analysis of the major themes developed from the study, and 
to understand the conditions that give rise to the destructive processes that lead to violent 
attacks and cause danger to Afghan humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan. In 
Burton’s work on structural violence and conflict causation, he warns that: 
if certain human needs are not satisfied, there will be conflict. The conflict will be 
of such a character that no suppressive means will contain it. Attempts to suppress 
it will lead, on the contrary, to exponential increases in conflict. One could go on 
to predict a total catastrophe. (Burton, 1990, p. 231) 
Even though Burton did not invent human needs theory, he is regarded by many 
conflict and international relations scholars and political scientists as one of the pioneers 
of conflict resolution and dispute studies (Sandole, 1999). Burton’s basic human needs 
theory posits the existence of certain universal basic needs that must be attained in order 
to avoid destructive conflicts in societies. He argues very firmly that when the pursuit of 
these basic needs are frustrated, and people are deprived the opportunities or the means to 
attain them, individuals will go to extreme measures in order to fulfill their “deeply felt 
needs, even death by suicide bombing or by hunger strikes” (Burton, 1997, p. 19). 
Burton’s basic human needs theory has four components that are most significant to 
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understanding destructive social conflicts, and these are the needs for: identity, 
recognition, security, and personal development (Burton, 1990, 1997). However, 
according to Burton, no model is able to “depict deep-rooted human motivations” (1990, 
p. 75). He believes that such motivations require a “conceptualization that goes beyond 
the capacity of models to describe” (p. 75). He concludes that such uses of models are 
“misleading” (p. 75), because they only bring attention to certain interactions, hence not a 
“substitute for a full analytical exposition” (Burton, 1990, p. 75). Nonetheless, for the 
sake of empirical evidence and to avoid observations that merely lead to labeling 
aggression, frustration, violence, and anti-social behavior, Burton posits the following 
hypotheses: 
If learning and social development require consistency in response, security, 
identity, and recognition, and if human behavior is characterized by learning and 
social development, then humans pursue consistency in response, security, 
identity, and recognition as a condition of their learning process. It is reasonable 
to argue, further, that organisms have a genetic drive to learn, for existence 
depends upon learning. These learning needs will be fulfilled. If recognition, 
identity of self, and some measure of control over the environment are human 
needs, then the absence of their fulfillment will lead to adaptations that restrict 
development and perhaps create abnormalities in behavior, or lead to anti-social 
behaviors. (Burton, 1990, p. 95) 
Burton’s argument is supported by Sites’ control theory (1973), in which he 
argues that the satisfaction and deprivation of individual human needs are the key sources 
of societal order and change. He insists that people will fight and risk dying to protect 
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values related to need gratification. Sites maintains that the individuals’ desire to satisfy 
their basic needs is so strong that they are willing to “step out of the real world into a 
world of their own” in order to seek the satisfaction of their basic needs or simply to 
“escape their complete frustration” (Sites, 1973, p. 10). In the same token, Burton and 
Sites agree that if individuals are not able to satisfy their needs through legal, morally, or 
socially justifiable means, they will seek other means necessary, including causing harm 
to themselves and others (Burton, 1990, p. 96). According to Burton, basic human needs 
will be pursued without regard to the consequences, even when it leads to conflict. 
Therefore, the desire for individuals to seek and satisfy their basic needs is a fundamental 
precondition for maintaining social order. He argues that any society’s ability to function 
is dependent on its individual citizen’s ability to fulfill their basic human needs (1990, 
1997). 
My participants spoke of instances when the young men and women in Afghan 
communities had no hope. They cannot take care of themselves or feed their families, so 
they said, “When the people have no hope, the number of the Taliban is increasing.” My 
participants did not attempt to defend young Afghan men and women who struggle every 
day to have their basic needs met, but instead they provided an empathetic understanding 
of the consequences of structural violence, which created the conditions that continues to 
frustrate young Afghan men and women and deny them their basic human needs. 
In an attempt to explain the conditions of structural violence as experienced by 
young Afghan men and women, one participant talked about the issues of “joblessness 
and unequal distribution of revenue.” These were the conditions that he said created 
“past skirmishes and fighting” that led to sectarian and civil conflicts in the Afghanistan. 
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Insisting that if he has a job and the ability to provide for his family, he would not be 
thinking of joining jihadist or terror groups, or doing harm to himself and other innocent 
people. He talked about the propaganda used to lure young men and women into jihadist 
terror training camps by what he called “some elements in our neighborhood,” referring 
to Pakistan—“they’re explaining that this is like a holy war. If they kill themselves, they 
will be going to Janna.”  
In Jessica Stern’s work entitled Terror in the Name of God (2003), she affirms 
that “martyrdom operations are sacred acts, worthy of both earthly and heavenly 
rewards” (p. 33). From her interviews with Hamas leaders, they acknowledged that 
poverty and hopelessness increased support for them and made recruiting for jihad easier. 
During one of her interviews, she was asked to take a look at the living conditions of the 
Palestinian people, and then she would understand “why there are always volunteers for 
martyrdom” (p. 38). One of the Hamas leaders told her that “Hardship always brings 
people back to God” (p. 38). During one of my interviews with a participant, I asked him 
what he would say to the U.S. President Obama if he had the president’s attention, and he 
simply said he would ask the president to spend half the money it would cost the U.S. to 
pull out its military troops from Afghanistan on civil development that will provide 
opportunities for Afghan people. And he said, “Just ten percent, and there will be no 
more fighting.” He believed that the main issue driving insecurity and terrorism is the 
lack of opportunities—that people are fighting because “they do not have hope”—they 
cannot see the “endless enduring dream and a thousand points of light” that the former 
President George H. Bush (1988, para.107) spoke about during his speech accepting the 
Republican presidential nomination. So my participant will ask President Obama to shine 
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some light of hope for the Afghan people to see, just as the former President George H. 
Bush (1988) likened America to “a brilliant diversity spread like stars, like a thousand 
points of light in a broad and peaceful sky” (para. 62). My participant believed that 
Afghans will choose peace, prosperity, and long life, instead of blowing themselves up.  
Identity. The issue of identity deals with how individuals navigate the pursuit of 
belonging and acceptance, sometimes sought through groups such as ethnic groups, 
religious groups, social groups, or work/professional groups (Burton, 1990). This need 
provides the feeling of belonging, which can translate to a sense of confidence and 
security knowing that one is not alone. The question of identity was never asked directly 
to my participants, and was not discussed during the interviews and the focus group 
discussions. However, one participant alluded to the fact that one of the achievements of 
the war on terror was the elimination of ethnic conflict and rivalry. He noted that prior to 
the arrival of the U.S. and NATO troops, ethnic rivalry between Tajiks and Pashtuns, as 
well as language and tribal differences used to be causes of conflict; now he said, 
Afghans have become less interested in such divisions, suggesting that the people have 
been “sensitized” as their “awareness has been raised.” They have new issues to dwell 
on that are much bigger than the individual: they worry about protecting the constitution, 
civil rights for all Afghans, and equal justice for all as they look ahead for the next 
election season to vote for someone they believe will be the best leader for all the people 
of Afghanistan. 
A key element of identity has to do with the issue of joblessness—the inability of 
young Afghans to find employment and be able to provide for their families. Burton 
(1972) alluded to role behaviors and how they affect and define the individual’s sense of 
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self. The roles individuals play in society affect how they are perceived by the society 
and people that they interact with, thereby affecting their own self-esteem and how they 
self-identify. 
The issues of jobs and employment are central to the ability of an individual to 
seek and attain their basic human need of identity. Having gainful employment provides 
the individual with a role in society that gives them the identity and self-worth, which 
leads to how they perceive themselves in society and how society perceives them. If they 
are not working, not able to provide for themselves or take care of their families, they 
may begin to look elsewhere for the diminished sense of pride in their identity. 
According to Burton (1990), they become vulnerable and susceptible to ideologies and 
propagandas in the environment because they will now do whatever it takes to fulfil those 
unmet needs, even if it means using terrorism or joining jihadist groups that promise 
them hope. 
Finally, the issue of foreign interventions from Pakistan and neighboring 
countries, which my participants claim imposed their will on the people of Afghanistan, 
were voiced frequently by my participants. One participant talked about how orders to 
release a prisoner from an Afghan jail were given from Islamabad, Pakistan. He shared 
that people referred to Afghanistan as another province of Pakistan. This erosion and 
deprivation of national identity can affect one’s ability to perceive themselves as a 
member of an independent people, therefore affecting their self-esteem. This feeling can 
also be compounded by the fact that Afghanistan has been occupied by several powers in 
recent history: once by the British, then the Soviet Union, and now by the U.S. and 
NATO troops. As Stern (2003) states in her study of religious militancy, one of the 
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dominant issues that drives Islamic militancy is pride, the shame of humiliation by the 
West. This may be a self-defeating proposition, or as a result of the conditions from 
conflicting dynamics playing out in several Islamic environments such as the Israeli and 
Palestinian conflict, or the Western invasions and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
As a result of these structural conditions, young Islamic men and women seeking to 
redeem their identities are made vulnerable in their quest to fulfil this unmet human need 
(Burton, 1990, 1997). When the conditions in the environment frustrate their ability to 
attain their basic needs, they may begin to seek other means outside the social norm, 
including violent means to express their frustrations (Burton, 1990). 
Security. Insecurity has been a critical area of vulnerability affecting the 
psychology of most Afghans for over thirty years. A nation that has seen many 
occupations, invasions, and internal civil conflicts, and has been classified by the UN as a 
complex political emergency is an environment with considerable breakdown of 
authority, requiring international response beyond the capacity of any single nation 
(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1999). Its people 
are not safe, as insurgents and jihadist groups attempt to disrupt their fragile state of 
normalcy using fear and mayhem to subject its people to ideologies that will form and 
frame their existence. 
Several participants talked about their lack of trust in the Afghan government and 
the Afghan national security’s inabilities to protect them and their families. One 
participant felt that the Afghan military was not capable of defending the country against 
military attack from Pakistan following the U.S. and NATO drawdown of forces in 2014. 
This sense of vulnerability affects not only the individual’s sense of security, but also 
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their sense of national identity. When the attainment of basic human need is obstructed 
and made unattainable, people will resort to dire measures to attain them (Burton, 1997). 
According to Burton (1990, 1997), if people do not feel safe, and have no way of 
making sure that their loved ones will be safe, many will resort to vigilante justice; they 
will seek ways to protect and shelter their loved ones even if it leads them to breaking the 
law. Individuals will go to extreme measure in order to provide safety needs for their 
family (1997). A female participant shared that during the Taliban regime, many Afghan 
women risked their lives, operating underground to sustain the women’s movement 
against the Taliban rules and knowing fully well that they could be put to death, but they 
were not deterred from fulfilling the need for the pursuit of the rights of women and equal 
protection of all Afghans under the law. They were willing to risk their lives to get 
freedom from the Taliban. 
Recognition and Personal Development. I am reminded of Burton’s assertion 
that behavior is a function of “learning and social development” (1990, p. 95). He argues 
that “if recognition, identity of self, and some measure of control over the environment 
are human needs, then the absence of their fulfillment will lead to adaptations that restrict 
development and perhaps create abnormalities in behavior, or lead to anti-social 
behaviors” (Burton, 1990, p. 95). With hope and the opportunity for self-development, 
individuals have a conducive atmosphere that nurtures and encourages the attainment of 
the basic human needs of recognition and personal development without fear of physical, 
psychological, mental, or social harm. Individuals and societies have the opportunity to 
develop environments that are free from structural violence, which frustrate the 
attainment of basic human needs, and give rise to conflicts that create insecurities. 
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Structural Violence. In earlier sections, I introduced ideas from John Burton 
(1972, 1990, 1997), Johan Galtung (1964, 1969, 1990), and Paul Sites (1973),on 
structural violence and the systematic conditions that frustrate individuals from attaining 
their basic human needs, and how the frustration and inability to attain basic human 
needs of security, identity, recognition, and personal development or self-actualization 
can push people and societies into conflicts, terrorism, and social disorder. Galtung 
(1969) defines violence as the reason for the “difference between the potential and the 
actual, between what could have been and what is” (p. 168). And cultural violence is 
defined as those attributes and characteristics that define our core essence “exemplified 
by religion, language and art, empirical science and formal science that can be used to 
justify or legitimize direct or structural violence” (Galtung, 1990, p. 291). To this end, 
my female participants were quite clear on the type of peace they seek in Afghanistan: 
just peace! They told me—the belief that all Afghans (men, women and children) need to 
be free with equal opportunities and peace for all Afghans. 
Theoretical Framework from Research Findings 
One main objective of this study was to explore the lived experiences of Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, on the war on terror, and to better 
understand the conditions that expose them to risks and violent attacks. My investigation 
led to a better understanding of the conditions that continue to give rise to the increase in 
violence, kidnapping, and killings of humanitarian aid workers in complex political 
emergencies. Using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) my data analysis generated 
six dominant themes from the storied narratives of my 10 face-to-face interview 
participants, and seven dominant themes from my focus group discussions with twenty 
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Afghan NGO directors. Originating from my research data is a new theory of 
intervention, which I have named Otubako Post 9-11 Conflict Theory. The name Otubako 
is in memory of my late father who was assassinated during the Nigerian civil war in 
1968. A family legend is that the original family name was Otubako, meaning that a 
woman’s vagina is wealth. Shamed from ridicule my father decided to change the family 
name from Otubako to Ogwude. The early Ibo custom believed that a woman that bore 
many children brought wealth to her husband’s home. 
Emanating from this theory of intervention is a model for transforming 
environments from violent conflicts to sustainable, collaborative, co-existence of its 
entire people—an environment which provides individuals the ability to seek and attain 
their basic human needs of security, identity, recognition, and self-actualization. 
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Security:  
People feel secure in their 
environment; secure borders; and 
the ability to make decisions for 
themselves and their families 
 Funding:  
Increase funding for new 
businesses; create jobs and 
opportunities; build schools and 
infrastructure 
 Trust:  
Establish good relationships with 
local people, communities, and 
governments; develop and 
communicate clear military and 
political goals/strategies 
 
Conflict Environment: 
Complex Political Emergency:  
A humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where 
there is total or considerable breakdown of authority 
resulting from an internal or external conflict and which 
requires an international response that goes beyond the 
mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the 
ongoing United Nations country programs 
 
Secure Environment: 
Where people are able to 
provide basic needs for 
themselves and their families; 
have a strong sense of identity; 
ability to seek personal 
development; and feeling of 
recognition for their 
contributions 
 
 
Improve 
efficacy 
and the 
rule of 
law  
 
 Create 
opportunities 
for all; improve 
national pride 
and identity 
 Develop 
human 
capacity; 
discourage 
brain drain 
 Improve 
collaboration 
with all parties 
and 
stakeholders - 
including 
insurgents 
 Just Peace 
– with 
equality 
for all 
 Eradicate 
hopelessness 
and the 
militarization 
of youths 
Figure 2. Illustration of Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory 
Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory 
Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory is a theory of interventions founded and 
derived from my data of storied narratives from ten face-to-face interviews and a focus 
group discussion with twenty Afghan humanitarian aid workers. The theory postulates 
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that the efficacy of interventions and their ability to transform conflict environments 
(Complex Political Emergencies) to more secure, supportive, and just environments can 
be determined by the conditions in the environments vis-à-vis the conditions that existed 
in the environments at the time of the interventions. A favorable intervention will 
produce positive conditions that are secure, supportive, and just for its inhabitants, so that 
they are able to provide basic human needs for themselves and their families. However; 
an unfavorable intervention will produce negative outcomes, which give rise to 
conditions that create chaos and insecurities in the environment—conditions of structural 
violence that deny and frustrate individuals from attaining basic fundamental human 
needs for themselves and their families. The nature of the intervention may be hostile as 
in the case of Afghanistan, or friendly as in the case of the plumber. In either case, 
Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory postulates that for interventions to be successful, the 
interveners must leave the context in conditions similar to, or better than, the original 
conditions that existed at the time of the intervention, otherwise the resulting conditions 
will lead to chaos and insecurities. 
When I asked my participants how they felt about the war on terror, in almost 
every instance the answer was: “Do not abandon Afghanistan like in the 1990s.” Many 
followed with the Afghan proverb: “When you try to lift a piece of stone, and you find 
that it is too heavy; you cannot lift it, you should kiss it and leave it in its place.” They 
said that in the beginning of the U.S. intervention, the U.S. and NATO troops knew that 
they could not lift the stone; they should have kissed it, and should not have come to 
Afghanistan. Just like the plumber who was invited into a home to repair a clogged 
kitchen sink, but creates conditions worse by damaging the garbage disposal. His 
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intervention will be deemed unsuccessful because the condition in the home as a result of 
the intervention is worse than the condition that existed prior to his intervention. In the 
same token, when the U.S. and NATO troops intervened in Afghanistan, they tried to fix 
a fragile state in disarray, but only to create conditions worse than the original state of 
disarray. Now my participants claim that the whole area of Afghanistan is “engulfed in 
fire.” They warned that since the U.S. and NATO troops have actively intervened in 
Afghanistan, they cannot abandon Afghanistan until they put out the “fire,” as former 
General Colin Powell warned that “if you break it, you own it” (as cited in Samuels, 
2007, para. 1). 
Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory postulates three ingredients: security, funding, 
and trust, necessary for transforming complex political emergencies in a post-9/11 world. 
The model begins with building security infrastructure, adequate funding for all sectors 
of society, and building trust between all groups and stakeholders, including insurgents. 
These actions, correctly executed, have the ability to transform conflict environments 
(Complex Political Emergency) into secure environments where different groups 
collaborate and individuals are able to provide basic human needs for themselves and 
their families; individuals are recognized for their contributions to society and as a result 
have strong sense of self and national identity. 
The model is configured in sections to illustrate the different components needed 
to create sustainable post-conflict environment; the top section depicts the conditions that 
must be initiated in order to begin the process of transformation. The next section is the 
context or environment that is acted upon to produce change; this change process is 
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depicted in the last section as it transforms from violent state into a more secure 
environment. 
Contribution of Study 
The primary contribution of this study of the lived experiences of Afghan 
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, is to create a better understanding of the 
conditions in Kabul as a result of the war on terror that give rise to the structural violence 
that leads to insecurities, terrorism, and Islamic militancy. I also expect that this study 
will make viable contributions to scholarly debates and lead to further investigations on 
how the conditions in complex political emergencies like Afghanistan lead to suspicion 
and mistrust that give rise to violence against humanitarian aid workers (Deutsch, 2011). 
With the escalation of conflicts in many parts of the third world, complex political 
emergencies involving several political, military, and insurgent groups which infringe on 
humanitarian space—as we have witnessed in the past twelve years, particularly in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Sudan, Liberia, Congo, Kosovo, Columbia, Palestine, and now Syria—have 
become the new framework for international conflict in the ‘War on Terror.’ As a student 
of conflict resolution, I believe that this research study will enable scholars of conflict 
and dispute studies to begin to investigate the conditions of structural violence that 
frustrate individuals from obtaining their basic human needs. For over thirty years, the 
world was warned that individuals frustrated from attaining their basic human needs will 
be willing to go to “extreme lengths to defy systems in order to pursue their deeply felt 
needs, even death by suicide bombing or by hunger strikes” (Burton, 1997, p. 19, 1990, 
1972). Sites (1973) made the argument that the satisfaction and deprivation of individual 
human needs are the key sources of societal order and change. It is my hope that this 
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research study will further this dialog and lead to more investigations on structural 
violence and the frustration and deprivation of basic human needs, as foundational to 
addressing this violent phenomenon of terrorism and the radicalization of young men and 
women. To this end, I have developed a conflict model: Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict 
Theory—a theory of the efficacy of interventions with the ability to transform conflict 
environments (Complex Political Emergencies) into secure environments where people 
are able to provide basic human needs for themselves and their families, they are 
recognized for their contributions to society, and have a strong sense of self and national 
identity. 
From the discussions I had with my participants in Kabul, a central desire 
expressed by my participants was the need to be heard. They hoped that this research 
study would provide them the opportunity to voice their opinions on issues relating to the 
war on terror, and their role as Afghan humanitarian aid workers in a conflict that some 
have referred to humanitarian aid workers as “force multipliers” (Ferris, 2010). The 
feeling was that their voices had been drowned from discussions on civil-military 
cooperation, as well as their frustration on how local Afghan NGOs are funded through 
the International NGOs. It is my hope, therefore, that the stories of these men and women 
will shed light on the dangerous and often life threatening conditions that Afghan aid 
workers endure as a result of the war on terror. It is my hope that through better 
understanding, more constructive interactions and relationships with Afghan aid workers 
will develop. 
I am hopeful that this investigation will help us better understand the true 
meanings of the past twelve years of war on terror and its impact on humanity. September 
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11, 2001 was a ‘moment of change’ that changed the nature of conflicts as the world had 
known. Groups of young men of Islamic faith flew airplanes into the World Trade Center 
buildings in New York City, killing over 3,000 men and women; such acts of terrorism 
that struck New York City, Arlington, Virginia, and Shanksville, Pennsylvania have 
significantly and, as many believe, have permanently affected the way Americans view 
themselves and the rest of the world. These new conditions are changing the nature of 
conflicts and creating a power in-balance, tilting the power balance from the U.S. 
Department of State to the Department of Defense—a new phenomenon that has changed 
the dynamics of international conflicts by giving rise to conditions that some have coined 
the “militarization of aid” (Ferris, 2010). This investigation attempts to provide 
understanding of the consequences of this military violation of humanitarian space in 
complex political emergencies. 
Using the stories of individual interviews and focus group discussions from 
humanitarian aid workers in Kabul, Afghanistan, I have sought to understand how the 
war on terror affects and impacts on aid workers and their ability to deliver and provide 
desperately needed and lifesaving aid to the young, women, and the old who are often 
victims of war and conflict. To this end, I have developed a theoretical model: Otubako 
Post-9/11 Conflict Theory—a conflict transformation model that addresses conditions 
characteristic of post-9/11 conflict environments with the aim of transitioning post-9/11 
militarized contexts into stable, more secure, and sustainable environments. It is my hope 
that this study can be replicated in complex political emergencies around the world, and 
lead to better and deeper understanding of factors which give rise to destructive processes 
in conflict management and resolution (Deutsch, 2011). I invite scholars and practitioners 
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of conflict analysis and resolution to join me in implementing and tweaking this new 
theoretical framework that promises hope for many in highly undesirable conflict 
environments around the world. 
Limitations of Study 
One of the key factors that limited this research study was what I felt was a 
narrow sampling of participants for the study. First, the participation in the study was 
limited to Kabul, Afghanistan, for obvious reasons of limited funding and concern for 
security. Being an insecure environment, I did not plan to venture into other provinces of 
Afghanistan. Even though I received several requests from Afghan humanitarian aid 
workers in other provinces who were interested in participating in the study, the risks for 
such venture seemed very high to bear with the limited funding that I had for the project. 
Second, the study was restricted to Afghan humanitarian aid workers only. It did not 
include international NGOs and aid workers from different countries working in 
Afghanistan. Also it did not include members of the military, the Afghan government 
officials, Afghan communities, and other international communities. I believe that all 
these viewpoints would have enriched and broadened the scope of discussions and the 
final analysis. However, in this particular study, a central goal was to give voice to the 
Afghan humanitarian aid workers with a focus on Kabul. Again, the participation of 
Afghan humanitarian aid in other provinces of Afghanistan would have broadened the 
scope of the study. 
Additionally, using a narrative inquiry, I would have liked to have spent more 
interview time with my participants. Possibly, a second or third interview would have 
allowed for follow-up questions and more time immersed in my participants’ 
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environment. My interviews lasted approximately one hour each, and the focus group 
discussion lasted two hours. 
Due to my limited time in Kabul, I was unable to attend events that my 
participants invited me to attend with them. These events would have exposed me to the 
different humanitarian services and activities they offered, leading possibly to the 
opportunity to meet some of the aid beneficiaries. This would have given me a deeper 
understanding of their roles and the different actors they interact with. During my visit to 
Kabul, one of the participants had inquired if I was interested in meeting other 
constituents. I believe he was referring to the possibility of interviewing Afghan 
government officials, local Afghan communities, and some insurgents. Unfortunately, the 
scope of my research was quite limited both in funding and in the capacity to execute a 
project of such magnitude in an insecure environment. 
Another area of limitation was the fact that I did not video tape the interviews and 
the focus group. By not videotaping, I missed utilizing the body language and other 
nuances that give meanings to the dialog in my analysis. I also believe that the study 
would have been more revealing with a video component. However, I am often reminded 
that Afghanistan is an insecure environment; mobility and security of individuals 
involved in such projects must be of priority consideration. 
I believe that I have attempted to faithfully represent and interpret my 
participants’ storied narratives. However, like most researchers, I am cognizant of my 
biases, points of view, political viewpoints, feelings, and personal experiences that 
influence my analysis and interpretation of the study. It is my hope that my research 
committee, peer/expert reviews, and participant validations have mitigated some of my 
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personal biases. I believe that some of my background experiences, such as growing up in 
Nigeria, helped me to understand some of the nuances and sensibilities of my 
participants, my hosts, and the context. Ultimately, the main focus of this study is to give 
voice to the storied narratives of the humanitarian aid workers who risk their lives every 
day to bring aid to needy Afghans in very insecure environments of the war on terror. In 
the end, I hope that with them I have been able to shed light for better understanding of 
the conditions in complex political environments that give rise to violence against 
innocuous humanitarian aid workers through the narratives that my participants and I 
have co-constructed together. 
Future Recommendations 
A key recommendation from this study is for scholars, researchers, and 
policymakers to pay particular attention to the frustration and deprivation of individual 
human needs as key drivers of social conflicts and the radicalization of young men and 
women around the world. I recommend that more studies be done to better understand 
these dynamics, rooted in structural violence that are denying and frustrating individuals 
around the world from their basic human needs. For this purpose, I highly recommend 
my newly developed theoretical framework: Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory of 
interventions, which can transform complex political emergencies into secure 
environments that promise hope for individuals to obtain their basic human needs of 
security, identity, recognition, and self-actualization. 
More research is also needed to explore the impacts of war on terror on complex 
political emergencies around the world, how the war on terror is impacting on local 
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humanitarian aid communities in complex political emergencies, and what can be done to 
mitigate risks of violence to aid workers in such insecure environments. 
Additionally, I believe that a study on the interactions and relationships between 
local NGOs, national NGOs, and international NGOs will shed light on constructive and 
deconstructive processes that the humanitarian aid communities have to deal with in the 
new global war on terror and offer opportunities for future integration of services. 
Lastly, for policymakers, certainly, it will not be a surprise to learn that the war on 
terror will not be won by how many bullets and bombs, or how many terrorists are killed 
by drones. This idea has been echoed on several occasions by military commanders, 
government officials, legislators, and news reporters. As one participant said, when we 
take out one terrorist leader, another person is waiting to take their place—maybe this 
time, one more brutal than the one that was taken out. The strength of terror was not in 
the leadership that was killed, but in the numbers of recruits who are radicalized and 
waiting to carry out the acts of terror. Another participant said that we have to find the 
“seed of terror” and stop it in its roots. The seeds of terror are the young men and women 
who are frustrated and deprived from their basic human needs. We must catch them 
before they are recruited and sowed for terror. If individuals are frustrated and denied of 
their basic human needs, they will go to “extreme lengths to defy systems in order to 
pursue their deeply felt needs, even death by suicide bombing or by hunger strikes” 
(Burton, 1997, p. 19). 
Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan still offers windows of opportunities that are fast 
closing. The situation in Afghanistan is still hopeful and can still be rectified. I 
recommend the following: 
242 
 
1. Help and lead negotiations with the Taliban and other insurgent groups, so that all 
the parties are represented at the table. 
2. Help and lead negotiations with Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan for peaceful and 
possible militarized border control. The goal is to stop interventions from Iran and 
Pakistan. 
3. Equip and train Afghan military and the Afghan police to be effective and 
efficient, so they can defend Afghan borders and secure peace internally. 
4. Work closely with Afghan government to improve governance and eradicate 
corruption in public offices. 
5. Help develop Afghan national infrastructure with local Afghan participation to 
build skills and human capacity. 
6. Negotiate a long term U.S. military presence to create room for stability and 
sustainable economic development. 
If Afghanistan is given a five to 10 year buffer from interference from its 
neighbors to focus on developing its infrastructures and national economy, it will be able 
to develop into a viable and sustainable economy that will provide opportunities for its 
young population, so that everyone can contribute to the growth with shared 
opportunities for all. An Afghan society that provides opportunities for its young men and 
women will no longer be a place to sow the seeds of terror. 
Conclusion 
I started this research study simply wanting to understand how people with 
desperate needs to survive would want to inflict harm on the same people that risk their 
lives to bring them the help they desperately need to survive. I have since learned from 
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my study that there are fundamental factors that create the conditions which give rise to 
such violence and hostilities against Afghan men and women (humanitarian aid workers) 
who risk their lives every day to bring desperately needed help to local Afghan families 
in insecure environments. Some might argue that these factors go back many decades, 
and I believe they will be right to make that argument, but as violent and defunct as the 
foundation was, it had not crumbled. When a plumber is commissioned to one’s home to 
unclog the sink and mistakenly damages the garbage disposal, now the condition is worse 
than when the plumber came into the home. The plumber becomes agitated and 
apologetic, and works very hard to make the bad situation right. Now the plumber has to 
turn off the water supply to the kitchen to stop the flooding, and the dishwasher is no 
longer usable. This is not a sustainable situation for the plumber and the home owner. 
The plumber calls the office to report the incident, and the office instructs the plumber to 
initiate a service order for a next day replacement at no charge to the customer. It is that 
simple: If you break it, you own it (C. Powell as cited in Samuels, 2007, para. 1). 
I reflect on an Afghan proverb shared by my participants that when one attempts 
to lift a piece of rock, and finds it too heavy to lift; one should just kiss it and leave it in 
its place. My participants were suggesting that in 2001, when the U.S. troops came to 
Afghanistan, they saw the rock that was heavy to lift, and instead of leaving it in its place, 
they decided to intervene and change the status quo. Now, according to my participants, 
Afghanistan is “engulfed in flame; they cannot leave until they put out the fire”—just like 
the plumber who could not leave the customer’s home without instituting proper 
measures to address the new condition in the customer’s home, which was created as a 
result of the plumber’s intervention, even though the plumber was commissioned. 
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Similarly, the burden of responsibility to correct and restore order in the environment still 
rested on the individual or group of individuals who intervened. 
The question that Strand (2007) posed in 2007 is still relevant. He wondered why 
the local Afghans no longer came out of their homes, excited and happy to see the 
international humanitarian aid workers when they arrived at the villages, like they did in 
the past—a very simple question, but quite complicated in the reasons why. The question 
was simply about what had happened to the trusting relationship developed with the 
Afghan communities. What had come between them to cause the mistrust? In this study, 
my participants asked similar questions: Why have they become suspicious and now 
wonder if we have guns? Why do they now see us as helpers of the foreign soldiers? I 
have learned from this study that there were several factors that complicated the 
relationships and created mistrust for the humanitarian aid workers, particularly the 
Afghan aid worker. It was not simply because of the collaborations with foreign military 
forces that made nightly incursions into local Afghan communities and homes to arrest or 
maybe kill potential or suspected terrorists, or the collaborations with the PRTs who my 
participants claimed were perceived by most Afghans to be corrupt. I believe that over 
time, the context that Strand (2007) inquired about had become “harsh.” As a result, the 
inhabitants of the context became hardened. My participants said that the Taliban are the 
terrorists; however, in the villages where people have no jobs, no opportunities to make a 
living and be able to take care of their families, the Afghan government is not able to 
provide any services to assist Afghans who live in insecure villages due to the presence 
of the Taliban. Suppose the terrorists or the Taliban have access to the people, they 
provide them with food, money, and basic needs to take care of their families. My 
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participants argued that the people are going to listen and do whatever the Taliban tells 
them or wants them to do. And in some instances, they claim that mothers have been 
brainwashed to make the ultimate sacrifices of giving their own sons to jihad, in return 
for the help they were told that Allah provided for them. One participant described the 
war on terror as “a war of intelligence” and others have called it a propaganda war. Either 
way, it is about WHAM: Winning Hearts and Minds. The idea was a correct one, but the 
implementation was flawed and ill-informed. The WHAM strategy can be re-
implemented with better focus. The jihadist and leaders of fundamentalist groups recruit 
young men and women who become radicalized through propaganda to give up their 
lives. They also convince good mothers and fathers to make the ultimate sacrifices of 
giving up their sons and daughters to blow up themselves and innocent people for the 
propaganda of a holy war and the reward in heaven (Stern, 2003). The jihadists and 
fundamentalists are currently winning this war of ‘intelligence’ or propaganda war 
because the rest of the world is fighting with drones and sophisticated military hardware. 
The little beggar boys I described in my research context are the jihadists of tomorrow. If 
systems in the context do not create conditions that will provide young men and women 
pathways to systematically transition from the streets to productive contributors of 
society, with opportunities to provide for themselves and take care of their families, this 
research study finds that innate human needs are at the core of most conflicts, and they 
must be addressed and satisfied if society is to find peaceful resolution satisfactory to all 
the parties (Burton, 1972; Sites, 1973). Further, the study finds that Afghan humanitarian 
aid workers in Kabul are exposed to risks of danger and violent attacks as a result of the 
conditions of structural violence that frustrate and deny young Afghans, as well as their 
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families, security, identity, recognition, and self-actualization (Burton, 1972, 1990; 
Galtung, 1964). 
The only way to win this war on terror is to employ all means necessary, 
including “stopping the seed of terror in its root.” As one participant told me, we must 
catch them before they are recruited and radicalized into jihad. I believe it all comes 
down to the satisfaction of the core human needs. If the conditions in the environment are 
denying young men and women their basic needs, and frustrating them from seeking and 
attaining these essential basic needs, they are going to seek their basic human needs 
elsewhere, even if it leads them into extreme dangers, including death by suicide 
bombing (Burton, 1997). 
As we ponder on the different conflicts around the world—the sectarian civil war 
in Syria; ISIS in Iraq (which are redefining the states of Iraq and Syria as we have known 
them); the struggle for national unity and identity in Ukraine; Israel’s and Palestine’s 
inability to reach a two-states solution with two nations co-existing side-by-side in peace, 
with dignity, and mutual respect for the Jewish State and the State of Palestine; Boko 
Haram in Nigeria, which continues to elude Africa’s richest and most populous nation 
with inability to provide security for its citizens and protection for young school girls 
who are abducted, abused, and sold into sex slavery; and many conflicts around the 
world, some just waiting to erupt—I am reminded of people who live in states of siege, 
which deny them of the most fundamental human needs, yet they must uphold standards 
indicative of the rich and wealthy nations whose basic needs are exceeded daily, yet they 
are judged and condemned for displaying feelings of anger and frustration. What this 
study reveals is that when people are held in conditions of structural violence that 
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frustrate and deny them of their basic, fundamental human needs of security, identity, and 
the sense of value and recognition, they will go to the extremes and employ violent 
means to satisfy their basic needs (Burton, 1997; Sites, 1973).  
My findings from this study have exposed me to new understandings, which have 
resulted in a new theoretical framework that I call Otubako Post-9/11 Conflict Theory—a 
theory of intervention, which postulates that for interventions to be successful, the 
interveners must leave the context in conditions similar to, or better than, the original 
conditions that existed at the time of the intervention, otherwise the resulting conditions 
will lead to more chaos and insecurities. When the plumber came into a home to service a 
kitchen drain, and created conditions that were worse than the original condition, which 
existed before the plumber arrived in the home, the plumber could not leave the 
environment, which had become unsustainable until he/she was able to institute order and 
negotiate a favorable plan of correction. Likewise, when the U.S. and NATO troops 
intervened in Afghanistan, and created the insecure conditions of a complex political 
emergency, the interveners must not leave the context until the conditions in Afghanistan 
are the same or better than the conditions that existed at the time of the intervention. 
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Appendix A: Face-to-Face Interview Guide 
Interview Questions to Guide the Study 
1. Tell me about your experiences – what has it been like? 
2. Where do you find the words to begin to describe this war – the impact it’s 
had on you, the Afghan community, your family, the aid community? 
3. Tell me your story – how did it all begin? 
4. Take me inside one of your typical days – you’re bringing aid to people in 
desperate need… What happens? 
5. How satisfied are you with the work you’re doing now? 
6. What is the biggest challenge?  
7. As you look back to these experiences, what do you say? Do they have 
meaning? Any hope? 
8. What is your assessment of your country’s readiness to take over military and 
political responsibilities from the U.S. and foreign forces in 2014? 
9. How did you arrive at this assessment? 
10. What are the challenges facing this country? How do you feel about it?  
11. What would you like to say to President Obama? 
12. What would you like to say to the American people? 
13. What would you say to Afghan people – your country men and women? 
 
Note: During the interviews, this researcher asked follow-up questions as needed for 
clarification in order to redirect or expand on topic. 
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Appendix B: Focus Group Discussion Guide 
Discussion Questions for Focus Group  
1. What roles do Afghan Humanitarian Aid Workers, National and Local NGOs and 
CSOs play in Afghanistan? Why should people care what they think? 
 
2. The perception is that you are already biased – your whole industry has been built 
on the War on Terror, you have benefitted immensely from the presence of the 
U.S. and International Forces in Afghanistan – isn’t it understandable, therefore, 
why your members overwhelmingly oppose the drawdown of forces in 2014? 
 
3. What are the consequences of a drawdown of U.S. and International Forces from 
Afghanistan in 2014? 
 
4. The perception is that the terrorists are not in Afghanistan. Some have argued that 
Osama bin Laden was not found and killed in Afghanistan – therefore questioning 
the activities of the foreign forces in Afghanistan, if that is so, why maintain the 
presence of the U.S. and International Forces in Afghanistan? Why are they 
needed?  
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